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Chapter 1
Introduction
The environment in which you grow up impacts the rest of your life. In
the US, higher parental income is associated with higher child income in
adulthood, higher college attendance, and lower teenage childbearing for
women (Chetty et al., 2014). In the Netherlands, 28% of children end up
in the bottom quintile of the income distribution if their parents were in
the bottom quintile as well (Van der Brakel and Moonen, 2013). Parental
income is just one way through which childhood circumstances may affect
later life outcomes. However, many factors that could explain the rela-
tionship between childhood circumstances and later life outcomes - e.g.
genetics, family stability, child health, the school the child attends, or the
neighborhood the child grows up in - may be correlated with one another.
This makes it hard to identify the contribution of each individual factor. It
is for this reason that the focus within Economics lies on measuring causal
effects : what would happen to child outcome Y in absence of childhood
circumstance X?
Estimating causal effects is difficult as there likely are many unobserved
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characteristics that correlate with childhood circumstance X. Economists
often rely on natural experiments that allow for a separation of the effect
of childhood circumstance X and these unobserved characteristics. These
natural experiments can arise from policy interventions by which rules de-
termine that some individuals are affected whereas others are not, from
regional differences, or from nature. Evidence from this literature shows
that characteristics early in life can explain a large part of the variation
in educational attainment and labor market outcomes (Almond and Cur-
rie, 2011a; Currie, 2011). These characteristics range from differences in
the prenatal environment (Almond and Currie, 2011b; Scholte et al., 2015;
Almond et al., 2018), to differences in post-birth factors, like parental in-
vestments (Bjo¨rklund and Salvanes, 2011), household budget constraints
(Becker and Tomes, 1986; Cunha and Heckman, 2007), and parental en-
rollment in social insurance (Dahl and Gielen, 2018).
Childhood circumstances are important, which implies that inequalities
that exist between children in early life may amplify in adulthood. Given
that early childhood is a crucial time for skill formation (e.g. Heckman and
Mosso, 2014), governments can allocate resources to earlier in the life-cycle
to account for differences in childhood endowments. This is particularly
important in a time of skill-biased technological change where increased re-
turns to higher education may further reinforce existing disparities (Goldin
and Katz, 2007; Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). This thesis adds to the litera-
ture by studying how three different childhood factors influence the child’s
human capital formation, and focuses on the role of family in fate.
Chapter two focuses on childhood circumstances before conception. This
chapter studies how improved socioeconomic conditions affect parental se-
3lection, i.e. which type of parents are having a child, and consequently
the child’s labor market and health outcomes in adulthood. I exploit novel
variation that arose with the end of WWII in the Netherlands. Specifically,
I use regional variation in the timing of the liberation, that caused a birth
peak in the area that experienced the largest improvements in socioecono-
mic conditions.
I combine this regional variation with the timing of the liberation in
a difference-in-difference framework. My main findings are twofold. First,
I find no evidence that better socioeconomic conditions induced by the
end of war lead to parental selection. Second, when focusing on a group
of unplanned conceptions that occurred as a response to the improved
circumstances, I find that growing up in a less stable family environment
does not lead to poorer long-term labor market and health outcomes. Given
the severity of the shock of the end of war, it is surprising that I find no
evidence of parental selection in this chapter.
The third chapter examines childhood circumstances after conception
but before birth. This chapter, which is joint work with Dr. Anne Gielen, ex-
amines whether biology, and specifically prenatal testosterone, can explain
gender differences in educational performance. It is impossible to directly
relate prenatal testosterone to educational outcomes, and therefore we ex-
ploit exogenous variation in prenatal testosterone exposure resulting from
a natural experiment in twins, where prenatal testosterone is hypothesized
to transfer in-utero from a male twin to his twin sibling. To control for
the socialization effects of growing up with a same-sex or opposite-sex sib-
ling we use a control group of closely spaced siblings whose birth dates
are at most twelve months apart. We can identify the effect of prenatal
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testosterone if socialization is similar for this group and twins.
We find that girls with a twin brother score about 7% of a standard
deviation lower on math in primary school; no effects are found on reading.
This seemingly counterintuitive effect is concentrated among children raised
in traditional families and areas. We hypothesize that adherence to the
social norm plays an important role. Our results are not just driven by
biology, but rather materialize depending on environmental factors.
The fourth chapter focuses on childhood circumstances after birth. It
studies how a preference against being in last place shapes the child’s edu-
cational outcomes. These educational outcomes are determining the track
level in secondary education, which is important given the effects of abil-
ity tracking that persist until adulthood. This chapter studies a Dutch
educational reform that merged the two lowest educational tracks. Thus,
those who would first enroll in the second-lowest track would now enroll in
the lowest track. I exploit that only children who are expected to attend
the lowest track are affected by the reform, and I analyze how the reform
impacts the variables that determine track allocation in secondary school:
(1) a track recommendation made by the teacher and (2) performance on
a high-stakes standardized test.
The results show that children who are expected to attend the lowest
track are less likely to receive a track recommendation above the lowest
track, and perform worse on the high-stakes standardized cognitive test.
The lower test score cannot entirely account for the lower track recommen-
dation. Moreover, the effects are concentrated among the child’s weakest
subject (reading or math). Also, the effects are stronger for children in fam-
ilies where last place aversion is hypothesized to be stronger. This suggests
5that children perform worse when the pressure to perform well is high, and
hence last place aversion may affect performance negatively.
This dissertation examines how three different childhood factors affect
human capital formation. It shows that better socioeconomic conditions
induced by the end of WWII in the Netherlands do not lead to parental
selection, that higher exposure to prenatal testosterone leads to lower math
test scores for girls, and that last place aversion can cause lower educational
performance. The universe of childhood circumstances that may influence
the child’s human capital formation - ranging from pre-conception factors
to factors that appear long after birth - is large, and the three factors
studied in this dissertation represent only small pieces of the puzzle of how
one’s family may influence one’s fate. However, one can only solve a puzzle
when all pieces are in the box, and hereby this dissertation brings us one
step closer to understanding which childhood circumstances are important
determinants of the child’s human capital.

Chapter 2
The end of war, parental
selection and children’s
outcomes
1
2.1 Introduction
This paper explores how the socioeconomic environment at conception af-
fects the size and composition of a cohort. Using a natural experiment
induced by the timing of the end of war, I examine whether children who
are conceived during a period of lower socioeconomic turbulence grow up
in more or less stable families, and how this affects their later life labor
market and health outcomes. Literature shows that family environment
is important for the child’s human capital accumulation (e.g. Cunha and
Heckman, 2007; Bjo¨rklund and Salvanes, 2011). Disparities early in life
may amplify in adulthood, which can be considered unfair given that a
child has no influence over its parents nor its timing of birth. If children
1I wish to thank Janet Currie, Anne Gielen and Olivier Marie for useful discussions
and support. This paper benefited from comments made by Brian Beach, Leah Boustan,
Alex Bryson, Arnaud Chevalier, Gordon Dahl, Emilia Del Bono, David Dorn, Reyn van
Ewijk, Ralf Futselaar, Emeric Henry, Hans van Kippersluis, Erik Plug, Frans van Poppel,
Maria Rosales-Rueda, Dominik Sachs, Robert Scholte, David Silver, Hannes Schwandt,
Tom Vogl, Dinand Webbink, and seminar participants at Erasmus University Rotterdam
and Princeton University. All errors and emissions are my own.
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are born to parents with different characteristics due to changes in the
socioeconomic environment, governments may want to adjust spending in
ways to account for both a changed cohort size and composition. My main
findings are twofold. First, I find no evidence that better socioeconomic
conditions induced by the end of war lead to parental selection. Second,
when exploring heterogeneity and focusing on unplanned conceptions that
occurred as a response to improved socioeconomic conditions, growing up
in a less stable family does not lead to poorer long-term child outcomes.
Fertility responds to economic conditions, and is pro-cyclical as better
(worse) labor market conditions lead to higher (lower) fertility (Becker,
1960; Ben-Porath, 1973; Lindo, 2010; Schaller, 2016). An economic down-
turn affects fertility through an income and substitution effect (Gronau,
1977). A negative income effect leads to a lower demand for children,
whereas the time-intensive nature of raising children causes a substitution
effect leading to a higher demand for children. The procyclicality of fer-
tility suggests that the income effect is larger than the substitution effect.
However, the magnitudes of both effects can differ across families, imply-
ing that economic conditions can affect both the size and composition of
cohorts. For instance, Perry (2004) shows that for total fertility, the in-
come effect dominates for women with high earnings potential, whereas
the reverse is true for women with low earnings potential. In line with this
finding, several papers demonstrate that women conceiving during times
of high economic uncertainty are negatively selected in terms of education
and health (Dehejia and Lleras-Muney, 2004; Del Bono et al., 2012; Currie
et al., 2015), which results in lower educational outcomes for their children
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(Chevalier and Marie, 2017).2 Little is known about parental selection in
a context of a more severe shock to the socioeconomic environment, which
might translate in even larger compositional changes.
This paper exploits such a large change in socioeconomic conditions,
and specifically takes advantage of an improvement in the socioeconomic
environment induced by the end of the World War II in the Netherlands.
The liberation eliminated the poor socioeconomic conditions that prevailed
in the last war years as economic recovery was fast and started right after
the war (Klemann, 2002). Also living conditions improved with the elimi-
nation of war-related uncertainties. The improved socioeconomic circum-
stances are perhaps best illustrated by the unprecedented rise in fertility
that occurred in the Netherlands in 1946 - about nine months after the
end of WWII.3 The Birth Peak represents an unprecedented and tempo-
rary increase in the birth rate of approximately 35% from 1945 to 1946. It
represents a significant amount of 37, 400 excess births,4 on 284, 000 actual
births. The peak was short-lived as birth rates quickly converged to lower
levels, suggesting that changed family formation norms cannot explain the
peak (Beets, 2011).5 The availability of rich Dutch administrative data
2Dehejia and Lleras-Muney (2004) and Currie et al. (2015) focus on economic un-
certainty in terms of unemployment rates, Del Bono et al. (2012) on job displacements,
and Chevalier and Marie (2017) on the transitional period which was characterized by
high economic uncertainty after the fall of the Berlin wall.
3Other potential explanations for the Birth Peak include a catching up of fertility
after the famine in the winter prior to the liberation, migration, and the absence and
later abundance of men are addressed in Section 2.2.4.
4The difference between the actual and the predicted amount of births. Author’s
calculations with publicly available data from Statistics Netherlands (statline.cbs.nl).
Predictions are calculated by taking the average increase in the number of births from
1941 to 1944 and extrapolating for 1945 and 1946.
5It is not uncommon for fertility to respond to changes in the socioeconomic envi-
ronment induced by war: the Netherlands faced a fertility rise 26 years earlier after the
end of the First World War, and fertility surges also arose in other previously occupied
countries after WWII (Van Bavel and Reher, 2013). Besides, within the Netherlands
dips (peaks) in fertility are observed nine months after worsening (improvements) of war
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allows me to study whether being born in a particular family affects labor
market outcomes more than 50 years later, and health outcomes more than
60 years later. This combined with the larger increase of the birth rate in
the area in which the liberation caused larger changes in the socioeconomic
environment, make the Dutch Birth Peak a particularly relevant historical
episode to use as a natural experiment.6
The regional variation and timing are exploited in a difference-in-differ-
ence framework. The results show that children born in regions that faced
a larger shock to the socioeconomic environment after the liberation - the
Children of the Birth Peak (CoBP) - grow up in smaller families, although
no effect is found on the stability of their parents’ marriage. In terms of
long-term child outcomes, CoBP are not different in terms of employment,
labor earnings, and enrollment in social insurance programs. Moreover, no
effects are found on mortality before age 65 and age 70. CoBP do have
a lower use of prescription drugs in groups relevant to the family environ-
ment, which is especially driven by a lower use of prescription drugs for
mental health problems. Thus, the cohort is not growing up in more or
less stable households, and does not have better or worse labor market
outcomes in adulthood. These findings are robust to different definitions
of the control and treatment group.
The lack of an effect found may be caused by the fact that two types
of behaviors led to pregnancies after the war: (1) couples may have de-
circumstances.
6Many countries faced an increase in fertility for some years following the end of the
war (e.g. US, Canada, France, Belgium). The birth rate in the Netherlands increased in
the year after the liberation, but quickly stabilized to lower levels (Van Bavel and Reher,
2013). Only the birth rate in England and Wales shows a similar behavior (Van Bavel
and Reher, 2013). Due to data availability and the presence regional variation I focus
on the Netherlands.
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layed fertility to better times and (2) unanticipated pregnancies may have
occurred in the wave of optimism and celebrations that prevailed after the
war. These two types of behaviors may reflect different types of parental se-
lection. Evidence shows that especially women with better socioeconomic
characteristics adjust fertility in times with higher economic uncertainty
(e.g. Dehejia and Lleras-Muney, 2004; Del Bono et al., 2012; Chevalier
and Marie, 2017). Although it is unclear that this mechanism extrapolates
to changes in socioeconomic circumstances induced by war, it might be
that the children conceived due to delayed fertility have better long-term
outcomes. Equivalently, evidence shows that access to family planning
measures like the pill and abortion, measures that can prevent unantici-
pated/unplanned births, are associated with improvements in the labor
market outcomes of children born (e.g. Gruber et al., 1999; Ananat et al.,
2009; Ananat and Hungerman, 2012; Bailey, 2013; Mølland, 2016). Hence,
children born from unanticipated pregnancies are more likely to have neg-
atively selected parents, which may result in worse long-term outcomes.
The difference-in-difference strategy would give the average differences in
outcomes. By using information on the marital states of the parents a dis-
tinction is made between these planned and unplanned conceptions. More
precisely, when focusing on a sample of first births who are born in-wedlock,
a division is made between children who were conceived in-wedlock and
children who were conceived out of wedlock (i.e. in shotgun marriages).
Given the nature of family formation norms in the Netherlands at the time,
the first group is more likely to be a product of delayed fertility, whereas
the latter are more likely to be unanticipated.
When estimating the difference-in-difference models for these sub-sam-
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ples of planned and unplanned conceptions a different picture emerges.
First, when comparing the labor market and health outcomes of planned
and unplanned conceptions, children born from unanticipated conceptions
have significantly worse labor market and health outcomes. Second, al-
though CoBP who are conceived in-wedlock grow up in smaller families no
effects are found on their parents’ marital stability. Conversely, for CoBP
born in shotgun marriages no effect on family size is found, whereas their
parents’ marriage lasts on average 5.6% shorter. Hence, within a sample
of unanticipated conceptions, those conceived during a period with better
socioeconomic circumstances, grow up in less stable households. Third,
for the samples of planned and unplanned births no effects are found on
various labor market and health outcomes beyond age 50. Summarizing,
although CoBP born from unanticipated conceptions grow up in less stable
family environments as measured by the length of parental marriage, this
does not result in different labor market outcomes and health outcomes in
adulthood.
One might be concerned that cohort effects may mask any parental
selection effects, as crowding out may negatively affect labor market and
health outcomes in adulthood (e.g. Bound and Turner, 2007; Brunello,
2010), which may drive the estimates to zero. First, controls for cohort size
on the province level are added to capture potential crowding effects in the
classroom as well as on the labor market. Second, I examine the outcomes
of the younger siblings of the studied cohorts. These siblings are born to the
same mother, but in different times, and thereby this analysis can separate
the effect of cohort-specific effects and parental selection. Based on these
tests I do not find evidence for cohort effects driving the results found.
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Further, throughout my analysis I do not find that family size affects child
long-term outcomes. Ultimately, I check how much other explanations for
the fertility rise, apart from changed socioeconomic conditions, affect the
main findings. More precisely, I focus on the influence of the famine in the
winter prior to the liberation, the absence of men during war years, and the
presence of Canadian soldiers after the liberation. The tests performed do
not find evidence for the contributions of these other explanations, and it
appears that the changed socioeconomic conditions are indeed the biggest
contributor to the fertility rise.
This paper contributes and improves the existing literature in several
ways. First, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper that ex-
ploits the end of war as a natural experiment to study parental selection
and children’s outcomes. As such, this paper contributes to the literature
on how economic uncertainty affects parental selection (Dehejia and Lleras-
Muney, 2004; Del Bono et al., 2012; Currie et al., 2015), and consequently
child outcomes (Chevalier and Marie, 2017). The change in socioecono-
mic circumstances studied in this paper is much larger than business cycle
fluctuations studied in other papers. Chevalier and Marie (2017) exploit a
shock of a similar magnitude, namely the fall of the Berlin Wall, but study
child outcomes that occur much earlier in the life-cycle (i.e. educational
outcomes in childhood and adolescence). It appears that the fertility re-
sponses that are documented to occur with changes in economic uncertainty
do not extrapolate to this particular setting. Suggesting that the influence
of the economic environment in the decision making process in the demand
for children (as outlined by Gronau, 1977) may work differently in times of
war.
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Second, this paper adds to the literature on the long-run effects of family
environment on child outcomes (e.g. Cunha and Heckman, 2007; Bjo¨rklund
and Salvanes, 2011). It focuses on how the parents’ marital stability affects
child long-term labor market and health outcomes for over 50 years. It
particularly adds to the literature on the long-run effects of being born
unanticipated (e.g. Gruber et al., 1999; Goldin and Katz, 2002; Bailey,
2006; Ananat et al., 2009; Mølland, 2016; Myers, 2017). Within the sample
of unplanned conceptions I do not find that growing up in a less stable
family environment affects long-term child outcomes. This is in contrast
with the literature that usually finds long-term effects of growing up in a
particular family. The lack of an effect found may suggest that parental
marital stability is not related to very long-term child outcomes, but not
that there is no effect of family environment on child outcomes. Similarly,
the considered outcomes are measured beyond age fifty, suggesting that any
adverse effects that may occur earlier in the life-cycle cannot be identified.
More research is needed on the effects of changed socioeconomic conditions
on different parental characteristics, on outcomes observed earlier in the
life-cycle, and on whether these results translate to other settings with
comparable large changes in socioeconomic conditions.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the institutional
background of the Birth Peak that is underlying the natural experiment
exploited in this paper. The difference-in-difference strategy is discussed
in Section 3. Section 4 explains the historical macro-data as well as the
administrative micro-data used in this paper. The results on family envi-
ronment, child labor market and health outcomes are outlined in Section
5. Section 6 explores several mechanisms that could be driving the results
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found and a conclusion is provided in Section 7.
2.2 The Dutch Birth Peak of 1946
2.2.1 The Netherlands in WWII
Germany invaded the Netherlands in May 1940 after the start of World
War II in September 1939. Clearly the Dutch were not pleased with the
German occupation, but they had no other choice than to adjust to the
new situation. The collaborative nature of the Dutch led to extra trade
with the Germans, and as a result the Dutch economy was booming in the
first 1.5 years (1940/1941) of the occupation. Unemployment disappeared,
there was little poverty, farmers and store-owners were doing well, and
companies made large profits. In these first years the Dutch barely resisted
against the German occupation. This changed when the Dutch economy
collapsed by the end of 1941. The years thereafter were characterized by
impoverishment, ‘redundant’ companies were closed by the Germans, and
employees were exported to Germany. Klemann (2002) argues that the
impoverishment that prevailed after 1941 coincided with an increase in
the resistance against the German occupation. The resistance increased
even more with the turning point of the war7 after which people started to
believe Germany would eventually loose the war.
The allied forces initiated the attempt to liberate Western Europe in the
spring of 1944. The south (Figure 2.1) of the Netherlands was liberated by
the Allied forces in September 1944. The attempt to liberate the northern
7The turning point of the war came with the losses of Nazi Germany in Stalingrad
(August 1942 to February 1943), Kursk (July-August 1943), and North-Africa (June
1940 to May 1943).
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provinces failed, and the Dutch government called out a railroad strike to
support the Allied forces in their attempt to free the nation. The occupying
forces reacted by enforcing an embargo on food transport to the densely
populated west, which caused a famine in its large cities (denoted by black
dots). A new liberation attempt was initiated by the Allied forces in the
spring of 1945, and the Netherlands was liberated on the 5th of May 1945
with the surrender of Germany.
The liberation ended five years of war, took away uncertainties associ-
ated with war times and improved socioeconomic conditions. The changed
socioeconomic environment is best reflected by the unprecedented rise in
the number of births about nine months after the liberation.
2.2.2 The Birth Peak
The yearly crude birth rate (number of births per 1000 individuals) in the
Netherlands is documented in Figure 2.2. The Netherlands is a small coun-
try and is very much depending on its international connections. Protec-
tionist policies played a big role after the First World War, and the Dutch
economy suffered. This explains, together with the onset of the Great De-
pression in the 1930s, why the birth rate was decreasing in the 1920s and
early 1930s. The Dutch government abolished the Gold standard in 1936,
which should have started economic recovery. However, as major trade
allies were forming alliances with other countries, it was hard to catch up
economically, and the birth rate remained low up until the first war-years.
The start of the war in 1939 and the invasion of the Netherlands in 1940
caused an inflow of trade from Germany, leading to a booming economy.
This economic expansion and low unemployment increased the birth rate
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right from the early war years. The birth rate kept increasing during the
war, despite the economic downturn that started around 1942. Pro-family
policies, i.e. tax benefits and child subsidies, were implemented by the gov-
ernment during the war (Klemann, 2002), which may explain the upward
trend in the birth rate.
What stands out in Figure 2.2 is the unprecedented and temporary
increase in the birth rate following the end of WWII (vertical lines) up to
30 births per 1000 inhabitants.8 The monthly number of births started to
increase rapidly from March 1946 and the largest number of children were
born in May 1946. Given that the Netherlands was officially liberated in
May 1945, the birth rate started to increase 10 months after the liberation.9
The yearly birth rate increased by 35% from 1945 to 1946, after which it
quickly returned to lower levels.10 The peak represents an unprecedented
rise in the number of children born as never before this many children were
born in a year.11,12 The quick reversal to pre-liberation levels suggests that
it cannot be explained by permanent changes in family formation attitudes
(Beets, 2011), and it is rather a response to the liberation. Although the
liberation might have been expected with the weakening of the German
occupants, the timing of the fertility response about nine months after the
8A crude birth rate of 30 is relatively high when comparing it to other countries in
the same year. A similar high crude birth rate can be observed for Poland after WWII.
Comparable but somewhat lower birth rates can be observed for Canada, Finland and
Iceland in that same year (Van Bavel and Reher, 2013).
9This is not surprising as it took until the beginning of June before all Dutch munic-
ipalities were actually free of German occupants.
10This number ignores the dip in birth rates in 1945. The birth rate increased by
approximately 29% from 1944 to 1946.
11Before 1946, the largest number of children were born in 1920, two years after the
end of the first World War (vertical lines).
12The peak cannot be explained by a late registration of children born during the war,
as this would have resulted in a rise in ‘reported’ births right after the liberation in May
1945.
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liberation suggests that it was not anticipated.
The south of the Netherlands was liberated in September 1944, where-
as the northern provinces were liberated in May 1945. Implying that if
the Birth Peak is the result of the liberation and changed socioeconomic
conditions there should be geographical differences in the magnitude of the
Birth Peak. Apart from the differential timing of the liberation in different
parts of the Netherlands it is important to take into account that dense-
populated cities in the west suffered from a famine in the winter prior to
the liberation. This allows for the identification of three different areas
which are depicted in Figure 2.1. First, the south that was liberated in
1944 and was not affected by the famine, (2) the north that was liberated
in 1945, and (3) large cities in the west that suffered from the famine and
that were liberated in 1945.
Figure 2.3 shows the fertility trends for the north (in- and excluding
the large cities in the west) and the south. What stands out is that other
than differences in the levels, the trends look remarkably similar across
regions before 1945.13,14 The magnitude of the fertility response is largest
in the north, and practically absent in the south. A simulation exercise is
done to illustrate the differences in magnitudes. When extrapolating the
growth in the number of births from 1941 to 1944 for 1945 and 1946, the
observed number of births is higher than the predicted number of births
by 17, 092 in the north (excluding famine-affected areas), and 2, 815 in the
13Historically the south is known for its Roman-Catholic denomination, whereas the
Protestant and Calvinist faith are the main religions in the north. Fertility is higher
among Roman-Catholics as opposed to other religions, and fertility is higher in rural
versus urban areas (Engelen, 2005). This explains the different levels of fertility among
the Catholic and rural south, the rural northeast, and the urban northwest.
14The areas are also different in population size. About 52.1% of the Dutch population
is based in the north (when excluding the large cities in the west), 25.6% is located in
these large cities in the west, whereas the remaining 22.3% is based in the south in 1946.
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south. Implying that the end of the war contributes to the birth rate by
3.5 extra births per 1000 inhabitants in the north, and 1.3 for the south.
The peak in the birth rate is also visible when focusing on the number of
births (Figure 2.A1).
The dip in birth rates in 1945 can be explained by the onset of the
famine. Children born in famine-affected areas are excluded from the ana-
lysis to prevent that famine-exposure is driving fertility and parental selec-
tion after the war.15 Leaving out those children decreases the magnitude
of the dip from -9.2% to -4.4%.16,17 Figure 2.4 shows the yearly percent-
age change in the number of births for north and south. The change in
the number of births followed a similar pattern in north and south prior
to 1945. What stands out is that the growth in the number of births is
particularly large in 1946 for the north (+33.0%) whereas the change is
much smaller in the south (+8.5%).
The explanation for the slight impact for the south is less straightfor-
ward. The south was liberated in 1944, and if anything a similar fertility
response would be expected to occur in 1945 given a pregnancy duration
of nine months. First, more than half of the country was still occupied
by Nazi Germany after the liberation of the south, which may lower the
responsiveness of fertility to the liberation. Second, the south was charac-
terized by a large share of Catholics who had traditional family formation
norms, which might translate in less responsive fertility.18 Third, family
15That is, all children born in large cities in the west (i.e. Amsterdam, Delft, Haarlem,
Leiden, Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht), which is about 25.6% of all births in 1946.
16An extensive discussion on the potential effects of the famine and how I deal with
this is provided in Section 2.2.4.
17The decrease in the number of births from 1944 to 1945 for the north including, and
excluding the large cities in the west.
18The Dutch Catholics had developed a certain rigor after having had a minority
position for years (Van Poppel, 1985). Out-wedlock births were highly undesirable at
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size was on average larger in the south as opposed to the north, which may
also make fertility less responsive to changes in war conditions. Hence,
the regional variation between the different regions is likely caused by a
combination of family formation norms and the fact that more than half
of the country was still occupied. The latter implying that the change in
socioeconomic conditions was probably smaller in the south at the time of
its liberation.
2.2.3 Delaying and/or celebrating?
The liberation also affected other family structure decisions, such as the
marriage rate (Figure 2.5).19 Marriage and fertility decisions were strong-
ly intertwined half-way 20th century Netherlands. Marriage took place
whenever the couple gathered sufficient material and financial resources.
Children were generally born in-wedlock,20 i.e. within a marriage, and pre-
marital conceptions were followed by shotgun marriages such that the child
was born in-wedlock. During WWII stark spikes in the number of marriages
are visible in 1939, 1942 and 1946,21 whereas a similar trend deviation for
fertility is only observed in 1946.22 Suggesting two types of behaviors that
led to pregnancies in 1946. First, individuals who got married in 1939 and
1942 (and the years in between) delayed conceptions up until after the war.
Second, the peak in marriages and fertility in 1946 suggest that premarital
the time, but the social stigma associated with a premarital conception followed by a
marriage was completely different. For Catholics both types of premarital conceptions
were unacceptable.
19The same Figure for the number of marriages is shown in Appendix Figure 2.A2.
20Out-wedlock births comprised only 2.5% of all births in 1946. The percentage of
out-wedlock births is lower in surrounding years (Statistics Netherlands).
21Regional data is missing for 1940, but on the country level a decrease in the number
of marriages is observed in 1940.
22The effect of an absence of men during war times on fertility, and hence perhaps
also on the marriage rate, is discussed in Section 2.2.4.
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conceptions, occurring in the wave of post-war optimism, led to shotgun
marriages.23 Given family formation norms in the Netherlands, it might
well be that shotgun marriages indicate that the conception may have been
unanticipated. The fertility rise appeared for marriages of both shorter and
longer duration which suggests that both mechanisms are at play (Van den
Brink, 1950).
Figure 2.6 shows the trend in maternal age at first birth by region using
the micro-data. Note that the line for the north excludes famine-affected
areas, which are plotted separately. The trends look very similar before
and after 1946 for the north and south. The trends in maternal age at
first birth can be explained by economic uncertainty, where higher (lower)
economic uncertainty leads to lower (higher) fertility (Becker, 1960; Ben-
Porath, 1973; Lindo, 2010; Schaller, 2016). Maternal age at first birth was
increasing up until the end of the war, which can be explained by the slow
recovery from the Great Depression. Bad (socio-) economic circumstances
complicate the process of marriage and childbearing as it is hard to gather
sufficient financial and material resources when unemployed. The trends
in maternal age at first birth reversed after the first post-war years. The
economic circumstances were good after the war so there were no reasons
to delay marriage. Female labor market participation increased, making it
easier to obtain sufficient resources for marriage (Van Poppel and Willeken-
s, 1982). This led to a decline in age at first birth of about two years in
the after-war years (CBS, 2012).
23These shotgun marriages were quite common in the Netherlands, respectively 11.6%
and 13.4% of marriages in the marriage cohorts of 1945 and 1946 had a birth within 6
months after marriage (Van den Brink, 1950). Figure 2.A3 shows the higher incidence
of out-wedlock conceptions after the liberation, which is driven the higher number of
shotgun marriages.
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What stands out in Figure 2.6 are the jumps in maternal age at first
birth in 1946. Maternal age at first birth can be interpreted as an indicator
for fertility delay as well as unanticipated pregnancies. Parents may have
delayed their first birth until better times. At the same time, unanticipa-
ted pregnancies are more likely to occur for single unmarried women, and
hence in first birth. A jump in maternal age at first birth is expected for
the 1946 birth cohort if women delay their first birth due to the war. This
increase may be dampened by the occurrence of unanticipated pregnancies,
which generally occur at lower ages.24 The increase is larger in the south,
which may be explained by smaller incidence of unanticipated pregnan-
cies.25 Figure 2.7 shows the number of months between marriage and first
birth, which is another indicator for fertility delay. This difference will be
larger after the liberation if married couples delayed their first birth. The
difference is increasing up until 1945 for the south, which is consistent with
their liberation in 1944. For the north, the difference in increasing up until
1946, which is also consistent with the end of the war in 1945. Suggesting
that married couples did delay their first birth until better times.
Figure 2.8 shows the trends in maternal age at second birth by region. A
jump in maternal age at second birth is visible in the north and south in the
year after their respective liberations (i.e. 1945 for the south and 1946 for
the north). Hence for second births, in which parents were probably already
married, there is a fertility response in the year right after the liberation.
Suggesting that parents delayed second births until better times, and given
that they were already married they could start right away. This might
24Maternal age at first birth in 1946 is 4.7 years lower for shotgun marriages as opposed
to in-wedlock conceptions (22.8 versus 27.5) in the marital sample (P = 0.000).
25Also women in the south were on average older when having their first child, and
thereby pressure to have a child after the war may have been higher.
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also explain the absence of a fertility response for first births in 1945 for
the south. As mentioned before, the south had very conventional family
formation norms at the time due to its mainly Catholic denomination.
Suggesting that fertility is less responsive because children were conceived
within marriage.
Together the evidence above illustrates that (a) the trends in fertility in
north and south were very similar before 1945, (b) the fertility rise in the
north was sudden, temporary, and of unprecedented magnitude, and (c)
the trends in the marriage rate, maternal age at birth, and the timing from
marriage to first birth suggest that both delayed fertility and unanticipated
conceptions played a role during the Birth Peak.
2.2.4 Explaining the Birth Peak
Four potential explanations for the Birth Peak are: (1) the catching up after
the Hunger Winter, (2) migration, (3) the relative absence and later abun-
dance of men, and (4) improved socioeconomic conditions. The changed
socioeconomic conditions after the liberation seem to be the greatest con-
tributor to the fertility rise and are the focus of this paper. The relative
importance of each explanation and strategies to deal with potential prob-
lems are discussed below.
‘Catching up’ after the famine
Large cities in the west of the Netherlands suffered from the Hunger Winter
in the winter prior to the liberation. A lack of food affects the ability to
conceive. To illustrate, during the famine 16% of women had irregular
menses (Elias et al., 2007) and half of Dutch women were not menstruating
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during the famine (Roseboom, 2010). Additionally, women who lost a child
during the famine may be more likely to bear another child after the famine
(e.g. Nobles et al., 2015). Hence, the fertility response after the liberation
could be perceived as a ‘catching up’ of fertility after the famine. However,
it cannot be the primary explanation for the peak. Figure 2.3 shows a
fertility rise even in absence of the large cities in the west.
The famine could be problematic for the set-up of control and treat-
ment groups. If women in famine-affected areas are more likely to have
experienced conception difficulties during the famine, or if maternal health
is affected by the famine, this may impact parental selection and the out-
comes of their children. Therefore, children born in exposed areas, i.e.
those born in the large cities in the west, are left out of the treatment
group. Leaving these children out will likely capture most of the potential
effect of the famine on subsequent fertility. Food rations show that the
famine only played a role in the west (Table 2.A1). Within the west, only
urban areas suffered as people could produce food themselves on the coun-
tryside. To illustrate, when people in The Hague and Leiden were starving,
villages nearby were much better off (Stein et al., 1975). Similarly, mor-
tality during the famine was specifically high for males in the urban west,
whereas mortality in the rural west and the rest of the country was very
comparable (Ekamper et al., 2017). Hence, dropping children born in large
cities in the northwest will probably eliminate the impact of the famine.26
However, Figure 2.3 shows a small dip in fertility even when leaving out
these cities. I execute robustness checks in which I leave out all children
26In their study on the in-utero impact of the famine Scholte et al. (2015) and Stein
et al. (1975) children are exposed to the famine if they are born in these large north-
western cities.
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conceived during the famine which does not change the results.
Migration
Migration could be responsible for the Birth Peak in the north especially
if pregnant women moved to the north. Freely moving across the country
was difficult during the German occupation, but also right after the lib-
eration. The infrastructure suffered as roads, railroads, and bridges were
destroyed during the war. This is particularly important as the northern
and southern provinces are separated by rivers, and bridges were key means
of transportation from the south to the north. Figure 2.9 shows net migra-
tion27 per 1000 inhabitants by region.28 If migration was the main driver of
the Birth Peak in 1946 one would expect positive net migration in the north
(excluding the big cities in the west), which is not the case when looking
at Figure 2.9. Hence, it is unlikely that migration is driving the fertility
rise. Moreover, Figure 2.3 controls for migration by taking into account the
average29 yearly number of inhabitants in the region in the denominator,
and the presence of a peak suggests that migration cannot be the main
driver. Migration might especially pose problems for famine-affected areas,
which is shown in Figure 2.9 as the line including these areas shows a net
inflow of people after the war, as this is where circumstances were worst
prior to the end of the war. For other reasons discussed above children
born in famine-affected cities are left out of the analysis, which would also
address this potential issue.
27The number of immigrants minus the number of emigrants.
28A figure with net migration (not per 1000 inhabitants) is shown in Appendix Fig-
ure 2.A4.
29The average of the number of inhabitants at the beginning of the year and the
number of inhabitants by the end of the year
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From absence to an abundance of men
The absence of men during war-years can lead to lower fertility as con-
ceiving is hard when men are away, and similarly their return might cause
an increase in conceptions.30 There was basically no mobilization of the
army in the Netherlands, as the Dutch army fought for four days only.31
However, forced labor did generate a big loss of young and fit manpower
(Stein et al., 1975). About 531,000 men were recruited for forced labor in
Germany during the war years, and approximately 8,500 died (Krimp and
Kemperman, 2015).32 Considering that the population of the Netherlands
aged between 20 and 45 in 1945 was about 3,462,000, and by assuming
a sex ratio of 0.5, this would give an approximation of 1,731,000 men in
childbearing ages. Hence, about 31% of men in ‘childbearing ages’, i.e.
aged between 20 and 45, were in forced labor at one point during the war.
Even though forced labor entailed a considerable temporary loss of men
in childbearing ages, there is no indication for a non-proportional withdraw-
al of men across the country prior to the winter of 1944. Especially men
working in companies that were closed by the Germans, and those in spe-
cific age-categories were called up for forced labor (Sijes, 1990). The fall
of 1944 was characterized by raids that took away a significant amount of
men in especially the cities of Rotterdam and The Hague (to illustrate, in
Rotterdam about 50,000 men were taken away in November 1944). Child-
30The relatively abundance of men, i.e. the sex ratio, also interacts with fertility. High-
er sex ratios lead to better bargaining positions for males (Angrist, 2002; Abramitzky
et al., 2011; Bethmann and Kvasnicka, 2013; Porter, 2016).
31They fought from 10 to 14 May 1940 and 2,200 to 2,300 soldiers were killed in action.
32Other war casualties in the Netherlands include about 100,000 Jews, 16,000-25,000
victims from the Hunger Winter, 50,000 deaths due to lower public health, 30,000 civilian
casualties of war, and 23,000 civilian casualties of the liberation (Krimp and Kemper-
man, 2015).
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ren born in these two cities are left out of the analysis to prevent that the
absence of men is driving the fertility response after the liberation. Overall,
it is unlikely that the absence of men is driving the fertility rise in 1946
as even though many men were away during the war, fertility was still in-
creasing during the war and responding to changes in war circumstances
(Figure 2.11).
Another explanation that has been put forward for the post-WWII
baby-boom in the US is increased female labor force participation during
the war due to the absence of men (Doepke et al., 2015). Women who were
sufficiently old to work entered the labor market during the war and gained
labor market experience. After the war, younger women with less labor
market experience were crowded out of the labor market, especially with the
return of the men. Fertility was an outside option for these younger women,
and the birth rate increased for them. For the Netherlands this explanation
seems very unlikely. First, women did not disproportionately enter the
labor force. And second, the Dutch fertility response is driven by older
women, which is in contradiction with this hypothesis (see Figure 2.A5).
After the war there was not only an inflow of Dutch men back into the
country, there was also an inflow of Allied forces soldiers into the country.
The Netherlands hence moved from an absence to a relative abundance of
men. The festivities with the Canadian Allied forces led to the birth of
approximately 7,000 ‘libertarian babies’ (estimate from Okkema, 2012).33
The majority of these babies were conceived after the liberation of the
south, which explains the higher number of out-wedlock births in 1945 as
33Soldiers from the US, the UK, and Poland also contributed to the liberation. How-
ever, the focus of Dutch media solely on the involvement of Canadian soldiers with
Dutch girls, suggests that the others played only a minor role.
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opposed to 1946 (see Figure 2.A3). A conservative estimate of the amount
of babies born to the Allied forces in 1946 would be half of the total amount
born to the soldiers, 3,500. This is 1.2% of the total amount of births
in 1946, and 9.4% of the number of excess births (i.e. 37,400). Hence,
the presence of the Canadian soldiers increased births but cannot be the
primary explanation of the Birth Peak. The mechanisms section explores
the sensitivity of the results to the presence of the Canadian liberators by
exploiting two strategies. First, the analysis is run with children conceived
after the largest departures of Canadian soldiers. Second, children born in
municipalities with closer proximity to the Canadian soldiers are left out
of the analysis.
Improved socioeconomic conditions
Fertility is affected by economic uncertainty as better (worse) econom-
ic conditions lead to higher (lower) fertility (Lindo, 2010; Schaller, 2016;
Chevalier and Marie, 2017). The Dutch economy was not doing well after
the Great Depression in the 1930s. The start of the war initiated trade
with the Germans which improved economic conditions. Figure 2.10 shows
the trends in GDP from total production and industrial employment. The
Dutch economy was doing well in the first 1.5 years of the occupation but
eventually collapsed by the end of 1941, which is shown by declines in in-
dustrial employment and GDP between 1942 and 1945. Post-war economic
recovery was fast and kicked in right after the war.
Bad economic conditions caused the birth rate to remain low after
WWI and recovery started with the improved economic conditions in the
first years of the occupation. The birth rate remained high during the
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war, which may be explained by the pro-family polices implemented at
the time. The end of the war came with improved economic conditions,
but the effect on society may have been even larger. The liberation did
not only improve economic conditions, but entailed a change in socioeco-
nomic and living environment as times of war were over. The initiator of
WWII and the leader of Nazi Germany had committed suicide and the
war was over. Even though combat action did not affect all civilians, the
war was associated with poor nutrition, and high stress levels due to the
risks of persecutions, bombings or combats (Lindeboom and Van Ewijk,
2015). These uncertainties were eliminated with the end of the war. The
significance of the change in socioeconomic conditions that came with the
liberation is illustrated by peaks in fertility that occurred earlier for coun-
tries that were not affected by the war. This recovery took place after the
end of the war for involved countries, suggesting that the liberation was a
sufficiently large shock to the socioeconomic environment (Van Bavel and
Reher, 2013). This is confirmed by the timing of the fertility rise about
nine months after the liberation.
The responsiveness of fertility to socioeconomic conditions is also demon-
strated by the monthly crude birth rate (Figure 2.11). There are drops
in fertility nine months after the start of the war in September 1939, nine
months after the German invasion, nine months after the February strike of
1941, and nine months after the Hunger Winter of 1945/55.34 Birth peaks
were observed in March 1945 (nine months after the invasion of the Allied
forces in Normandy), and about nine months after the liberation. Both
34The fertility dip after the famine in 1945 seems to be balancing the fertility rise in
1946. However, this picture does not take into account regional variations in the fertility
rate, as these are unfortunately unavailable.
30 CHAPTER 2. PARENTAL SELECTION
birth peaks can be explained by optimism surrounding the expectation of
favorable war circumstances (CBS, 2012). The general responsiveness of
fertility to changes in war circumstances together with the timing about
nine months after the liberation suggest that changed conditions were driv-
ing the 1946 Birth Peak.
2.2.5 What about the ‘marginal child’?
The ‘marginal child’, the child that would not have been born in the absence
of post-war optimism, could be different from the average child through
two mechanisms. Section 2.2.2 established that the fertility rise is driven
by both delayed fertility and unanticipated conceptions. Parents who de-
layed fertility are likely different from those who faced an unanticipated
conception, and so may be their children’s outcomes. First it is important
to stress that parental selection after the war is not driven by the avail-
ability of medical care. The medical sector expanded during war years.35
Equivalently, the number of perinatal deaths and stillbirths is not higher
for the 1946 cohort, whereas child mortality is somewhat elevated (Fig-
ure 2.A6). This suggests that health care conditions were sufficient, and
that parental selection is driven by choices instead of available care. If
anything the higher prevalence of child mortality would hint at negative
parental selection for this cohort.
First, the bad socioeconomic circumstances that prevailed during the
last war years, together with the expectation that the Germans would even-
tually be defeated after the turning point of the war could cause parents to
35The number of doctors, dentists and midwifes increased from 1938 to 1942 by re-
spectively 5%, 28% and 10%. In 1948, 22% more people were employed in the medical
sector as opposed to 1938.
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delay fertility until after the war. Previous literature on parental selection
and economic uncertainty shows that women with better socioeconomic
characteristics are more likely to respond to economic uncertainty by ad-
justing fertility (Dehejia and Lleras-Muney, 2004; Del Bono et al., 2012;
Currie et al., 2015; Chevalier and Marie, 2017). This would imply posi-
tive parental selection for parents who delayed fertility during the war, and
consequently better long-term outcomes for the ‘marginal child’. However,
during a war it is unclear who is delaying fertility. It is hard to survive
with the available means, and people had to use their assets to survive.
Richer individuals have greater resources than poorer (in terms of money
and goods) to exchange for necessary goods, which might lead to a larger
impact of the war on individuals from lower socioeconomic strata during
the war. However, the low social classes (i.e. laborers) were not necessar-
ily worse off as they often started trading on the black market (Klemann,
2002). Hence, it is not a priori clear who is delaying in times of war.
Apart from the ambiguity of the interaction of war circumstances and
parental selection, fertility delay is not by definition good for the child.
Older mothers biologically have a higher probability on adverse pregnancy
outcomes (e.g. Abdalla et al., 1993; Gianaroli et al., 1999; Pellicer et al.,
1995; Ananth et al., 1996; Stein and Susser, 2000), which may also impact
the child’s later life outcomes. These adverse health outcomes become ap-
parent beyond certain age, likely around age 33-35 (e.g Royer, 2004; Miller,
2011; Bratti and Cavalli, 2014). This biological channel will likely only play
a minor role in this paper, as the margin of later motherhood is centered
around age 27 (see Figure 2.6 and 2.8). Additionally to take into account
any biological concerns, I control for maternal age at birth in the empirical
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strategy. Hence, the biological channel will likely not affect the results.
Similarly delaying fertility might be good as it provides women with the
opportunity to invest in their human capital before childbirth which im-
proves labor market outcomes (Miller, 2011; Bratti and Cavalli, 2014), and
can be beneficial for the child (Miller, 2009). However, this channel mainly
works through increased parental resources and home stability induced by
delayed fertility (Fergusson and Woodward, 1999). This channel may play
a smaller role in the studied time period as human capital accumulation
may be complicated during war times, and either way female labor force
attachment was very low in the 1940s/1950s.
Second, immediate post-war optimism could lead to unanticipated con-
ceptions. Women might get pregnant in the wave of optimism that pre-
vailed right after the war without well considering the consequences. This
is especially relevant there was no access to oral contraceptives at the time,
and induced abortion was illegal. Despite the availability of other (less
effective) contraceptives (i.e. rubber condoms and periodic abstinence)
unintended conceptions were prone to occur, and prone to end up as un-
anticipated/unplanned births. Earlier literature shows that children whose
mothers got (improved) access to abortion, a measure that can prevent un-
anticipated/unplanned births, have better living circumstances and adult
labor market outcomes (Gruber et al., 1999; Ananat et al., 2009; Mølland,
2016). Similarly, improved access to the pill provided women the ability
to plan pregnancies and is associated with a lower number of unwanted
births (e.g Goldin and Katz, 2002; Bailey, 2006; Myers, 2017). The diffu-
sion of the pill led to positive parental selection in the longer-run (Ananat
and Hungerman, 2012), which extends towards better educational and la-
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bor market outcomes for their children (Bailey, 2013). The micro-data
shows that marriages of parents who conceived in-wedlock lasted on aver-
age 7 months longer than marriages of parents who conceived out-wedlock
(P = 0.000).36 Suggesting that children born in the latter marriages may
grow up in a less stable household environment. Unanticipated pregnancies
are hypothesized to be associated with negative selection into parenthood,
and the ‘marginal child’ would have worse characteristics on average.
Last but not least, when studying child adult outcomes in this particu-
lar setting it is important to take into account that the studied cohort may
not only be different in composition, but is for sure different in size. Evi-
dence shows that cohort size may negatively affect a cohort’s educational
and labor market outcomes (e.g. Bound and Turner, 2007; Brunello, 2010).
For the Birth Peak cohort, the entrance of large groups of pupils into pri-
mary schools led to large classes (48 to 50 students were not uncommon in
primary school). The cohort entered the labor market in the 1960s. Un-
employment was low because the cohort’s labor market entrance coincided
with a large demand for labor, and staying longer in school became a new
option (Schuyt and Taverne, 2004; CBS, 2012). The large size of the cohort
is hypothesized to negatively affect adult outcomes. Section 2.6.1 discusses
two methods to separate parental selection effects from cohort size effects,
and based on these tests I find no evidence for cohort effects.
36Based on in-wedlock births in 1946 who are observed in the marital data.
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2.3 Empirical strategy
2.3.1 Parental selection during and after WWII
This paper examines how improved socioeconomic circumstances at con-
ception affect the size and composition of a cohort. It exploits regional
differences in the timing and magnitude of changed socioeconomic induced
by the end of WWII in the Netherlands as a natural experiment. The
geographic variation allows for an application of a difference-in-difference
strategy to examine parental selection and consequently the outcomes of
their children. Studies investigating historical events often compare child-
ren born before and after the event to children exposed to the event (Lumey
et al., 2011). It is more complicated in this setting as children born be-
fore 1946 are exposed to the war. Parental selection will likely be different
during the war, directly after the war, and when the situation is back to
normal. A hypothetical representation of parental selection responses to
war circumstances and their expected effects on child outcomes are depicted
in Figure 2.12. The timing in the figure corresponds to the month and year
of birth of the child, and for convenience assumes a pregnancy duration of
nine months.
The ratio of child outcomes (k) increases with positive parental selection
in the north, i.e. if child outcomes improve in north versus south, and the
other way around. The ratio is constant in segment A, as both areas are
exposed to war and experience similar parental selection. Part B represents
the situation after the liberation of the south in September 1944. Ratio
k declines when assuming positive parental selection for the south in this
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period.37 The post-war conceptions are represented by segment C. When
assuming positive parental selection for the Birth Peak cohort, ratio k
would increase with better outcomes for children in the north. Ratio k
returns to its steady-state in segment D.
The main test resulting from Figure 2.12 is comparing segment A and B
to segment C. As this paper studies how an improvement of socioeconomic
conditions shapes parental selection and children’s outcomes, the relevant
test is to compare children on the margin from worse to better circum-
stances, that is before and after the liberation. The identification strategy
accounts for other war events that can affect parental selection after the
liberation. Segment C and D are compared in a robustness check. Both
cohorts born after the war are exposed to better socioeconomic conditions,
for the latter group no Birth Peak is observed. The first test captures the
influence of changed socioeconomic conditions at conception on the size
and composition of a cohorts.38
2.3.2 Identification strategy
In my analysis I exploit the end of war as a natural experiment that caused
an exogenous shock in socioeconomic conditions that induced a shock in
the birth rate. The temporary nature of the shock allows for an identifi-
cation of the cohorts born before and after the liberation. Furthermore,
a larger effect on the birth rate is observed in the area in which the lib-
eration caused larger changes in the socioeconomic environment. Hereby
the liberation had a large effect on the birth rate in the north, whereas
37This figure ignores parental selection caused by the famine as children born in
famine-exposed cities are left out of the analysis.
38At the same time, selection into the sample after the Birth Peak (e.g. those born in
1947/1947) may be affected by fertility decisions of parents during the Birth Peak.
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there was barely an effect on the birth rate in the south. The south serves
as a natural control group, and controls for a shared macro-environment
that may affect the long-run outcomes of the studied cohorts. I employ a
difference-in-difference strategy in which I compare cohorts born before and
after the liberation, where the latter are exposed to a better socioeconomic
environment, in the north and south. The birth rate started to increase
from March onward and remained fairly high up until September 1946 as
is shown in Figure 2.12. Therefore, the Birth Peak cohort is defined as
born between March and September 1946.39 The control groups contains
children born between January 1944 and February 1946. As of the limited
influence of the Birth Peak in the south, I can credibly estimate the effect
of the fertility shock while controlling for common cohort-specific effects
that may affect long-term child outcomes.
Equation 2.1 is estimated for different outcome variables yirt, where
subscripts refer to individual i born in region r, and month/year t. The
labor market outcomes of interest are labor force participation, earnings
and enrollment in any disability insurance scheme in 1999. The health out-
comes of interest are indicators for mortality before age 65 and 70, and an
indicator for whether the individual had any prescription drugs for diseases
related to the individual’s lifestyle (i.e. mental health, cardiovascular, res-
piratory, and diabetes) in 2006.40. Equation 2.1 contains an indicator for
being born in the Birth Peak cohort (March-September 1946) (BPit), an
indicator for being born in the North of the Netherlands (Northir), and
their interaction indicating that the child is born in the north during the
39Robustness checks with respect to the choice of this definition are provided in Sec-
tion 2.5.4.
40More information on the outcome variables is available in Section 2.4.2.
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Birth Peak and hence is considered a Child of the Birth Peak, henceforth
CoBP (CoBPirt).
41 An indicator for birth in the time period between the
liberation of south and north is added (LibSoutht). Linear and quadrat-
ic region-specific age trends are added to take into account region-specific
age profiles in outcomes. For example, individuals in different regions may
sort into different occupations, i.e. the agricultural south and more urban
north. Vector Xi contains individual-specific controls, standard errors (irt)
are clustered by month of birth and region.42
yiprt = γ0 + γ1BPit + γ2Northir + γ3(CoBPirt)
+γ4LibSoutht + f(MoB, Y oB)ir + Xiδ + irt
(2.1)
First, it is important to note that the studied cohorts were all subject
to the same educational system, as there were no educational reforms up
until 1968 (Dodde, 1983). Likewise, fertility after the war is not driven
by the availability of medical care. However, a potential concern with the
aforementioned identification strategy is that it is hard to eliminate the
impact of other war events on fertility and parental selection. Although
children exposed to the Hunger Winter are born from February 1945 to
December 1945 (Scholte et al., 2015), i.e. before the Birth Peak, there
might be responses to famine circumstances that might affect fertility and
selection after the liberation. To exclude any potential confounding by the
Hunger Winter all children born in famine-exposed cities (more than 40, 000
inhabitants in 1944)43 are excluded from the treatment group. Second, to
41Hence this indicator represents BPit ∗Northir.
42Equation 2.1 is estimated by OLS for the ease of interpretation, but results are
robust to the use of binary probit models. Results are available on request.
43This is treatment definition of famine-exposure used in Scholte et al. (2015).
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exclude that the earlier liberation of the south is differentially affecting
fertility across areas, an indicator for births within this time-interval is
added to the specification. Section 2.5.4 shows that the results are robust
to excluding all children who are conceived during the famine, and during
the liberation of the south.
Equation 2.1 cannot distinguish between delayed fertility and unantici-
pated conceptions, and rather gives the average effect of being born in this
Birth Peak cohort. By using information on the marital status of the par-
ents, a distinction is made between children who are conceived in-wedlock
and those who are conceived out of wedlock. More precisely, to take in-
to account potential premature births, children born within seven months
after marriage are defined as in-wedlock conceptions. The difference-in-
difference model is estimated separately for first births who are born in
wedlock, where a distinction is made between in- and out-wedlock concep-
tions. The first are more likely to be a product of delayed fertility, whereas
the latter are more likely to reflect unanticipated conceptions.
Another worry is that it is hard to distinguish between the effect of
cohort size and cohort composition, especially when studying the child’s
outcomes in adulthood. Two tests are done to explore the effect of cohort
size on the results. Firstly, a control variable for the size of the child’s
birth cohort at the province level is added to the specification to account
the potential effects of cohort size. The province level size of the birth
cohort is a reasonable proxy for capturing cohort size considering the low
residential mobility of the Dutch. Secondly, a stronger test is performed in
which I examine the outcomes of younger siblings. Given that these younger
siblings are born to the same mother, but in a different time, parental
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selection effects can be separated from cohort effects (see Section 2.6.1).
The key assumption of a difference-in-difference strategy is that the
trends in outcomes, for both treatment and control, would be the same
in absence of treatment (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). This paper is about
parental selection, and it is of primary interest to check that parental char-
acteristics in north and south exhibit similar pre-trends. Figure 2.6 shows
that the trends in maternal age at first birth are very similar in north and
south prior to 1946, and Figure 2.8 shows a similar picture for age at second
birth prior to 1945. Figures 2.A9 and 2.A10 show pre-trends at the child
level for labor market and health outcomes. Pre-trends look very similar for
the outcomes considered prior the last war years. I also test the common
trend assumption for parent and child outcomes more formally. Following
Autor (2003) I estimate Equation 2.2. The outcome of interest (y) of in-
dividual i born in year t and region r is regressed on a set of region fixed
effects (λr) and year fixed effects (δt), standard errors are clustered by birth
month/year and region. Indicators Dit represent interactions between the
treatment variable, i.e. born in the north, with birth year (ranging from
1941 (j = −5) to 1950 (j = 5) where 1940 is the reference category). The
common trend assumption holds if parameter estimates for earlier years are
not significantly different from zero. The results are reported in Table 2.A3
and 2.A4. I find no evidence for differences in pre-trends on the parental
level and on child level in the years prior to the last war years.
yirt = λr + δt +
+5∑
j=−5
βjDirt + irt (2.2)
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2.4 Data
2.4.1 Macro-data: historical regional demographics
Province-level demographics and monthly fertility data dating back to be-
fore WWII are retrieved from the historical collection of Statistics Nether-
lands (available at historisch.cbs.nl). This online portal contains scans of
the original publications from the archives, and I digitized the data in these
records manually. Information on the monthly crude birth rate is available
in the Statistics of Population Development records (Statistiek van de Loop
van de Bevolking, 1938, p45 ). Municipality level data on the number of
live births, population at the beginning and end of the year, migration,
and number of marriages is available in the records that document popu-
lation development by municipality (Loop van de Bevolking per Gemeente,
1930-1950 ).
With the above mentioned data I calculate the crude birth rate in year
t as the number of live births per 1000 inhabitants.44 For migration I
calculate net migration (incoming minus outgoing) per 1000 inhabitants
in year t.45. The average population is the average of the population on
January 1 and the population on December 31.46
44CrudeBirthRatet = (
LiveBirthst
AveragePopt
) ∗ 1000
45Migrationt = (
NetMigrationt
AveragePopt
) ∗ 1000
46AveragePopt = (
PopulationJan1,t+PopulationDec31,t
2 )
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2.4.2 Micro-data: administrative individual-level
data
Administrative data for the Netherlands is obtained from Statistics Nether-
lands47 in which individuals are uniquely identified by a Random Identi-
fication Number (RIN). Due to the nature of the data, two samples are
set up. First, an unrestricted sample in which individuals are observed if
they are alive and registered in a Dutch municipality by 1995. Second, a
restricted sample in which individuals are observed if the individual and its
mother are alive and registered in a Dutch municipality by 1995. The unre-
stricted sample is larger, but more limited in the availability of information
on household characteristics as compared to the restricted sample. The re-
stricted sample contains a different set of individuals (selective sample),
which is exploited to study sample selection.
A conceptual framework for ‘culling’
This paper focuses on labor market and health outcomes in adulthood (I
observe labor market outcomes when the studied cohorts are aged 51 to
55). Any study that examines the long-run effects of historical events,
and especially those that occur before birth, copes with selectivity of the
survivor population. This paper considers selection into parenthood, but
there may be additional selectivity of the survivors, i.e. which children are
born alive, and survive until adulthood. This is often referred to as ‘culling’.
Culling is important when studying the long-term effects of pandemics and
disease (e.g Almond, 2006; Mamelund, 2006), as the survivors are probably
47Statistics Netherlands provides non-public microdata which can be accessed remote
access after signing a confidentiality agreement.
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in better health. Negative parental selection may also lower the child’s odds
of survival onto later ages. The interaction between parental selection and
mortality can be formalized in a latent variable framework.
Let h∗i denote the unobserved characteristics of individual i (following
Almond, 2006). The individual’s unobserved characteristics h∗i are a func-
tion of their own unobserved characteristics (e.g. genes) c∗i , and parental
quality pj.
h∗i = f(c
∗
i , pj) (2.3)
Higher levels of h∗i are associated with larger odds of survival to later
ages, up to the point that individuals are observed in the data (denoted by
T ). If h∗i falls below a threshold level d, the individual does not survive until
adulthood. The mortality rate prior to adulthood (before T ), denoted by
Early Mortality Rate (EMR), can be defined by the cumulative distribution
function F (h∗i ):
EMR ≡ F (d). (2.4)
The survival rate (SR) for individual i at time T , i.e. those that have
survived until adulthood, is then given by:
SR ≡ 1− F (d). (2.5)
I assume that early life mortality (i.e. before T ) is most likely to occur
for those individuals with lower h∗i . Implying that, conditional on hav-
ing survived until adulthood and by assuming that lower h∗i coincides with
lower ability, their outcomes would have been worse compared to the indivi-
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duals who are observed in the sample.48 Due to this selection, the estimated
effects of parental selection are biased upwards, i.e. be less negative in case
of negative parental selection or more positive in case of positive parental
selection.
The selectivity is more complex for the restricted sample, when condi-
tioning on the survival of the mother until year T . Let pj denote parental
characteristics of mother j, which are a function of unobserved parental
quality q∗j , and maternal age at birth aj.
pj = g(q
∗
j , aj) (2.6)
Parental quality is a proxy for unobserved factors contributing to the
mother’s survival until T . Age at birth mechanically lowers the odds of
survival as the probability of death (before T ) increases with age at birth.
Higher levels of pj are associated with larger odds of survival. pj is in-
creasing in parental quality q∗j and decreasing in age at parenthood aj.
Hence:
∂pj
∂q∗j
> 0 and
∂pj
∂aj
< 0. (2.7)
Parents die before year T if pj falls below threshold level e. The indi-
viduals who are alive by T and whose mother is alive by T are different
from those whose mother has died. They can be different as (1) lower qual-
ity parents died in which case average h∗i will be higher, (2) older parents
died, and when assuming that these parents have better characteristics, h∗i
48With the data I have it is not possible to examine the selectivity in the survivor
population. However, section 2.6.3 discusses insights from other sources that can shed
more light on the characteristics of the survivor population.
44 CHAPTER 2. PARENTAL SELECTION
average would be lower.
Unrestricted sample
For setting up the unrestricted sample I start with the Municipal Popula-
tion dataset (Gemeentelijke Basisadministratie 2016), which contains data
of all individuals registered in Dutch municipalities by 1995. Available
variables include the individual’s birth date, birth dates of parents, gender,
and country of origin. The sample is restricted to individuals born between
1944 and 1948 (N=1, 161, 250). Individuals born outside of the Netherlands
(N=120, 338) are dropped from the sample. The data is merged with the
place of birth dataset. The file contains information on place of birth for
individuals registered in municipalities by 2004. Individuals for whom place
of birth cannot be determined (N=105) and individuals born in Flevoland49
(N=1, 168) are dropped from the sample, as well as individuals whose moth-
er’s age is missing (N=926). The resulting sample contains 530, 113 males
and 508, 600 females (see Table 2.1).
This paper exploits geographical differences in the magnitude of the
Birth Peak. The different municipalities are assigned to provinces using
municipality codes.50 Children are born in the south if their place of birth
is in the provinces of Limburg, Noord-Brabant, or Zeeland. North con-
tains children born in Zuid-Holland, Noord-Holland, Utrecht, Groningen,
Friesland, Drenthe, Overijssel, and Gelderland. All children born in the
large cities (more than 40, 000 inhabitants in 1944) in the west are ex-
cluded as these were affected by the famine. Following Stein et al. (1975)
49Flevoland is the youngest province of the Netherlands (dating back to 1986), most
of its land was reclaimed in the 1950s and 1960s after a flood in the early 1900s. Hence
the population in this area was very low in 1946.
50Available at statline.cbs.nl, Gebieden: overzicht vanaf 1830.
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and Scholte et al. (2015) this excludes children born in Amsterdam, Delft,
Haarlem, Leiden, Rotterdam, the Hague, and Utrecht.
Restricted sample
Children are matched to their parents to get more information on family
and parental characteristics. The Parent-Child dataset matches children
to parents who are alive and living in the Netherlands between 1995 and
2015, and contains information on 15, 860, 240 individuals. Children can be
matched if their mother is still alive by 1995.51 Stillbirths (N=22, 290) and
individuals whose mother’s RIN is missing (N=547, 350) are dropped from
the sample. This data is supplemented with demographic characteristics
from the Municipal Population dataset (in Dutch: Gemeentelijke Basisad-
ministratie). A sample of 15, 284, 285 individuals remains after merging the
demographic data to the Parent-Child dataset. In the remaining sample
children are defined as siblings if they share the same mother. Birth order
is defined based on the child’s date of birth relative to siblings. Individuals
whose mother’s age at birth cannot be determined (N=3, 912) are dropped
from the sample. The sample is restricted to individuals born between 1944
and 1948 (N=735, 085). Individuals who are not born in the Netherlands
(N=23, 086) are dropped from the sample. Data on the individuals’ place
of birth is added. Individuals whose place of birth cannot be determined
(N=25) are dropped, as well as individuals reported to be born in Flevoland
(N=829). The remaining (restricted) sample contains 363, 023 males and
348, 122 females and is shown in Table 2.1.
Information on the marital state of the parents during childbirth (from
51Table 2.A2 shows maternal age at birth in 1946 and the respective age of the mother
in 1995.
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gbaburgelijkestaatbus) is added. The dataset contains all past and present
marital statuses (unmarried, married, registered partnership, etc.) for indi-
viduals registered in Dutch municipalities from 1995. From the individuals
in the restricted sample 100,082 cannot be matched to a marital status.
The remaining sample contains 310,240 males and 300,823 females. Al-
though 14.07% of observations cannot be matched to information on the
marital status, the observed percentage of in-wedlock births in the data in
1946 (i.e. 97.3%) closely reflects the actual population average of 97.5%.
In-wedlock conceptions are defined conservatively as childbirth within sev-
en months after marriage to account for the possibility of premature births.
Shotgun marriages make up to remaining share of in-wedlock births, and
represent a situation in which a child is conceived out-wedlock and born
in-wedlock. They portray a situation in which the child is conceived before
a couple is married, and likely reflect unanticipated conceptions given the
nature of family formation at the time.
Labor market and health outcomes
Data on labor market outcomes is available starting from 1999. This paper
focuses on labor market outcomes in this particular year, when the studied
cohorts are aged 51 to 55, to capture as many individuals as possible in
active labor market positions.52 This is especially important as the cohorts
had access to an early retirement scheme, which is not yet available for the
studied cohorts in 1999 (Scholte et al., 2015). Information for labor earn-
ings is retrieved from the dataset with yearly taxed earnings from all paid
employments in 1999 (baanprsjaarbedragtab), and from the dataset with all
52It is also the first year in which these outcomes are observed in the administrative
data from Statistics Netherlands.
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earnings from self-employment in 1999 (zelfstandigentab).53 An indicator
for labor market participation is created which is equal to one when labor
earnings from the two sources mentioned above are greater than zero in
1999. An indicator of the individual’s enrollment in any social security
scheme is created with data on whether the individual received benefits
from disability insurance (aototpersoonsbus)54, unemployment insurance
(wwjaarbedragtab), or welfare (bijstandjaarbedragtab) in 1999.
The analysis on labor market outcomes is restricted to men due to the
nature of female labor force participation for the studied cohorts. First,
until the 1960s women were not allowed to work after marriage, implying
that labor market outcomes may well reflect marriage market success. Al-
though after 1957 women in public service jobs could no longer be fired, it
was not immediately acceptable for women to work, especially after hav-
ing children (De Graaf and Keil, 2001).55 Second, the cohorts studied in
this paper show a steep increase in labor force participation at late ages
(Arts and Otten, 2013). Comparing the late-life labor market outcomes
of these cohorts of females may pick up this general trend in labor force
participation.56
The analysis on health outcomes, i.e. mortality and the use of pre-
scription drugs, is done for the sample of men and women. Information
53Income from self-employment is negative for 0.85% of the sample, those observations
are recoded as having zero income. One cent is added for observations with zero income
after which the log is taken. The results for estimating the models conditional on
having positive earnings, hence leaving out observations with zero or negative earnings
are shown in Table 2.A5.
54Including the general scheme for employees (WAO), the scheme for young individuals
(WAJONG), and the scheme for self-employed individuals (WAZ).
55To illustrate, only 3 out of 10 women at the start of the 1980s had a paid job for
more than 12 hours a week (De Graaf and Keil, 2001).
56This is one of the reasons, apart from the famine potentially affecting reproductive
capacities, why Scholte et al. (2015) do not consider female labor market outcomes.
48 CHAPTER 2. PARENTAL SELECTION
on mortality is available in the dataset with all dates of death of individu-
als registered in Dutch municipalities by 1995 (gbaoverlijdentab). Implying
that the mortality measures only capture individuals who have survived up
until 1995 and died afterwards (i.e. survived until age 49 for those born
in 1946). Indicator variables are created that represent mortality before
age 65 and before age 70. The latest data-file is available for 2017, and for
this reason I cannot capture mortality beyond age 70 yet. The medication
file (medicijntab) contains information on prescription drugs (ordered by
ATC-4 code) provided and covered by basic health insurance in 2006.57 I
focus on prescription drugs associated with diseases that could potentially
arise due to growing up in a different family environment. This includes
prescription drugs for mental health problems (anti-psychotics, anxiolytics,
sedatives, and antidepressants),58 cardiovascular diseases (including hyper-
tension), diabetes mellitus, and respiratory diseases.59 Unfortunately the
data does not show how many prescriptions the individual received in each
category in a year, but rather whether the individual received any prescrip-
tion in the specific ATC-category in a given year. An indicator is created
which is equal to one if the individuals received any prescription in 2006 in
the four categories discussed before. Models with indicators for receiving
prescriptions drugs in the four separate categories, as well as an indicator
for having received any prescription drugs (irrespective of whether drugs
could be related to diseases caused by lifestyle) are also reported.
57Basic health insurance is a mandatory insurance for all inhabitants of the Nether-
lands that covers necessary care.
58These correspond to respectively ATC-codes N05A, N05B, N05C, and N06A.
59There is no data available for earlier years. Following Huber et al. (2013) an individ-
ual is classified as having prescription drugs for cardiovascular diseases if he or she takes
drugs with ATC-codes B01A, C01, C02, C04A, C07, C08 and C09. For diabetes mel-
litus this includes drugs with ATC-codes A10A, A10B, and A10X, and for respiratory
diseases this includes drugs with ATC-code R03.
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Table 3.4 shows descriptive statistics for the sample discussed. Parents
are on average slightly older in the south, and family size is also bigger
in the south. As all big cities in the west of the Netherlands are left out
the analysis due to the famine, the urban indicator (equal to one for cities
with more than 40,000 inhabitants in 1945) is lower in the north versus
the south. Mortality after 1995 is very similar in north and south for the
studied cohorts, although the use of prescription drugs that could be re-
lated to growing up in a particular family is higher in the south. Labor
market outcomes are better for children born in the north, as they have
higher employment, higher earnings, and a lower enrollment in social in-
surance. Table 2.3 focuses on first births and splits the sample by in- and
out-wedlock conceptions. Children born in shotgun marriages have younger
parents, and more siblings. What stands out is that shotgun conceptions
do worse than in-wedlock conceptions on the majority of outcome variables.
Particularly, they have higher mortality before age 70, higher use of pre-
scription drugs related to lifestyle, lower employment, lower earnings, and
a higher enrollment in social insurance.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Family environment
This paper argues that socioeconomic conditions may change parental se-
lection and hence the family environment in which a child grows up. Family
environment again affects the child’s human capital accumulation, which
can have consequences that extend towards adulthood (e.g. Cunha and
Heckman, 2007; Bjo¨rklund and Salvanes, 2011). This section examines
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outcomes related to family environment and hence can be interpreted as a
first stage.
Table 2.4 shows the difference-in-difference estimates with two family
characteristics as outcome variables, namely the number of children in a
family, and the stability (length) of parental marriage. The CoBP grow up
in families that are significantly smaller by 6.8% compared to cohorts born
before and those born in the south. This finding makes sense if parents
delayed fertility, as there is simply less time (biologically) to reproduce
when starting at a later age. Similarly it might be that if the first birth is
unanticipated, parents may have less subsequent children. When focusing
on first births and by making a distinction between delayed conceptions
and unanticipated conceptions, it seems that the lower family size effect
is driven by planned births. Hence, parents who conceived their child
in-wedlock and who are more likely to have delayed fertility, have lower
completed fertility. Note that this model only compares children who are
conceived and born in-wedlock, suggesting that the planned births in the
1946 cohort are different from those in earlier cohorts. The point-estimate
is however less precisely estimated which decreases significance, but the size
of the coefficients increases (-0.274 vs -0.311). There is no evidence for an
effect on family size for unanticipated conceptions, i.e. the point-estimate
is much smaller (-0.037) and very imprecisely estimated. Suggesting that
within the group of unanticipated conceptions, those born in 1946 in the
north do not grow up in families of different size as opposed to earlier
cohorts.
When considering the length of parental marriage as an outcome vari-
able, the difference-in-difference is not significantly different from zero.
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However, when only regarding children who are born in-wedlock, and mak-
ing a distinction between children who are conceived in wedlock and those
who are not (shotgun marriage), an interesting picture emerges. The
difference-in-difference estimator is not significantly different from zero for
children who are conceived in-wedlock. However, the length of parental
marriage is significantly shorter for CoBP conceived in shotgun marriages.
More precisely, all else equal the marriage of their parents takes on average
5.6% shorter.60 CoBP born from unanticipated pregnancies grow up in less
stable households, which may reflect lower quality match of their parents,
which is suggestive evidence for negative parental selection.
2.5.2 Labor market outcomes
The results for labor market outcomes are shown in Table 2.5, and re-
member that these models are only estimated for males. Panel A reports
the results from the difference-in-difference model where children born be-
fore and after the liberation are compared in the north and south of the
Netherlands. First, note that the point-estimates change with the inclusion
of controls. As the outcomes are measured at one point in time (i.e. 1999)
and the cohorts are of different age at that particular point, the speci-
fication controls for these age profiles by including linear and quadratic
region-specific age trends. This, together with controls for being conceived
during the liberation of the south and the inclusion of birth month dum-
mies that control for birth circumstances, and a control for being born in
the city to additionally control for regional differences, makes that point
estimates change with the inclusion of controls. The dummy for being
60Using a two-sample t-test I find that the difference between the difference-in-
difference estimators of in- and out-wedlock conceptions is significant with P < 0.05.
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born from March to September 1946 is associated with better labor market
outcomes in the specification without controls, whereas the coefficient gets
smaller and insignificant with the inclusion of controls. Suggesting that
age-trends do indeed matter for labor market outcomes. Another pattern
that appears is that children born in the north have significantly better
labor market outcomes, which may be caused by differences in occupations
across regions.
When looking at the difference-in-difference estimator (i.e. CoBP ), no
clear picture emerges from the table when considering various labor market
outcomes. Implying that on average, there is no evidence that CoBP fare
significantly better or worse as compared to those conceived before the lib-
eration. If anything, although imprecisely estimated, the point estimates
suggest that they would do worse on all three labor market outcomes con-
sidered (lower employment, lower earnings, and higher enrollment in any
social insurance program). Notice that the point-estimates for log labor
earnings are particularly large (but estimated very imprecisely). CoBP
would on average have 11% lower earnings. However, the zeros for the
unemployed are included in this outcome measure by adding up one cent
to earnings before taking the log. When considering a conditional earn-
ings measure (see Table 2.A5) which conditions on employment, another
picture emerges. Conditional on being employed, CoBP would earn 2.6%
more, although imprecisely estimated. Hence it seems that the large neg-
ative point-estimate in Table 2.5 is driven by the zeros in the outcome
variable.
The absence of an effect in this aggregate approach might be caused by
the fact that two types of behaviors led to births in 1946, namely delayed
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fertility and unanticipated conceptions. The aggregate approach may mask
these two potentially offsetting effects. Panel B endeavors to distinguish
above-mentioned behaviors by restricting the attention to first births who
were born in-wedlock, and by making a distinction between children who
were conceived in-wedlock and those who were not (i.e. born in shotgun
marriages). The first are likely to be a product of delayed fertility, where-
as the latter likely reflect unanticipated pregnancies. Remember that the
CoBP coefficient should be interpreted within the group considered. That
is, for unanticipated conceptions it measures how shotgun conceptions con-
ceived after the liberation of the north are different from those born before
the liberation and in the south. Interestingly, also within each category
there is a premium of being born in the north as those children have bet-
ter labor market outcomes. However, this coefficient is only significant
for in-wedlock conceptions which may be caused by the lower sample size
and consequently lower precision for the shotgun sample. Although the
difference-in-difference estimators are not significant for any of the labor
market outcomes considered, it is interesting to examine the sizes of the
coefficients in both groups. CoBP conceived in-wedlock have lower employ-
ment, lower earnings, and lower enrollment in any social security system,
whereas CoBP born in shotgun marriages have lower employment, higher
earnings, and lower enrollment in social insurance. Summarizing, Table 2.5
does not provide clear evidence that CoBP fare better or worse. Similarly,
when a distinction is made between planned and unplanned births no clear
pattern emerges.
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2.5.3 Health outcomes
The results for the health outcomes are reported in Table 2.6. The mod-
els for health outcomes are estimated for both genders combined, which
explains the about doubling of the sample size compared to the analysis
on labor market outcomes.61 Panel A shows the results of the baseline
difference-in-difference model. Note that the inclusion of controls does not
have a big effect on the mortality indicators, which is because they are
measured at a fixed age (i.e. before age 65 and 70). Including controls
does affect the point estimates for having had any prescription drugs in
the four relevant categories (i.e. drugs for mental health, respiratory dis-
eases, cardiovascular diseases, and diabetes), as this outcome is measured
in 2006. The results for mortality in Table 2.6 are not statistically signif-
icant, and also economically very small. When regarding the use of any
prescription drugs the point-estimate is negative and significant. CoBP
have a 2.4 percentage points lower use of prescription drugs in the four
relevant categories. When distinguishing between the four drug groups in
Table 2.A6 it seems that this negative effect is driven by lower prescriptions
(-1.8 percentage points) for mental health drugs for CoBP.62
The difference-in-difference estimator on the aggregate level may mask
heterogeneity among planned and unplanned births. Panel B focuses on
first births and distinguishes between those who were conceived in-wedlock
and those born in shotgun marriages. Although imprecisely estimated, the
61The results are robust to estimating the models for both genders separately (see
Table 2.8).
62Table 2.A6 also includes an outcome variable for the use of any drugs, irrespective
of whether the drug may be related to lifestyle and family environment. Although a
significant point-estimate is found for this outcome, it should not receive much attention.
This outcome variable also includes drugs for coincidental and temporary diseases and
hence does not tell us much.
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effects on mortality before 65 seem larger among unplanned births, whereas
the effects on mortality before age 70 are very similar in both groups. The
effects on prescription drugs is larger among unplanned births, although
estimated imprecisely. When considering the results in Table 2.A6 both
effects seem again driven by an lower use of mental health drugs. To sum
up, the results in Table 2.6 do not show strong evidence that CoBP fare
better or worse. They do have a lower use of prescription drugs which are
relevant to family environment, and particularly prescription drugs related
to mental health problems.
2.5.4 Robustness checks
The results show very little evidence for the CoBP being different in terms
of family environment as well as later life labor market and health outcomes.
This section explores the robustness of the results. First, the main analysis
compares children before and after the liberation in north and south as
these children are exposed to different socioeconomic circumstances. A
robustness check is done in which the Birth Peak cohort (born March-
September 1946) is compared to later cohorts (i.e. born from October
1946 to December 1948). Both cohorts are exposed to better socioeconomic
conditions. Table 2.7 and 2.8 show the robustness to using later cohorts as
control group on respectively the family and child level.63 On the family
level, the finding on family size disappears, suggesting that CoBP do not
have smaller families when comparing with cohorts born after. The results
on the length of parental marriage and labor market outcomes show very
similar patterns. The point-estimate for the use of prescription drugs in
63Full estimation results are available in Table 2.A7, Table 2.A8 and Table 2.A9.
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the four relevant drug groups is no longer significant (which is caused by
a decrease in the point-estimate). Overall, the main conclusions do not
change when using the post-cohorts.
Second, I check the robustness of the results to using different sub-
groups. The main results do not condition on birth order, whereas the
sub-sample analyses conditions on first births who are born in-wedlock.
The analysis is redone for only first births and the results for family and
child outcomes show a similar pattern. The analysis on health outcomes
is estimated for a joint sample of men and women. The results are robust
to estimating the models separately by gender. Then, the main model on
child outcomes is estimated for out-wedlock births only. Notice that this
is a very small sample due to the nature of family formation at that time.
Within this sample of illegitimate births, those conceived in times with
better socioeconomic do not fare better or worse in adulthood.
Third, the main analysis compares children born in the north and the
south of the Netherlands. One could argue that these areas are very differ-
ent as the outer regions of these areas are geographically dispersed. To im-
prove comparability I re-estimate the main model by focusing on provinces
in the north and south who are closer geographically (i.e. comparing the
south with the provinces of Zuid-Holland, Utrecht and Gelderland). The
results are reported in Table 2.7 and Table 2.8. Again the results are very
similar to the main estimates in this robustness check. Only the coefficient
for the use of prescription drugs decreases and loses significance, the coeffi-
cient on the parents’ marital stability and mortality before 70 increase and
become marginally significant.
Fourth, I investigate the robustness to different definitions of treatment
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and control group. The BP-cohort is defined as all birth between March and
September 1946, as the number of births started to increase from March
1946. These children are, when assuming a pregnancy duration of nine
months, conceived from June to December 1945. The liberation occurred
in May 1945, implying that children born in February may also be a part
of the Birth Peak cohort. The Birth Peak cohort is redefined as births
from February to September 1946, and the results show a similar pattern.
Two differences are that the coefficient of interest for employment increases
and becomes marginally significant, and the point-estimate for the use of
prescription drugs decreases and is no longer significantly different from
zero. Another robustness check is executed in which the Birth Peak cohort
is redefined as born between March and May 1946, which are the months
in which birth rates were highest. These could be the months in which
conceptions were mostly driven by the changed socioeconomic conditions.
The results are robust to using this different definition as point-estimates
are very similar for the considered outcomes.
As a next step I examine the robustness to leaving out children who
were conceived in periods characterized by war circumstances that could
also have affected on fertility. The main analysis leaves out children born
in famine-affected areas, which are defined as the large cities in the western
part of the Netherlands. As a robustness check I leave out children born
between March and December 1945, who were probably conceived during
the famine. The results for family characteristics, and child outcomes are
robust to using this different definition. The one difference being that the
coefficient on family size drops from -0.309 to -0.185. I also check the
robustness of the results to leaving out those who are conceived in the time
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period that the south was liberated, but the north was still occupied. The
main conclusions do not change when this definition is chosen, except the
point estimate for the use of any prescription drugs which decreases in size
and is no longer significant.
Finally, to investigate potential selection issues for the relevant outcome
variables I condition on mortality for the outcomes considered. That is, for
child outcomes, I condition that the individual must be alive in 1999 (for
labor market outcomes) and 2006 (for health outcomes). The results in
this robustness check show a similar pattern, it only mechanically changes
the point-estimates for the mortality indicators.
2.6 Mechanisms at work
So far I find no effects of improved socioeconomic conditions on parental
selection nor long-term child outcomes. Even though the change in socio-
economic environment studied in this paper can be considered as a severe
shock, parental selection effects to economic uncertainty to do not trans-
late to this particular setting. It could be that economic uncertainty has
different effects on the decision to have a child (as discussed in Gronau,
1977) as opposed to the end of war. Hence, the income and substitution
effects that occur as a response to economic uncertainty do not extrapolate
to a context where socioeconomic conditions improved due to the end of
war.
Similarly family size does not seem to affect long-term child outcomes in
my estimations. The quantity-quality trade-off of family formation predicts
that family size is negatively linked to child later life outcomes (e.g. Becker
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et al., 1973), although Black et al. (2005) find no causal effect of family
size on later life outcomes in Norway, which is in line with the findings in
this paper. Moreover, in a sub-sample for which I do find parental selec-
tion, in terms of a decreased household stability, I find no persistent effects
until adulthood. This is in contrast with the literature which generally
finds large effects of family environment on child long-term outcomes (e.g.
Cunha and Heckman, 2007; Bjo¨rklund and Salvanes, 2011). However, my
findings do not invalidate the findings in other studies. First, note that this
paper focuses on the effect of parents’ marital stability on outcomes that
persist for over fifty years. Suggesting that although the length of parental
marriage does not seem to be related to very long-term child outcomes,
this does not mean that there is no effect of family environment on child
outcomes. Second, evidence shows that family environment is less impor-
tant in the Nordic countries as opposed to the United States. Likewise, it
appears that changes in educational policy can also influence the effect of
family environment on child long-term outcomes (Black et al., 2011). The
institutional setting studied in this paper is more related to the Nordic set-
ting, suggesting that inter-generational persistence may be less strong in
the Netherlands. A high equality of opportunity may reduce the persistent
effects of family environment on child outcomes.
The next sections explore three additional mechanisms that may explain
the (lack of) effects found. First, it it shows that cohort effects cannot
explain the main findings in this paper. Second, it focuses on the role
of war circumstances, apart from changed socioeconomic conditions, that
may have affected fertility and parental selection right after the war. More
precisely, it concentrates on the role of Hunger Winter, the absence of men,
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and the influence of the Canadian liberators. It seems that the changed
socioeconomic environment is indeed the largest contributor to the fertility
rise. Finally, I consider the role of sample selection effects, as it could
be that potential adverse effects cannot be identified as they may have
occurred earlier in the life-cycle.
2.6.1 Cohort effects or parental selection?
It could be that any parental selection effects are offset by cohort-specific
effects. The 1946 cohort may not only be different in composition but is for
sure different in size. The cohort experienced large classes in school, but
the entrance onto the labor market for this cohort coincided with a large
demand for labor. Overall, being born in this particular cohort could influ-
ence labor market and health outcomes through other ways than parental
selection, e.g. through the size of the cohort. That cohort size matters is
also shown in the literature (e.g. Bound and Turner, 2007; Brunello, 2010),
and potential positive parental selection can be offset by negative cohort-
specific effects. I perform two tests to check whether cohort size or cohort
composition is driving the results. First, I add controls for the size of the
child’s birth cohort at the province level to the main specification. The
province level is chosen to capture potential crowding effects in schools or
on the labor market. As of the low residential mobility of the Dutch it
likely represents a good proxy. The results are shown in Table 2.12.64 The
point estimates are very similar when including these cohort level controls,
suggesting that cohort size does not contribute to the effects found.
A stronger test is performed in which I examine the outcomes of younger
64Full estimation results are available in Table 2.A10 and Table 2.A11.
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siblings.65 Specifically, I select all children born between January 1947 and
December 1950 in families in which at least two children were born between
March 1946 (start of the Birth Peak) and December 1950. The analysis
is restricted to these families as having a second (or further) birth may be
endogenous to earlier births, and these families are similar as they choose
to give birth to at least two children after the liberation. I also estimate
the models for a group of families that gave birth to exactly two children
after the liberation to address the endogeneity issue. Children born in
this time-frame who have an older brother or sister born during the Birth
Peak in the north are classified as CoBP siblings. These children were
not affected by the same cohort-specific factors as their older brother and
sisters, but they are born to the same parents. Implying that any cohort
effects that may have played a role for the BP cohort is not important for
these children. If the CoBP siblings are affected in a similar way as their
older brothers and sisters, one could argue for parental selection. If not,
it is likely that cohort effects instead of parental selection are driving the
results. A model analogous to the main difference-in-difference approach
used in this paper is estimated for this particular sample. Yet this time the
coefficient of interest is an indicator for having a CoBP sibling.
The results for labor market outcomes are shown in Table 2.9. Panel
A shows that the estimator of interest (CoBP siblings) is not significantly
different from zero for any of the labor market outcomes considered. Im-
plying that there is no evidence for CoBP to be different, and a similar
picture emerges for their siblings. If anything, the coefficient of interest is
positive (although estimated imprecisely). Panel B separates the sample by
65A similar strategy to separate parental selection from bad circumstances is executed
by Chevalier and Marie (2017).
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marital state at first birth. Implying that it distinguishes between children
whose first born brother or sister was conceived in-wedlock or conceived in
a shotgun marriage. Again none of the difference-in-difference estimators
is significantly different from zero.
Table 2.10 reports the results for health outcomes. Panel A shows that
the coefficient of interest is not significant for the health outcomes. Sug-
gesting that also for these health outcomes, there is no evidence for cohort
effects instead of parental selection are driving the results found in this pa-
per. Panel B separates the sample by marital state at first conception (i.e.
first birth was conceived in-wedlock or in a shotgun marriage). Again in
the coefficient of interest is not significant for any of the outcome variables
considered. Some of the point-estimates change, but as they are estimated
imprecisely it does not change the conclusion. Overall, as the coefficients
of interest are not significantly different from zero for both the CoBP and
CoBP siblings, I cannot conclude that cohort effects are driving the effects
found.
2.6.2 The influence of other war-related explanations
Apart from changed socioeconomic conditions, Section 2.2.4 discussed sev-
eral other explanations for the Birth Peak. This section explores how much
these explanations contribute to the effects found. Based on the tests pro-
vided below, it seems that the change in socioeconomic environment can
be considered as the largest contributor to the fertility rise.
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The influence of the Hunger Winter
As discussed in Section 2.2.4, the Hunger Winter could have affected fer-
tility, and consequently parental selection. To avoid that the famine was
affecting the results, children born in famine-affected areas (the large west-
ern cities) are left out of the treatment group. Equivalently, a robustness
check was done in Section 2.5.4 dropping all children who were conceived
during the famine, which showed very similar results. To explore the in-
fluence of the famine further, I do the analysis including children born in
famine-affected areas (Table 2.12). The point estimates are very similar
to those in the baseline model. Summarizing, the above mentioned checks
suggest that the results are not sensitive to the influence of the famine that
occurred in the winter prior to the liberation.
The absence of men
Another explanation for the Birth Peak as discussed before, is the absence
of men during war years. Likewise, fertility can increase after the war with
the return of these men. According to my estimates, at its highest point
about 31% of men in childbearing ages were in forced labor. However, even
during the war fertility was increasing and responding to war circumstances
suggesting that the absence of men cannot be the primary explanation for
the fertility rise. The largest losses of men to forced labor came at the
end of war (fall of 1944) when raids took place in Rotterdam and The
Hague were taken abroad. The raids in Rotterdam alone accounted for
about 14% of all men in forced labor.66 As Rotterdam and The Hague
66Author’s estimates based on the approximation that about 50,000 men were taken
away in November 1944, on a total of 351,000 men in forced labor (estimate from Krimp
and Kemperman, 2015)
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are left out of the treatment group as of the influence of the famine in
these cities, this would also partially address the disproportional retrieval
of men out of these municipalities. To the best of my knowledge there is
no information on the actual location of these men in Germany. Hence, I
cannot exploit differences in distance or difference in when these men were
allowed to go back to the Netherlands. However, I can estimate the model
excluding children born in provinces bordering Germany, and assuming
that men could return more easily/quickly when living in these bordering
provinces. Although the Netherlands is small, and this test is imperfect it
may provide some suggestive evidence. Table 2.12 shows that the results
are very similar to the main estimates when dropping children born in
border provinces. Based on this test, the influence of the absence of men
due to forced labor on parental selection seems limited.
The influence of the Canadian liberators
It could be that the presence of the Canadian soldiers led to extra birth-
s, and that any parental selection is also driven by the presence of these
soldiers. Although it is unlikely that the Canadian liberators had a ma-
jor impact on fertility at the time - a conservative estimate shows that
only 1.2% of all babies born in 1946 are born to Canadian liberators (see
Section 2.2.4 for more detail) - I examine the robustness of the results to
excluding births that were more likely to be from these Canadians soldiers.
Two strategies are employed: (1) one that exploits the timing of the exit
of the Canadian forces out of the Netherlands, and (2) one thats exploits
the location of the Canadian soldiers across the Netherlands.
The Canadian soldiers started leaving the Netherlands from June 1945
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(17,000 soldiers), July (26,000 soldiers), October (110,000 soldiers), and
the last soldiers left near the end of May 1946 (Bollen and Vroemen, 1994).
As the majority left before October 1945, children born from August 1946
are less likely to be from the Canadian liberators. I redefine the treatment
group as being born from August-September 1946. Those born from March-
July are temporarily dropped from the sample. The results are reported in
Table 2.12. Although some point estimates change, which is to be expected
when leaving out the children that were conceived in the months right after
the liberation, leaving out these children does not alter the conclusions.
The liberation of the northern provinces failed in the fall of 1944 and
the Allied forces had to re-group to resume the liberation attempt of the
north. Many Canadian soldiers had to be housed in the Netherlands, and
had to be entertained (Hofstee, 2012). So-called leave-centers were set-up
(first only in the south, but after May 1945 also in the north). Soldiers
were allowed to bring a ‘plus one’ back to the leave-centers, which led to
the nickname ‘love-centers’ (Okkema, 2012). This is where a lot of the
‘engagements’ took place, and it is likely that girls living in the neighbor-
hood of these leave-centers had a higher probability of engaging with the
Allied forces.67 I drop children born in cities with such a leave-center and
re-estimate the difference-in-difference model, the results are reported in
Table 2.12. The point estimates are similar to those in the baseline mod-
el and hence the conclusions do not change. Summarizing, from the two
67Before the liberation of the North these centers were located in Nijmegen, Bre-
da, Tilburg, Eindhoven, Den Bosch, Heerlen and Maastricht. After the liberation of
the north they were stationed in Amsterdam, Almelo, Arnhem, Deventer, Enschede, Ni-
jmegen, Zwolle, Amersfoort, Apeldoorn, Barneveld, Hilversum, Utrecht, Asssen, Gronin-
gen, Harlingen and Leeuwarden (Okkema, 2012). Kleinhout (2006) argues that the leave-
center in Amsterdam was most important, followed in popularity by Utrecht, Groningen,
Apeldoorn and Enschede.
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checks in this section I cannot conclude that the presence of the Canadian
soldiers is driving the findings in this paper.
2.6.3 Sample selection effects
Last but not least, it could be that sample selection effects drive the esti-
mate to zero. Section 2.4.2 discussed ‘culling’ of the weakest, which might
occur when late-life outcomes are studied. Specifically, the individuals who
are observed in the data are hypothesized to have better characteristics
than those who are not. This is particularly important as the individuals
who were most negatively affected/selected, may die prematurely and may
thereby be no longer observed in the data. To illustrate, Van Ewijk and
Lindeboom (2017) find no long-term health effects of prenatal exposure to
WWII, if anything health is better, which they explain among other things
with selective mortality. This section addresses potential selectivity into
the sample.
First, parents with different characteristics may decide to conceive in
different times, but it could also be that different parents are capable of con-
ceiving in different times. Section 2.2.5 established that parental selection
is not driven by available care. However, parental selection may be affected
by mortality of men and women in childbearing age during WWII. If men
and women who died are different from those who did not, children born in
1946 might be born to an even more selective set of parents. Figure 2.A7
shows mortality in the Netherlands from 1936 to 2015. Mortality during
the war is especially high for individuals aged 45 to 80. In the group of
men and women in childbearing age (aged 15 to 45) a peak of 7 deaths per
1000 inhabitants is observed in 1945. Mortality is even lower in other war
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years, and although there is no information available on selective mortality,
the low mortality in the relevant age group suggests that it will only play a
minor role. Second, there could be selection at birth. That is, conditional
on getting pregnant there may be differences in which women brought their
pregnancies to term. Induced abortion was not legal in 1946, implying that
(legal) selective abortions will not affect which children are born. Likewise
there are no trend-deviations in the number of stillbirths and perinatal
deaths for 1946 (Figure 2.A6), and the sex ratio is more skewed to boys in
1946.68 Unfortunately, there is no data available on these outcomes on the
regional level.
The main analysis uses the restricted sample in which more informa-
tion on family characteristics is available. Individuals are observed in the
restricted sample if they themselves and their mother are still alive and
registered in a Dutch municipality by 1995. The restricted sample con-
tains 166, 475 individuals born in 1946, which is 58.5% of the total amount
of births. The differences between the unrestricted and restricted sample
were formalized in Section 2.4.2 and two processes underlie the survival
from the unrestricted to the restricted sample: (1) individuals with a lower
quality mother are less likely to be observed, and (2) individuals whose
mother is older at giving birth have a lower probability of being observed.
Table 2.11 shows the results from the difference-in-difference models for
the unrestricted sample with an indicator for observing the mother in the
restricted sample as the relevant outcome. As predicted, a higher maternal
age at birth is associated with a lower probability of observing the moth-
68According to the fragile male hypothesis this does not raise concerns on bad pregnan-
cy circumstances Figure 2.A8. Bethmann and Kvasnicka (2014) argues that in many
European countries, including the Netherlands, the sex ratios during and right after
WWII were skewed towards boys.
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er. The double-difference estimator, that captures the effect of being born
March-September 1946 in the north, is not significantly different from zero
for both the pre- and post-sample. CoBP are not more or less likely to be
observed, which suggests that both processes outlined in Section 2.4.2 bal-
ance each other. In line with this finding, when estimating the difference-
in-difference model for the unrestricted sample (see Table 2.12) a similar
pattern arises, suggesting that there are no large differences between the
unrestricted and restricted sample.
The total number of births was 284, 456 in 1946, and 242, 196 of those
births are observed in the unrestricted sample (alive and registered in a
Dutch municipality by 1995), which is about 85.1% of the total number
of births. The discrepancy can arise from both deaths and migration. It
may be that children who are most negatively affected die before reaching
adulthood, and thereby are not observed in the data. Lindeboom and Van
Ewijk (2015) find that lower survival probabilities until age 55 for those
born directly after the war. However, this relationship disappears after
conditioning on survival up to age one and five. That lower survival prob-
abilities are probably caused by higher child mortality, is consistent with
Figure 2.A6 that shows that mortality after birth is higher for the 1946
cohort when comparing to later cohorts. Rau et al. (2017) argue that an
increase in unanticipated conceptions caused by a large price increase in
the price of contraceptives led to higher infant mortality, which could be co-
herent with negative parental selection. Similarly, Gruber et al. (1999) find
that access to abortion, a measure that can prevent unanticipated births is
associated with lower infant mortality. Unfortunately such potential effects
earlier in the life-cycle cannot be studied with the current data.
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2.7 Conclusion
This paper examines how the socioeconomic environment at conception
influences the size and composition of a cohort. It specifically explores
whether changed socioeconomic conditions, induced by the end of war in the
Netherlands, affect parental selection and consequently child outcomes in
adulthood. I exploit a natural experiment as regional differences in the tim-
ing and magnitude of the changed socioeconomic conditions led to a Birth
Peak in the area that experienced the most severe change in socioecono-
mic environment. The timing and regional differences in the magnitude of
changed socioeconomic conditions are exploited in a difference-in-difference
framework.
In my analysis I find no evidence of parental selection, as measured by
the stability of the parental marriage, nor do I find effects on long-term
child labor market and health outcomes. This implies that the parental
selection effects that are documented to occur with changes in economic
conditions do not extrapolate to the context studied in this paper. It could
be that the forces behind the demand for children respond differently to
changed economic conditions than to changed socioeconomic conditions
caused by the end of war.
The absence of an effect found could be explained by heterogeneity
between conceptions arising due to delayed fertility and unanticipated con-
ceptions. Different types of parental selection may underlie these two type-
s, which could net out on average. When distinguishing between planned
and unplanned conceptions, I find that unplanned conceptions who are
conceived in times of better socioeconomic circumstances grow up in less
stable families, although child later life outcomes are unaffected. The latter
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finding is in contrast with the literature that finds enduring effects of family
environment. However, it must be taken into account that this paper only
focuses on the effect of parental marriage stability on the long-term out-
comes more than fifty years later. Likewise, high equality of opportunity
in the Netherlands could mitigate the influence of family environment on
child long-term outcomes.
Thus, my findings do not directly provide a motive for policy aimed at
reducing inequalities due to large changes in the socioeconomic environment
at conception. However, this does not imply that policy-makers should not
be cautious when it comes to these large shocks to the socioeconomic envi-
ronment. There may be other potential drivers for parental selection, and
future research should address how comparable shocks to the socioecono-
mic environment affect parental selection in different institutional settings
and endeavor to identify effects earlier in the life-cycle.
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Figures
Figure 2.1: The Netherlands by region, black circles indicate large cities in
the west.
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Figure 2.2: Yearly crude birth rate, number of live births per 1000 in-
habitants, the Netherlands, 1900-1960. Source: Statistics Netherlands,
statline.cbs.nl.
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Figure 2.3: Yearly live births per 1000 inhabitants by region, the Nether-
lands, 1930-1950. North contains the provinces of Noord-Holland, Zuid-
Holland, Utrecht, Groningen, Friesland, Drenthe, Overijssel, and Gelder-
land. South contains the provinces of Zeeland, Noord-Brabant, and Lim-
burg. Data for 1940 is missing. Source: Author’s calculations based on data
from Statistics Netherlands Historical Collection, Loop van de bevolking
per gemeente, historisch.cbs.nl.
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Figure 2.4: Yearly increase in the number of births by region, the Nether-
lands, 1931-1950. North contains the provinces of Noord-Holland, Zuid-
Holland, Utrecht, Groningen, Friesland, Drenthe, Overijssel, and Gelder-
land. South contains the provinces of Zeeland, Noord-Brabant, and Lim-
burg. Data for 1940 is missing. Source: Author’s calculations based on data
from Statistics Netherlands Historical Collection, Loop van de bevolking
per gemeente, historisch.cbs.nl.
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Figure 2.5: Yearly number of newly married individuals per 1000 inhab-
itants by region for 1930-1941, yearly number of marriages multiplied by
two per 1000 inhabitants by region for 1942-1950, the Netherlands. Divi-
sion of regions is the same as in Figure 2.3. Source: Author’s calculations
based on data from Statistics Netherlands Historical Collection, Loop van
de bevolking per gemeente, historisch.cbs.nl.
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Figure 2.6: Yearly mean maternal age at first birth by child birth year
and region, 1930-1960. North contains the northwest and northeast but
excludes the large cities in the northwest of the Netherlands that suffered
from the Hunger Winter. The trends for these cities are plotted separately.
Source: Author’s calculations based on administrative data from Statistics
Netherlands, restricted sample.
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Figure 2.7: Yearly mean difference between marriage and first birth, in
months, 1940-1950. North contains the northwest and northeast but ex-
cludes the large cities in the northwest of the Netherlands that suffered
most from the Hunger Winter: Rotterdam, Amsterdam, The Hague, Delft,
Utrecht and Haarlem. Source: Author’s calculations based on administra-
tive data from Statistics Netherlands, marital sample.
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Figure 2.8: Yearly mean maternal age at second birth by child birth year
and region, 1930-1960. North contains the northwest and northeast but
excludes the large cities in the Northwest of the Netherlands that suffered
most from the Hunger Winter. Source: Author’s calculations based on
administrative data from Statistics Netherlands, based on the restricted
sample.
Figures 79
Figure 2.9: Net migration per 1000 inhabitants by region, the Nether-
lands, 1930-1950. Northwest contains the provinces of Noord-Holland,
Zuid-Holland, and Utrecht. Northeast contains the provinces of Gronin-
gen, Friesland, Drenthe, Overijssel, and Gelderland. South contains the
provinces of Zeeland, Noord-Brabant, and Limburg. Source: Author’s cal-
culations based on data from Statistics Netherlands Historical Collection,
historisch.cbs.nl.
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Figure 2.10: GDP total production in million guilders represented on the
left axis. Industrial employment in thousands of employees represented on
the right axis, The Netherlands, 1938-1948. Source: Klemann (2002)
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Figure 2.11: Monthly crude birth rate, the Netherlands, 1938-1950. Source:
Statistics Netherlands Historical Collection, historisch.cbs.nl, Statistiek van
de loop van de bevolking 1938, p. 45.
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Figure 2.12: Hypothetical ratio (k) of child outcomes in north vs south
(north/south) depicted on left axis. Monthly crude birth rate depicted on
right axis.
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Tables
Table 2.1: Frequencies by cohort and birth region
Unrestricted Restricted Marital sample
sample sample
Males Females Males Females Males Females
Pre-Birth Peak cohort
North 104,993 100,695 67,961 64,816 57,446 55,738
South 50,568 48,657 30,089 28,955 25,177 24,646
NW cities 39,259 37,976 26,646 26,293 21,974 21,679
Birth Peak cohort
North 40,866 39,248 28,114 26,784 24,079 23,377
South 16,590 15,887 10,534 10,127 8,950 8,750
NW cities 21,861 20,778 15,916 15,325 13,334 12,764
Post-Birth Peak cohort
North 132,015 126,712 95,292 90,831 83,224 80,398
South 60,855 58,222 41,414 39,455 35,965 34,701
NW cities 63,106 60,425 47,057 45,536 40,091 38,770
Totals
All 530,113 508,600 363,023 348,122 310,240 300,823
Without NW cities 405,887 389,421 273,404 260,968 234,841 227,610
Notes: Frequencies observed in the sample as described in Section 4.4, by birth region and
sample. Children in the Birth Peak cohort are born between March and September 1946. The
pre-Birth Peak cohort contains individuals born from January 1944 up until the Birth Peak
cohort. The post-Birth Peak cohort contains individuals born after the BP cohort until 1948.
The right column shows the number of children observed to be born in-wedlock by birth year
and birth region (within the restricted sample).
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics
North South ∆
(1) (2) (1) - (2)
# individuals 187, 675 79, 705
Birth cohort
Pre-Birth Peak 132, 777 59, 044
1946 (March-September) 54, 898 20, 661
By parental marital status
In marital sample 160, 640 67, 523
First birth: In-wedlock conception 45, 455 19, 630
First birth: Shotgun marriage 11, 493 2, 897
Family characteristics
Maternal age at birth 29.445 29.874 ***
Paternal age at birth 32.392 32.770 ***
Urban 0.108 0.248 ***
Birth order 2.281 2.439 ***
Siblings 4.271 4.704 ***
Length parental marriage (days) 16,828.93 16,566.30 ***
Health outcomes
Mortality ≤ 65 0.083 0.084
(0.277) (0.278)
Mortality ≤ 70 0.134 0.135
(0.341) (0.342)
Any drugs (0/1) 0.477 0.485 ***
(0.499) (0.500)
Labor market outcomes
# individuals (males only) 96, 075 40, 623
Employment (0/1) 0.841 0.819 ***
(0.366) (0.385)
Labor income (ln)∗ 7.738 7.423 ***
(5.651) (5.889)
Enrollment in social security (0/1) 0.230 0.252 ***
(0.421) (0.434)
Notes: Descriptive statistics for the restricted sample, see data-section. Standard
deviations between brackets.
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Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics: first births by marital state at
conception
In-wedlock Shotgun ∆
conceptions conceptions
(1) (2) (1) - (2)
# individuals 65, 085 14, 390
Maternal age at birth 27.204 22.821 ***
Paternal age at birth 30.077 24.853 ***
Urban 0.166 0.116 ***
Birth order 1 1
Siblings 3.348 3.730 ***
Length parental marriage (days) 16,455.42 16,571.70 **
Health outcomes
Mortality ≤ 65 0.081 0.085 *
(0.272) (0.279)
Mortality ≤ 70 0.129 0.139 ***
(0.335) (0.346)
Any drugs (0/1) 0.475 0.502 ***
(0.499) (0.500)
Labor market outcomes
# individuals (males only) 33,186 7,442
Employment (0/1) 0.844 0.829 ***
(0.363) (0.376)
Labor income (ln)∗ 7.853 7.567 ***
(5.635) (5.751)
Enrollment in social security (0/1) 0.201 0.238 ***
(0.401) (0.426)
Notes: Descriptive statistics for the restricted sample, focus on first born children who
were born in-wedlock, distinction between in-wedlock conceptions and shotgun concep-
tions (see data-section for more information). Standard deviations between brackets.
The last column presents the outcomes of a t-test on the equality of means.
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Table 2.4: Family characteristics
Family size Marriage stability
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Pre-sample
BP -0.092*** -0.001 1.88 57.52
(0.028) (0.052) (39.99) (76.07)
North -0.395*** -0.432*** 247.04*** 168.23**
(0.022) (0.040) (31.70) (69.23)
CoBP -0.117*** -0.274*** 52.36 54.68
(0.042) (0.072) (52.10) (64.65)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Mean dep. var. 4.400 4.400 16,751.34 16,751.34
N 267,380 267,380 221,999 221,999
Panel B: By marital status at conception
BP -0.183 -0.028 85.08 385.57
(0.115) (0.260) (219.50) (500.67)
North -0.317*** -0.157 267.68 634.79
(0.057) (0.231) (183.38) (385.94)
CoBP -0.311* -0.037 88.57 -935.31**
(0.158) (0.224) (168.32) (435.85)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group IW SG IW SG
Mean dep. var. 3.348 3.730 16,455.42 16,571.70
N 65,085 14,390 65,085 14,390
Notes: Estimated by OLS. Standard errors are clustered by birth month/year
and birth region (north versus south). The specification contains region-
specific birth-month/year trends (linear and quadratic), an indicator for
being conceived during the liberation of the south, birth month dummies,
and a control for maternal age at birth.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.5: Labor market outcomes - Males
Employment Labor earnings (ln) Social security
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Pre-sample
BP 0.026*** 0.005 0.403*** 0.029 -0.037*** 0.002
(0.004) (0.010) (0.060) (0.165) (0.005) (0.013)
North 0.022*** 0.032*** 0.314*** 0.459*** -0.025*** -0.039***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.065) (0.115) (0.005) (0.006)
CoBP -0.004 -0.007 -0.044 -0.117 0.014** 0.003
(0.005) (0.009) (0.079) (0.129) (0.007) (0.012)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Mean dep. var. 0.834 0.834 7.644 7.644 0.237 0.237
N 136,698 136,698 136,698 136,698 136,698 136,698
Panel B: Pre-sample by marital status at conception
BP -0.031 0.037 -0.466 0.211 0.015 0.045
(0.023) (0.038) (0.356) (0.579) (0.020) (0.064)
North 0.028*** 0.065* 0.426** 0.801 -0.026** -0.082*
(0.010) (0.033) (0.165) (0.527) (0.011) (0.045)
CoBP -0.006 -0.009 -0.201 0.169 -0.006 -0.058
(0.021) (0.032) (0.328) (0.488) (0.018) (0.052)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group IW SG IW SG IW SG
Mean dep. var. 0.844 0.829 7.853 7.567 0.201 0.238
N 33,186 7,442 33,186 7,442 33,186 7,442
Notes: Estimated by OLS, males only, restricted sample. The specification contains region-specific
birth-month/year trends (linear and quadratic), birth month dummies, and controls for whether the
individuals was conceived during the liberation of the south, and whether the individual is born in
a city, and maternal age at birth. IW indicates that the individual is conceived in-wedlock, whereas
SG denotes a shotgun conception.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.6: Health outcomes
Mortality ≤ 65 Mortality ≤ 70 I(Any drugs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Pre-sample
BP 0.002 0.001 -0.000 0.003 -0.014** 0.035***
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
North -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.006 -0.003
(0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
CoBP -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.024***
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Mean dep. var. 0.084 0.084 0.135 0.135 0.479 0.479
N 267,380 267,380 267,380 267,380 267,380 267,380
Panel B: Pre-sample by marital status at conception
BP -0.011 -0.019 -0.013 0.012 0.044** 0.059
(0.011) (0.032) (0.011) (0.043) (0.016) (0.045)
North -0.005 0.008 -0.006 -0.016 -0.005 -0.037
(0.008) (0.017) (0.008) (0.029) (0.014) (0.023)
CoBP 0.011 0.032 0.009 0.009 -0.049*** -0.070*
(0.010) (0.027) (0.011) (0.036) (0.016) (0.041)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group IW SG IW SG IW SG
Mean dep. var. 0.081 0.085 0.129 0.139 0.475 0.502
N 65,085 14,390 65,085 14,390 65,085 14,390
Notes: Estimated by OLS, restricted sample. The specification contains region-specific birth-
month/year trends (linear and quadratic), birth month dummies, and controls for whether the
individuals is born in a city, and maternal age at birth. The pre-sample specification also
contains an indicator for being conceived during the liberation of the south. IW indicates that
the individual is conceived in-wedlock, whereas SG denotes a shotgun conception.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.7: Robustness results - Family outcomes
Family size Length marriage
(1) (2)
Baseline -0.274*** 54.68
(0.072) (64.65)
N 267,380 221,999
Post-cohorts -0.036 -24.78
(0.055) (112.83)
N 342,551 294,189
First birth only -0.242** -71.372
(0.120) (128.038)
N 99,855 79,475
Closer to the rivers -0.338*** 165.493*
(0.066) (88.243)
N 167,155 138,710
Treatment: Incl. Feb -0.302*** 61.95
(0.064) (61.96)
N 267,380 221,999
Treatment: Mar-May -0.272*** 101.50
(0.063) (67.32)
N 225,770 186,833
Donut: Hunger Winter -0.162*** -4.78
(0.039) (50.33)
N 186,402 155,546
Donut: south liberated -0.377*** -39.46
(0.089) (152.90)
N 202,120 168,407
Notes : Double-difference estimate Birth’46*North is reported, full con-
trol specification.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.8: Robustness results - Child outcomes
Employ. Labor earn. Social Mort.≤ 65 Mort. ≤ 70 I(Any
(ln) Security drugs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline -0.007 -0.117 0.003 -0.002 -0.005 -0.024***
(0.009) (0.129) (0.012) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
N 136,698 136,698 136,698 267,380 267,380 267,380
Post-cohorts -0.012 -0.164 0.014* 0.002 -0.003 -0.005
(0.008) (0.130) (0.008) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007)
N 175,354 175,354 175,354 342,551 342,551 342,551
First birth only 0.005 0.035 -0.016 0.010 0.003 -0.044***
(0.019) (0.284) (0.015) (0.008) (0.010) (0.014)
N 51,272 51,272 51,272 99,855 99,855 99,855
Males only -0.006 -0.006 -0.020
(0.007) (0.009) (0.012)
N 136,698 136,698 136,698
Females only 0.001 -0.005 -0.028**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.012)
N 130,682 130,682 130,682
Out-wedlock birth 0.042 0.805 0.025 -0.025 -0.045 0.019
(0.045) (0.721) (0.081) (0.027) (0.034) (0.043)
N 3,063 3,063 3,063 6,164 6,164 6,164
Closer to the rivers -0.010 -0.192 0.002 -0.008 -0.009* -0.016*
(0.008) (0.125) (0.013) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009)
N 85,389 85,389 85,389 167,155 167,155 167,155
Treatment: Incl. Feb -0.014* -0.200 0.004 0.002 -0.006 -0.008
(0.008) (0.126) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010)
N 136,698 136,698 136,698 267,380 267,380 267,380
Treatment: Mar-May -0.005 -0.077 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.025***
(0.009) (0.135) (0.012) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008)
N 115,353 115,353 115,353 225,770 225,770 225,770
Donut: Hunger Winter -0.008 -0.165 0.006 -0.003 -0.008 -0.018*
(0.008) (0.123) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008)
N 95,350 95,350 95,350 186,402 186,402 186,402
Donut: south liberated -0.015 -0.283 0.030 0.005 -0.015 -0.003
(0.011) (0.189) (0.021) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010)
N 103,331 103,331 103,331 202,120 202,120 202,120
Conditioning on mortality -0.006 -0.102 0.003 -0.010** -0.013** -0.021***
(0.008) (0.118) (0.012) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
N 134,500 134,500 134,500 253,837 253,837 253,837
Notes : Double-difference estimate Birth’46*North is reported, full control specification.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.9: CoBP siblings - males - labor market outcomes
Employment Labor earnings (ln) Social security
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A:
Sibling in BP -0.010*** -0.014** -0.146*** -0.197** 0.014*** 0.011
(0.003) (0.006) (0.052) (0.093) (0.005) (0.007)
North 0.031*** 0.033** 0.587*** 0.635*** -0.046*** -0.044**
(0.011) (0.013) (0.179) (0.206) (0.016) (0.019)
CoBP Siblings 0.004 0.011 0.079 0.166 -0.003 -0.005
(0.004) (0.007) (0.066) (0.106) (0.006) (0.008)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2-child families No Yes No Yes No Yes
Mean dep. var. 0.880 0.878 8.341 8.330 0.190 0.188
N 139,247 90,599 139,247 90,599 139,247 90,599
Panel B: By marital status at first conception
Sibling in BP -0.015** 0.002 -0.232** 0.120 0.012 0.009
(0.007) (0.017) (0.103) (0.252) (0.008) (0.021)
North 0.010 0.080** 0.273 1.126* -0.010 -0.076
(0.014) (0.036) (0.234) (0.578) (0.022) (0.046)
CoBP Siblings 0.008 0.019 0.147 0.231 -0.002 -0.025
(0.008) (0.018) (0.119) (0.269) (0.009) (0.023)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2-child families Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group IW SG IW SG IW SG
Mean dep. var. 0.889 0.858 8.528 7.965 0.168 0.231
N 63,690 14,686 63,690 14,686 63,690 14,686
Notes: Estimated by OLS, males only, restricted sample. The specification contains region-specific
birth-month/year trends (linear and quadratic), birth month dummies, whether the individuals is
born in a city, and maternal age at birth.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.10: CoBP siblings - health outcomes
Mortality ≤ 65 Mortality ≤ 70 I(Any drugs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A:
Sibling in BP -0.003 0.001 -0.004 0.001 0.008** 0.017***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
North 0.001 0.007 0.009 0.012 -0.006 -0.002
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015)
CoBP Siblings 0.005* 0.003 0.007** 0.005 -0.002 -0.003
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2-child families only No Yes No Yes No Yes
Mean dep. var. 0.084 0.085 0.119 0.122 0.419 0.427
N 272,644 176,834 272,644 176,834 272,644 176,834
Panel B: By marital status at first conception
Sibling in BP 0.005 -0.015 0.004 -0.020 0.013** 0.005
(0.004) (0.010) (0.005) (0.012) (0.006) (0.017)
North 0.016* -0.022 0.023* -0.033 -0.008 -0.031
(0.009) (0.027) (0.012) (0.032) (0.017) (0.043)
CoBP Siblings -0.003 0.020* 0.001 0.018 0.012 -0.027
(0.005) (0.011) (0.006) (0.014) (0.008) (0.019)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2-child families No Yes No Yes No Yes
Group IW SG IW SG IW SG
Mean dep. var. 0.080 0.093 0.114 0.132 0.415 0.456
N 124,798 28,877 124,798 28,877 124,798 28,877
Notes: Estimated by OLS, restricted sample. The specification contains region-specific birth-
month/year trends (linear and quadratic), birth month dummies, whether the individuals is born
in a city, and maternal age at birth.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.11: Selection in restricted sample
I(Mother observed in restricted sample)
Pre-sample Post-sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BP 0.041*** -0.000 -0.043*** -0.008
(0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006)
North 0.050*** 0.035*** 0.040*** 0.025**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010)
CoBP -0.001 0.003 0.009 0.007
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
Mat. age at birth -0.027*** -0.023***
(0.000) (0.000)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Mean value of outcome 0.640 0.640 0.699 0.699
N 417,504 417,504 490,395 490,395
Notes: Estimated by OLS. Standard errors are clustered by birth month/year and
birth region (north versus south). The specification contains region-specific birth-
month/year trends (linear and quadratic), birth month dummies and a control for
maternal age at birth. The pre-sample specification also contains an indicator for
being conceived during the liberation of the south. Estimated for unrestricted sam-
ple.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.12: Mechanisms at work
Employ. Labor earn. Social Mort.≤ 65 Mort. ≤ 70 I(Any
(ln) Security drugs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline -0.007 -0.117 0.003 -0.002 -0.005 -0.024***
(0.009) (0.129) (0.012) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
N 136,698 136,698 136,698 267,380 267,380 267,380
Cohort effects or parental selection?
Cohort size -0.010 -0.177 0.010 -0.002 -0.004 -0.022***
(0.009) (0.135) (0.012) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
N 136,698 136,698 136,698 267,380 267,380 267,380
Influence of the Hunger Winter
Incl. HW-cities -0.005 -0.057 -0.000 -0.003 -0.006 -0.022***
(0.009) (0.137) (0.012) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
N 179,260 179,260 179,260 351,560 351,560 351,560
Influence of forced labor absence
Excl. border prov. -0.014 -0.205 0.009 -0.001 -0.005 -0.021**
(0.011) (0.142) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
N 76,443 76,443 76,443 149,508 149,508 149,508
Influence of Canadian Liberators
Leave-dates 0.004 0.117 -0.020 -0.007 0.011 -0.034**
(0.016) (0.244) (0.016) (0.007) (0.008) (0.013)
N 108,441 108,441 108,441 211,998 211,998 211,998
Leave-centres -0.011 -0.223 0.010 -0.002 -0.009 -0.023***
(0.009) (0.145) (0.014) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008)
N 106,896 106,896 106,896 209,098 209,098 209,098
Sample selection effects
Unrestricted sample -0.006 -0.054 -0.005 -0.004 -0.008 -0.016**
(0.009) (0.136) (0.010) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
N 213,017 213,017 213,017 417,504 417,504 417,504
Notes : Double-difference estimate Birth’46*North is reported, full control specification.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Appendix A: Additional Figures
Figure 2.A1: Yearly live births by region, the Netherlands, 1930-1950.
North contains the provinces of Noord-Holland, Zuid-Holland, Utrecht,
Groningen, Friesland, Drenthe, Overijssel, and Gelderland. South contains
the provinces of Zeeland, Noord-Brabant, and Limburg. Data for 1940
is missing. Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Statistics
Netherlands Historical Collection, Loop van de bevolking per gemeente,
historisch.cbs.nl.
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Figure 2.A2: Yearly number of newly married individuals by region for
1930-1941, yearly number of marriages multiplied by two by region for
1942-1950, the Netherlands. Division of regions is the same as in Fig-
ure 2.3. Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Statistics
Netherlands Historical Collection, Loop van de bevolking per gemeente,
historisch.cbs.nl.
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Figure 2.A3: Yearly number of out-wedlock conceptions, separated by
whether they are followed by a marriage (in-wedlock birth) or not (out-
wedlock birth). Source: CBS (1975).
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Figure 2.A4: Net migration by region, the Netherlands, 1930-1950. Di-
vision of regions is the same as in Figure 2.3. Source: Author’s calcu-
lations based on data from Statistics Netherlands Historical Collection,
historisch.cbs.nl.
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Figure 2.A5: Yearly live births per 1000 inhabitants by maternal age at
birth, the Netherlands, 1936-2015. Source: Statistics Netherlands, stat-
line.cbs.nl.
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Figure 2.A6: Yearly mortality per 1000 live births for perinatal deaths
and deaths after birth, yearly mortality per 1000 births for stillbirths, the
Netherlands, 1900-2016. Source: Statistics Netherlands, statline.cbs.nl.
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Figure 2.A7: Yearly mortality per 1000 inhabitants by age, the Nether-
lands, 1936-2015. Source: Statistics Netherlands, statline.cbs.nl.
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Figure 2.A8: Sex ratio, yearly number of males born for every 1000 females,
the Netherlands, 1900-2015. Source: Statistics Netherlands, statline.cbs.nl.
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(a) Employment in 1999 (0/1)
(b) Earnings in 1999 (ln)
(c) Social security benefits in 1999 (0/1)
Figure 2.A9: Common trend in labor market outcomes
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(a) Mortality before age 65 (0/1)
(b) Mortality before age 70 (0/1)
(c) Any prescription drugs, four groups related to
lifestyle (0/1)
Figure 2.A10: Common trend in health outcomes
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Appendix B: Additional Tables
Table 2.A1: Calorie rations by regions by three months. Source: (Stein
et al., 1975)
Area June-Aug Sept-Nov Dec-Feb Mar-May June-Aug Sept-Nov
1944 1944 1944-45 1945 1945 1945
West 1512 1414 740 670 1757 2083
North 1512 1450 1345 1392 1755 2083
South 1512 1403 1375 1692 1864 2083
Table 2.A2: Maternal age at birth in 1946 and age in 1995.
Maternal age Maternal birth Age in 1995
in 1946 year
20 1926 69
21 1925 70
22 1924 71
23 1923 72
24 1922 73
25 1921 74
26 1920 75
27 1919 76
28 1918 77
29 1917 78
30 1916 79
31 1915 80
32 1914 81
33 1913 82
34 1912 83
35 1911 84
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Table 2.A3: Common trend assumption tests - parental level
Maternal age Paternal age Length of
at birth at birth marriage
(1) (2) (3)
D41 -0.116 -0.139 27.357
(0.096) (0.103) (92.210)
D42 0.087 0.067 28.236
(0.088) (0.084) (72.995)
D43 0.029 0.058 77.690
(0.076) (0.085) (67.875)
D44 0.096 0.131 46.760
(0.089) (0.090) (67.563)
D45 0.096 0.172* 109.318
(0.084) (0.088) (69.607)
D46 0.080 0.072 136.075*
(0.068) (0.075) (69.978)
D47 0.091 0.106 65.996
(0.077) (0.082) (66.947)
D48 0.067 0.125* 99.078
(0.068) (0.074) (65.142)
D49 0.055 0.166** 78.647
(0.069) (0.077) (63.945)
D50 0.041 0.159 84.526
(0.064) (0.070) (64.725)
N 1,035,910 1,031,995 873,489
Notes : Estimated by OLS. The outcome of interest is re-
gressed on a series of region and year fixed effects (not
reported). The reported coefficients represent interac-
tions between birth year and being born in the north.
Standard errors are clustered by birthmonth/year and
region.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.A4: Common trend assumption tests - child level
Employed Earnings (ln) Any Social Mort. ≤ 65 Mort. ≤ 70 Any drugs
Security 4 groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D41 -0.008 -0.096 -0.001 -0.005 -0.004 -0.001
(0.012) (0.199) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
D42 -0.011 -0.134 0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.000
(0.011) (0.174) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
D43 -0.018* -0.244 0.007 -0.004 -0.004 0.001
(0.011) (0.166) (0.010) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007)
D44 -0.017* -0.261* 0.004 -0.001 0.002 -0.003
(0.010) (0.151) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
D45 -0.028*** -0.413*** 0.019** -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(0.010) (0.153) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008)
D46 -0.024** -0.333** 0.024*** -0.003 -0.001 -0.002
(0.009) (0.146) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007)
D47 -0.027*** -0.359** 0.020** -0.001 0.002 0.003
(0.009) (0.146) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
D48 -0.031*** -0.444*** 0.023*** -0.000 0.001 -0.001
(0.010) (0.150) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007)
D49 -0.035*** -0.486*** 0.031*** 0.000 0.002 0.006
(0.009) (0.145) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
D50 -0.031*** -0.471*** 0.028*** -0.003 0.001 0.005
(0.009) (0.145) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
N 530,117 530,117 530,117 1,035,910 1,035,910 1,035,910
Notes : Estimated by OLS. The outcome of interest is regressed on a series of region and year fixed effects
(not reported). The reported coefficients represent interactions between birth year and being born in
the north. Standard errors are clustered by birthmonth/year and region.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.A5: Log earnings conditional on employmen-
t
Labor earnings (ln)
Pre-sample Post-sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A
BP 0.020** -0.070*** -0.009 0.012
(0.008) (0.026) (0.006) (0.017)
North 0.018** 0.004 0.010** -0.036
(0.007) (0.021) (0.005) (0.028)
CoBP 0.003 0.026 0.011 0.021
(0.010) (0.024) (0.008) (0.017)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Mean dep. var. 10.281 10.281 10.298 10.298
N 112,484 112,484 149,743 149,743
Panel B: By marital status at conception
BP -0.045 -0.160 0.021 0.102
(0.037) (0.104) (0.027) (0.073)
North -0.003 0.151* -0.103* 0.116
(0.046) (0.077) (0.052) (0.141)
CoBP -0.003 0.030 0.066** -0.064
(0.033) (0.089) (0.032) (0.076)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group IW SG IW SG
Mean dep. var. 10.362 10.249 10.381 10.245
N 27,623 6,098 37,646 8,539
Notes: Estimated by OLS. Standard errors are clustered by birth
month/year and birth region (north versus south). The specifi-
cation contains region-specific birth-month/year trends (linear and
quadratic), birth month dummies, and a control for maternal age
at birth. The pre-sample specification also contains an indicator for
being conceived during the liberation of the south.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.A6: Results - Other health outcomes
Any drugs Mental Cardiovas. Respir. Diabetes
Panel A: Pre-sample
BP 0.030*** 0.024*** 0.019** 0.009 -0.008
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005)
North -0.007 0.015*** -0.013** -0.003 -0.004
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003)
CoBP -0.020*** -0.014** -0.014* -0.004 0.008*
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean dep. var. 0.744 0.191 0.330 0.086 0.067
N 267,380 267,380 267,380 267,380 267,380
Panel B: Pre-sample for first births conceived in-wedlock
BP 0.049*** 0.031** 0.018 0.001 0.009
(0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.011) (0.012)
North 0.003 0.018** -0.024 -0.006 0.000
(0.011) (0.008) (0.016) (0.008) (0.007)
CoBP -0.028* -0.018 -0.017 -0.018 -0.005
(0.015) (0.013) (0.019) (0.011) (0.011)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean dep. var. 0.742 0.189 0.321 0.083 0.062
N 65,085 65,085 65,085 65,085 65,085
Panel A: Pre-sample for first births conceived out of wedlock
BP 0.025 -0.000 -0.022 0.008 -0.041
(0.037) (0.024) (0.037) (0.034) (0.026)
North -0.037* -0.001 -0.060** -0.033** 0.003
(0.021) (0.017) (0.025) (0.014) (0.016)
CoBP -0.052 0.003 0.003 0.023 0.021
(0.032) (0.022) (0.035) (0.031) (0.024)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean dep. var. 0.746 0.188 0.358 0.094 0.084
N 14,390 14,390 14,390 14,390 14,390
Notes : Any drugs corresponds to any prescription for any drugs and not, as earlier only
for the relevant four groups. Double-difference estimate Birth’46*North is reported, full
control specification.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.A7: Family characteristics - Post-sample
Family size Marriage stability
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Post-sample
BP -0.085*** 0.078 65.56* 12.10
(0.026) (0.053) (36.04) (88.29)
North -0.382*** -0.480*** 259.53*** 388.72**
(0.023) (0.093) (22.77) (173.44)
CoBP -0.131*** -0.036 39.88 -24.78
(0.043) (0.055) (47.20) (112.83)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Mean dep. var. 4.412 4.412 16,705.47 16,705.47
N 342,551 342,551 294,189 294,189
Panel B: By marital status at conception
BP 0.019 -0.279 8.83 660.10
(0.083) (0.188) (183.37) (427.56)
North -0.583*** -0.506* 314.06 1221.63*
(0.183) (0.269) (319.36) (706.68)
CoBP -0.101 0.274 8.09 -813.22*
(0.102) (0.189) (199.06) (424.49)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group IW SG IW SG
Mean dep. var. 3.366 3.581 16,441.27 16,505.49
N 85,087 19,474 85,087 19,474
Notes: Estimated by OLS. Standard errors are clustered by birth month/year
and birth region (north versus south). The specification contains region-
specific birth-month/year trends (linear and quadratic), birth month dum-
mies, and a control for maternal age at birth.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.A8: Labor market outcomes - Males - Post-sample
Employment Labor earnings (ln) Social security
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Post-sample
BP -0.017*** 0.003 -0.267*** 0.071 0.012*** -0.013*
(0.003) (0.007) (0.053) (0.121) (0.004) (0.007)
North 0.018*** 0.034** 0.274*** 0.491** -0.018*** -0.027*
(0.003) (0.013) (0.050) (0.213) (0.004) (0.014)
CoBP -0.000 -0.012 -0.004 -0.164 0.007 0.014*
(0.004) (0.008) (0.067) (0.130) (0.006) (0.008)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Mean dep. var. 0.865 0.865 8.122 8.122 0.204 0.204
N 175,354 175,354 175,354 175,354 175,354 175,354
Panel B: Post-sample by marital status at conception
BP -0.004 0.023 -0.070 0.524 -0.018 -0.082*
(0.015) (0.041) (0.238) (0.642) (0.014) (0.043)
North 0.035 0.127** 0.459 2.222** -0.021 -0.136*
(0.027) (0.061) (0.409) (1.002) (0.024) (0.079)
CoBP -0.020 -0.035 -0.291 -0.693 0.015 0.085*
(0.018) (0.041) (0.274) (0.656) (0.015) (0.045)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group IW SG IW SG IW SG
Mean dep. var. 0.878 0.851 8.381 7.927 0.166 0.221
N 43,444 10,119 43,444 10,119 43,444 10,119
Notes: Estimated by OLS, males only, restricted sample. The specification contains region-specific
birth-month/year trends (linear and quadratic), birth month dummies, and controls for whether
the individuals is born in a city, and maternal age at birth. IW indicates that the individual is
conceived in-wedlock, whereas SG denotes a shotgun conception.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.A9: Health outcomes - Post-sample
Mortality ≤ 65 Mortality ≤ 70 Any drugs (4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Post-sample
BP 0.000 -0.003 0.004 0.004 0.030*** 0.007
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007)
North -0.000 -0.008 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.010
(0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.008) (0.003) (0.012)
CoBP -0.003 0.002 -0.005 -0.003 -0.008 -0.005
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Mean dep. var. 0.085 0.085 0.132 0.132 0.448 0.448
N 342,551 342,551 342,551 342,551 342,551 342,551
Panel B: Post-sample by marital status at conception
BP 0.003 -0.022 0.006 -0.025 -0.006 -0.040
(0.007) (0.014) (0.011) (0.024) (0.017) (0.034)
North 0.006 0.003 0.032 -0.033 -0.026 -0.123**
(0.013) (0.024) (0.021) (0.041) (0.031) (0.052)
CoBP -0.009 0.008 -0.023* 0.020 -0.005 0.047
(0.008) (0.015) (0.012) (0.024) (0.018) (0.033)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group IW SG IW SG IW SG
Mean dep. var. 0.079 0.095 0.124 0.145 0.442 0.482
N 85,087 19,474 85,087 19,474 85,087 19,474
Notes: Estimated by OLS, restricted sample. The specification contains region-specific birth-
month/year trends (linear and quadratic), birth month dummies, and controls for whether
the individuals is born in a city, and maternal age at birth. IW indicates that the individual
is conceived in-wedlock, whereas SG denotes a shotgun conception.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.A10: Labor market outcomes - Cohort size controls
Employment Labor earnings (ln) Social security
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Pre-sample
BP 0.005 0.004 0.029 0.018 0.002 0.004
(0.010) (0.011) (0.165) (0.169) (0.013) (0.013)
North 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.459*** 0.431*** -0.039*** -0.035***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.115) (0.116) (0.006) (0.006)
CoBP -0.007 -0.010 -0.117 -0.177 0.003 0.010
(0.009) (0.009) (0.129) (0.135) (0.012) (0.012)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Coh. size controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Mean dep. var. 0.834 0.834 7.644 7.644 0.237 0.237
N 136,698 136,698 136,698 136,698 136,698 136,698
Panel B: Pre-sample by marital status at conception
BP -0.031 0.035 -0.473 0.185 0.016 0.047
(0.023) (0.038) (0.359) (0.583) (0.019) (0.064)
North 0.027*** 0.065* 0.411** 0.805 -0.025** -0.083*
(0.010) (0.033) (0.163) (0.531) (0.011) (0.045)
CoBP -0.007 -0.013 -0.242 0.092 -0.002 -0.050
(0.021) (0.032) (0.332) (0.493) (0.018) (0.051)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Coh. size controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group IW SG IW SG IW SG
Mean dep. var. 0.844 0.829 7.853 7.567 0.201 0.238
N 33,186 7,442 33,186 7,442 33,186 7,442
Notes: Estimated by OLS, males only, restricted sample. The specification contains region-specific birth-
month/year trends (linear and quadratic), birth month dummies, and controls for whether the individu-
als is born in a city, and maternal age at birth. The pre-sample specification also contains an indicator
for being conceived during the liberation of the south. IW indicates that the individual is conceived
in-wedlock, whereas SG denotes a shotgun conception.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.A11: Health outcomes - Cohort size controls
Mortality ≤ 65 Mortality ≤ 70 I(Lifestyle drugs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Pre-sample
BP 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.035*** 0.035***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
North 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.003 -0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
CoBP -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.004 -0.024*** -0.022***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Coh. size controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Mean dep. var. 0.084 0.084 0.135 0.135 0.479 0.479
N 267,380 267,380 267,380 267,380 267,380 267,380
Panel B: Pre-sample by marital status at conception
BP -0.011 -0.019 -0.013 0.012 0.044*** 0.059
(0.011) (0.032) (0.011) (0.043) (0.016) (0.045)
North -0.005 0.008 -0.007 -0.016 -0.005 -0.037
(0.008) (0.017) (0.008) (0.029) (0.014) (0.023)
CoBP 0.011 0.032 0.009 0.008 -0.048*** -0.071*
(0.010) (0.027) (0.011) (0.036) (0.016) (0.041)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Coh. size controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group IW SG IW SG IW SG
Mean dep. var. 0.081 0.085 0.129 0.139 0.475 0.502
N 65,085 14,390 65,085 14,390 65,085 14,390
Notes: Estimated by OLS, restricted sample. The specification contains region-specific birth-
month/year trends (linear and quadratic), birth month dummies, and controls for whether the
individuals is born in a city, and maternal age at birth. The pre-sample specification also con-
tains an indicator for being conceived during the liberation of the south. IW indicates that the
individual is conceived in-wedlock, whereas SG denotes a shotgun conception.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Chapter 3
The role of prenatal
testosterone in test scores
1
Joint work with Anne C. Gielen
3.1 Introduction
Although there has been a quick reversal of the gender gap in education-
al attainment in the U.S. and most other developed countries in the last
decades (e.g. Goldin et al., 2006; Goldin, 2014), this increasing female col-
lege attainment stands in sharp contrast with the gender gap in education-
al test scores, which has remained remarkably stable over time. Generally,
boys outperform girls in mathematics (Fryer and Levitt, 2010; Bharad-
waj et al., 2015), but fall behind in the reading domain compared to girls
1This chapter is based on Gielen and Zwiers (2018). The authors wish to thank the
Centraal Instituut voor Toestsontwikkeling (CITO) and Perined for providing access to
their data. This paper benefited from comments made by Thomas Buser, Henrik Cron-
qvist, Gordon Dahl, Guido Imbens, Jan Kaba´tek, Sacha Kapoor, Olivier Marie, David
Neumark, Hannes Schwandt, Zahra Siddique, Andrea Terei, Dinand Webbink, Bas ter
Weel, Alice Wu, Basit Zafar, and participants in various conferences and workshops.
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(Halpern et al., 2007; Guiso et al., 2008; Banda et al., 2010). These diffe-
rences are important since test scores typically influence the type of (high)
school a child attends, and subsequently influence the type of college one
enrols for (Buser et al., 2014; Banda et al., 2010; Ceci et al., 2009), ultimate-
ly leading to gender-related earnings differentials.2 In fact, math skills may
become even more important in the labor market due to recent advances
in math-intensive technologies (Lippmann and Senik, 2018).3 Earlier lit-
erature has shown that gender differences in math and reading ability can
arise from social conditioning and gender-biased environments (e.g. Wilder
and Powell, 1989; Miller and Halpern, 2014; Lippmann and Senik, 2018;
Reardon et al., 2018). This paper adds biological factors as a potentially
additional important driver of gender gaps in educational performance. If
there is a role for biological factors in causing such gender differences, ig-
noring these implies that the role of any discriminatory or gender-biased
environmental factors is currently being over-estimated in the literature.
Hence, more knowledge on the role of biology is essential, especially in the
light of recent policies aiming to promote females in STEM fields of study
and STEM careers.
This paper explores biological factors as a potentially additional expla-
nation for gender differences in math and reading performance in childhood.
We specifically focus on the role of prenatal testosterone, which is a likely
and often mentioned explanation for various gender differences. Prenatal
testosterone induces the sexual differentiation of the male fetus. In addition
to influencing the development of sexually dimorphic physical characteris-
2For an overview of the literature, trends and explanations of the gender pay gap
consult Blau and Kahn (2000), and Blau and Kahn (2017).
3Mathematics performance is shown to be related to higher earnings (Altonji, 1995;
Arcidiacono, 2004; Joensen and Nielsen, 2009; Altonji et al., 2012; Blau and Kahn, 2017).
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tics, exposure to prenatal testosterone is known to wire the brain with
masculine behavioral patterns (i.e. in preferences, personality, and tem-
perament) (Jordan-Young, 2010).4 Little is known to what extent these
differences translate into gender-specific primary school outcomes such as
math and reading test scores.
In this paper, we exploit a natural experiment in twinning to iden-
tify the biological contribution of prenatal testosterone exposure to gen-
der differences in test scores. Measuring prenatal testosterone directly in
human fetuses is impossible due to practical and ethical constraints. We
circumvent this by exploiting the twin testosterone transfer (TTT) hypoth-
esis. Between the eighth and twenty-fourth week of gestation male fetuses
are exposed to elevated levels of testosterone (Auyeung et al., 2013). As
with other litter-bearing mammals, among human twins this testosterone
might transfer in significant concentrations from a male twin to his female
uterus mate. This TTT would imply that individuals with a male co-twin
are exposed to higher levels of prenatal testosterone than individuals with
a female co-twin. Previous studies from other scientific disciplines have
used TTT and their findings suggest that females with a fraternal co-twin
are more masculine in morphological characteristics, behavior, and cogni-
tive capabilities (Resnick et al., 1993; Cohen-Bendahan et al., 2004; Peper
et al., 2009; Vuoksimaa et al., 2010a,b; Heil et al., 2011; Slutske et al.,
2011).5 Since these male-typical cognitive capabilities, e.g. spatial skills,
4Evidence from laboratory and field experiments indicates that women display less
aggressive behavior (e.g. Bettencourt and Miller, 1996), act more risk averse (e.g. Eckel
and Grossman, 2008; Croson and Gneezy, 2009), and engage less in competitive activities
(e.g. Gneezy et al., 2003; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Buser, 2012b; O¨rs et al., 2013)
than men.
5For males with a male co-twin no evidence for increased masculine behavior or
characteristics is found (Resnick et al., 1993; Peper et al., 2009; Tapp et al., 2011;
Cronqvist et al., 2015).
118 CHAPTER 3. PRENATAL TESTOSTERONE
that result from more masculine wiring of the brain are known to be related
to boys’ advantage in math (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2010), we expect to
observe higher math scores for individuals with a male twin than for those
with a female twin. In this paper we argue that twinning is a plausible
natural experiment to proxy exposure to prenatal testosterone, and that it
can be used to identify the effect of elevated prenatal testosterone exposure
on math and reading test scores.
Earlier applications of TTT to economic outcomes are relatively scarce.
A study by Gielen et al. (2016) investigates the role of TTT to explain the
gender wage gap, and finds higher earnings for men with a male co-twin,
but no effect for women. Another study by Cronqvist et al. (2015) focuses
on financial decision-making, and finds that females with a male co-twin
take significantly more risk later in life compared to females with a female
co-twin. Both of these studies focus on outcomes in adulthood, but the
effects of TTT might well appear much earlier in life already. This paper
focuses on the role of TTT on outcomes during childhood, in particular
educational performance in primary school. We use Dutch administrative
data from Statistics Netherlands where we observe all twins born between
1993 and 2003, combined with test score records. These data allow us to
estimate the effect of having a male co-twin on math and reading test scores
in the final grade of primary education (i.e. at approximately age twelve)
in the years 2006 to 2014.
To study the causal effect of TTT on test scores we compare children
with an opposite-sex twin sibling with children that have a same-sex twin
sibling. We control for socialization effects of growing up with a same-sex
or opposite-sex sibling by using a control group of closely spaced singletons
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(CSS) which are siblings whose birth dates are at most twelve months a-
part.6 When socialization is similar for twins and CSS, this identification
gives the causal effect of TTT on test scores. Our baseline results show
that girls with an opposite-sex twin sibling score on average about 7% of a
standard deviation lower on math as compared to girls with a twin sister
and after controlling for socialization, whereas null effects are found on an
aggregate and a reading score. A further investigation in potential mech-
anisms and explanations for this effect highlights that the effect appears
to be concentrated among children growing up in families and areas with
more traditional gender norms, and we hypothesize that adherence to the
social norm plays an important role here. If TTT causes children to feel
different from the typical gender norm, a behavioral response may arise
which can offset any potential effect of TTT on test scores. We conclude
from this that our findings are not just driven by biological factors, but that
the influence of biological factors also strongly depends on environmental
factors.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section
summarizes the literature on the gender gap in math and reading test
scores, and the potential role of prenatal testosterone herein. Section 3
outlines the identification strategy. The data and results are presented in
sections 4 and 5. These are followed by a discussion of potential underlying
mechanisms in section 6, and a conclusion in section 7.
6The results are robust to using broader windows of 18, 24 and 36 months.
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3.2 Prenatal testosterone and the gender
math gap
Several studies for various countries have shown that on average boys per-
form better in math than girls (Fryer and Levitt, 2010; Banda et al., 2010;
Bharadwaj et al., 2015; OECD, 2015). The gap widens with age (Fryer
and Levitt, 2010; Bharadwaj et al., 2015), and ability (Ellison and Swan-
son, 2009; Fryer and Levitt, 2010; Pope and Sydnor, 2010; Stoet and Geary,
2013; OECD, 2015). The math differential is reversed in the reading do-
main, where girls generally outperform boys (Halpern et al., 2007; Guiso
et al., 2008; Banda et al., 2010). Apart from higher average performance
on math, and lower average performance on reading, boys are also known
to be more variable in their performance (Halpern et al., 2007; Machin and
Pekkarinen, 2008). The latter implies that boys are more often in both the
high and low end of the performance distribution.
Gender differences in educational performance are attributed to both
(1) biological differences (i.e. differences in brain development or testos-
terone exposure) or to (2) gender differences in socialization, stereotypes,
and preferences (Wilder and Powell, 1989; Miller and Halpern, 2014). The
existing literature examines explanations for the latter channel, e.g.: dif-
ferences in the cultural dimension (Guiso et al., 2008; Stoet and Geary,
2013), gender differences in competitiveness (Gneezy et al., 2003; Gneezy
and Rustichini, 2004; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Croson and Gneezy,
2009; Flory et al., 2010; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2010; Buser, 2012b; O¨rs
et al., 2013), stereotype threats (e.g. Spencer et al., 1999; Stoet and Geary,
2012; Nollenberger et al., 2014), gender biased environments (Fryer and
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Levitt, 2010; Bharadwaj et al., 2015), and gender identity norms (Lippman-
n and Senik, 2018; Reardon et al., 2018). However, our understanding of
biological factors explaining gender differences in educational performance
is still very limited.
It is well known that early life environments are important for the de-
velopment of a child’s cognitive capacities (e.g. Knudsen et al., 2006; Heck-
man, 2008; Almond and Currie, 2011a). The pre-birth environment plays
an important role alongside the post-birth environment. The fetal origin-
s hypothesis asserts that the prenatal period is of crucial importance for
both the cognitive development and the health of the child. In this period,
the fetus is very sensitive to -amongst others- maternal smoking, maternal
malnutrition, and maternal stress, and these factors can have large impacts
long after birth (e.g. Almond and Currie, 2011b; Scholte et al., 2015). This
paper considers the impact of prenatal exposure to testosterone on educa-
tional performance in childhood.
3.2.1 The role of prenatal testosterone
Testosterone is the main androgen causing sexual differentiation of the male
fetus. Males experience three periods of elevated testosterone exposure,
whereas female testosterone levels remain rather constant over the life-
cycle. These critical periods for males take place between the eighth and
twenty-fourth week of gestation (prenatal testosterone surge which causes
sexual differentiation of the fetus), three to four months after birth, and in
puberty (Auyeung et al., 2013).
Prenatal testosterone production starts at around the seventh and eighth
week of gestation and continues until approximately week twenty-four. It
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is known to be responsible for the development of the testes (Tapp et al.,
2011), but this period of gonadal development is also supposed to be criti-
cal for the development of the fetal brain (Van de Beek et al., 2004).7 More
specifically, prenatal testosterone is said to wire the brain with masculine
behavioral patterns (i.e. in preferences, personality, and temperament)
(Jordan-Young, 2010). The female fetus is exposed to much lower levels
of prenatal testosterone (Tapp et al., 2011; Auyeung et al., 2013).8 To the
extent that male-typical cognitive capabilities wired in the brain are re-
sponsible for the boys’ advantage in math, prenatal testosterone exposure
might explain the gender gap in test scores on math and reading.
Proxies for prenatal testosterone
The best measure for prenatal testosterone is fetal serum, but direct mea-
surements are infeasible due to the risks it brings to the unborn fetus. Other
proxies, like maternal serum testosterone, umbilical cord serum, and am-
niotic fluid concentrations all have their own disadvantages (Van de Beek
et al., 2004). It is for this reason that some direct tests of TTT, involving
these proxies, may find conflicting evidence. Earlier studies used medi-
cal conditions and 2D:4D digit ratios as proxies for prenatal testosterone.
Clinical studies examine the effects of prenatal testosterone exposure on
cognitive ability by studying women subject to congenital adrenal hyper-
plasia (CAH). Females with this condition are prenatally exposed to high
levels of androgens (Speiser and White, 2003). To illustrate, women diag-
7Sexual differentiation of the brain is said to take place between the 14th and 19th
week of gestation (Baron-Cohen et al., 2004).
8Although the female fetus begins to develop ovaries around week seven of gestation,
these ovaries produce only very low levels of estrogens. Estrogens are mainly produced
by the maternal placenta, exposure to estrogen levels is similar for both males and female
fetuses.
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nosed with CAH are found to perform better on spatial tasks than control
women (Puts et al., 2008). Disadvantages of using clinical samples are
the usually small sample sizes, and limited external validity (Baron-Cohen
et al., 2004).
The 2D:4D ratio (the ratio of lengths of the index finger to the ring
finger) is regarded as a (noisy) marker for prenatal testosterone (Cohen-
Bendahan et al., 2005). The ratio is sexually dimorphic as it is, on av-
erage, lower for men than for women (Lutchmaya et al., 2004; Medland
et al., 2008). Elevated fetal testosterone levels are associated with lower
2D:4D ratios (Lutchmaya et al., 2004), and girls diagnosed with CAH are
found to have lower 2D:4D ratios (Puts et al., 2008). Lower 2D:4D ratios
would be associated with lower risk-averseness (Dreber and Hoffman, 2007;
Coates et al., 2009; Garbarino et al., 2011), aggressiveness and increased
sensation-seeking (Hampson et al., 2008), more male-typical preferences in
occupational choices for women (Nye and Orel, 2015), social preferences
(Buser, 2012a), better performance in sports (Manning and Taylor, 2001),
and an elevated physical fitness (Ho¨nekopp et al., 2007). Lower 2D:4D
ratios are positively correlated with performance on mental rotation tasks
(Manning and Taylor, 2001), whereas this relationship is not confirmed by
Austin et al. (2002) and Coolican and Peters (2003). The 2D:4D ratio is
considered as a proxy for prenatal testosterone, although it is considered a
very noisy biomarker as digit ratios would be more correlated with ethnicity
than with gender (Cohen-Bendahan et al., 2005).
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Twin testosterone transfers
Due to the difficulties associated with finding a reliable statistic that mea-
sures prenatal exposure to testosterone, more recent studies have started to
proxy prenatal testosterone exposure using a sample of twins. Based on ev-
idence with mammals, humans with a male co-twin are hypothesized to be
exposed to high levels of prenatal androgens, since testosterone transmits
in-utero across amniotic membranes during gestation. This twin testos-
terone transfer (TTT) hypothesis can be exploited as a natural experiment
given that the gender of the co-twin is random (Tapp et al., 2011).
The existence of TTT was first documented in animal-studies, where fe-
male rodents with a position near their brothers in the womb were found to
display more male-typical behavior (for an overview see Cohen-Bendahan
et al., 2005). The existence of a similar channel for humans is documented
by Miller (1994). Direct testing of TTT among humans is very difficult
since direct manipulation of prenatal testosterone levels in human fetuses
is clearly unethical (Cohen-Bendahan et al., 2005). Twin studies, however,
show that females with a male co-twin have a more masculine brain struc-
ture (Cohen-Bendahan et al., 2004) and volume (Peper et al., 2009), are
more likely to be right-handed which is an indicator of high exposure to
testosterone (Vuoksimaa et al., 2010a), do better at mental rotation tasks
than females with a female co-twin (Vuoksimaa et al., 2010b; Heil et al.,
2011), and are more sensation-seeking (Resnick et al., 1993; Slutske et al.,
2011). Studies investigating digit ratios in relationship to TTT found lower
2D:4D ratios for opposite-sex twin females (van Anders et al., 2006; Vo-
racek and Dressler, 2007), although this result is not confirmed by Medland
et al. (2008).
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Some studies fail to find effects for males with a male co-twin even
though these males might also be exposed to higher levels of prenatal
testosterone (Resnick et al., 1993; Peper et al., 2009; Tapp et al., 2011;
Cronqvist et al., 2015). Tapp et al. (2011), however, argue that the ef-
fect is less obvious for males, as males themselves are already exposed to
relatively high levels of prenatal testosterone.
We use TTT as a proxy for prenatal testosterone exposure. To the
best of our knowledge, there are two earlier applications of TTT with-
in economics. Gielen et al. (2016) use TTT to examine the influence of
testosterone on the gender wage gap. Although positive effects of prenatal
testosterone exposure are found for men, prenatal testosterone is not associ-
ated with increased earnings for women. Cronqvist et al. (2015) use TTT to
explain gender differences in financial decision making and find that higher
exposure to prenatal testosterone can explain masculinization of investing
behavior, implying that females with a fraternal male co-twin undertake
more risky investments. Both of these papers focus on gender differences
in adulthood. However, these difference might originate from gender dif-
ferences already earlier in childhood. This paper is the first application
of TTT to gender differences in educational outcomes during childhood,
which likely influence other economic outcomes later in adulthood.
3.3 Empirical strategy
This paper exploits gender variation in twin pairs to examine the causal
effect of prenatal testosterone resulting from TTT on test scores. In order to
do this, three assumptions must hold: (1) there is a testosterone transfer in
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humans from a male fetus to the adjacent fetus, (2) the gender distribution
is random among and within twin pairs, and (3) there are no confounding
factors related to the gender composition of the twin pair that can affect
educational outcomes of children in ways other than through a testosterone
transfer.9
Although direct tests of the first assumption in humans are not avail-
able, direct testing on animals showed that in-utero testosterone transfers
exist (for an overview see Cohen-Bendahan et al., 2005). This evidence
has been used to hypothesize that this testosterone transfer also applies to
human twins (Miller, 1994), and has been supported by indirect evidence
showing increased masculine morphological, cognitive and behavioral char-
acteristics for women with a fraternal male co-twin (Resnick et al., 1993;
Cohen-Bendahan et al., 2004; Peper et al., 2009; Vuoksimaa et al., 2010a,b;
Heil et al., 2011; Slutske et al., 2011). Since no effects are found for males
with a male co-twin, possibly as they already have a high exposure to pre-
natal testosterone (Resnick et al., 1993; Peper et al., 2009; Tapp et al., 2011;
Cronqvist et al., 2015), Tapp et al. (2011) conclude that the evidence on
TTT is incomplete, but it is sufficient to authorize further investigations.
The second identifying assumption is that the gender distribution is
random among and within twin pairs. This implies that the gender of a
twin sibling is randomly determined. Twins can be monozygotic (identi-
cal), when one fertilized egg splits into two same-sex fetuses, or dizygotic
(fraternal), when two fertilized eggs develop into two same-sex or opposite-
sex fetuses. Identical twins are found to have lower sex ratios than fraternal
9Our identification strategy follows closely that in Gielen et al. (2016). We refer to
their paper for a more detailed discussion on these assumptions.
3.3. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 127
twins10, which is due to an anomaly which is inherent in X-chromosomes
which makes them more likely to divide, and hence form a identical twin
pair. Although this suggests that identical twins are more likely to have a
sister (and be female themselves), we are not aware of any evidence that
suggests that the probability of being an identical twin is itself determined
by levels of prenatal testosterone. For fraternal twins it is commonly as-
sumed that there is an equal probability to be male or female. However,
there is evidence showing that fraternal twins are in fact slightly more
likely to be male. James (2010) suggests this may be due to higher mater-
nal levels of steroid hormones (testosterone and estrogen) at conception.
Maternal serum testosterone levels are found not to be a good proxy for
actual prenatal testosterone (Van de Beek et al., 2004; Cohen-Bendahan
et al., 2005), but even if maternal and fetal testosterone levels would in-
teract this would only strengthen our identification strategy as individuals
with a male co-twin would be exposed to even higher levels of prenatal
testosterone (Gielen et al., 2016).
The third assumption stresses that the gender of the co-twin does not
influence educational outcomes in any way other than through the prenatal
testosterone transfer. This assumption is likely violated as growing up with
a brother is different from growing up with a sister, and any such socializa-
tion effects resulting from gender-specific parent and/or sibling interactions
might also cause the sibling’s gender to potentially affect educational out-
comes (Peter et al., 2018).11 To control for this, we define a control group of
closely spaced singletons (CSS), consisting of singletons who have a sibling
10Sex ratios represent the number of boys born for every one hundred girls. Gielen
et al. (2016) find a sex ratio of 94.2 for identical twins using data from James (2010).
11Similarly research shows that sibling gender can affect women’s labor market out-
comes (Cools and Patacchini, 2017; Brenøe, 2018).
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born within 12 months of their own birth date.12 Provided that any sib-
ling socialization effects are similar for twins and for singletons in the CSS
sample13, any remaining differences in the effects of sibling gender between
these two groups can be attributed to the effect of prenatal testosterone
exposure.
The control group of CSS allows us to disentangle the effect of prenatal
testosterone from the combined effect of prenatal testosterone and social-
ization, but it also imposes two extra assumptions on the identification
strategy. First, socialization must be similar for twins and closely spaced
singletons (CSS). Although the close spacing between siblings in the con-
trol group is likely to ensure a socialization closely resembling that between
twins, we perform several robustness checks in section 5.1 to assert that
there is no evidence for any differential socialization between twins and
CSS. Second, the gender of a singleton sibling should not be related to
the level of prenatal testosterone. In general, singleton sex ratios can be
considered exogenous to prenatal levels of testosterone (see also the discus-
sion in Gielen et al., 2016). However, it is important to note that prenatal
testosterone in male singletons is known to decline with birth order (as
measured by umbilical cord serum) when spacing between children is less
than four years (Maccoby et al., 1979; Baron-Cohen et al., 2004). In this
case, second-born singletons in a CSS-pair may experience lower levels of
prenatal testosterone in utero. As a robustness check, we estimate the
12This approach is suggested by Cohen-Bendahan et al. (2005) and Tapp et al. (2011)
and employed by Gielen et al. (2016).
13Evidence in favor of this assumption is provided by Bjo¨rklund and Ja¨ntti (2012),
who find strongest sibling correlations for years of schooling among dizygotic twins,
those for closely spaced siblings (defined as birth within four years) are stronger and
more similar to these dizygotic twins as compared to siblings born more than four years
apart.
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model using only first-borns to assert that this potential concern does not
influence our results.
Preferably we would want to distinguish between monozygotic and dizy-
gotic twins (see e.g. Peter et al., 2018), but unfortunately our data does
not include information on zygocity. We have to rely (like most other twin
studies) on the equal environments assumption (EEA), which states that
there are no systematic differences in the environments in which identi-
cal and fraternal twins are being raised. The implication of this EEA is
that any socialization effects are similar for identical and fraternal twins.
Clearly, there might be differences between identical and fraternal twins, es-
pecially as identical twins share 100% of their genetic material whereas this
is approximately 50% for fraternal twins. Yet, earlier studies have shown
that the EEA is not violated for spatial ability (Derks et al., 2006) and
in several other areas of interest (Matheny et al., 1976; Scarr and Carter-
Saltzman, 1979; Kendler et al., 1994; Hettema et al., 1995; Eriksson et al.,
2006; LoParo and Waldman, 2014), which gives credence to our approach.
The model we estimate to determine the effect of having an opposite-
sex twin is displayed in equation 3.1, and is based on a sample of twins
and closely spaced singletons. The variables of interest (yit) include an
overall test-score, and sub-scores in the domains of math and reading for
each individual i. We add a female indicator (femalei), an indicator for
being part of a twin-pair (twini), an indicator for being part of an opposite-
sex sibling pair (OSi), their respective interactions, as well as a vector Xit
including other individual and family characteristics, to control for the fact
that twins and CSS might have different characteristics and might be born
in different types of families, and a series of year dummies. Finally, uit
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is the individual-specific error term, which is clustered on the maternal
identification number.
yit = β0 + β1femalei + β2OSi+
β3twini + β4(femalei ∗OSi) + β5(twini ∗ femalei)+
β6(twini ∗OSi) + β7(femalei ∗OSi ∗ Twini) + Xitδ + uit
(3.1)
In this standard difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) model the
average difference in test scores between opposite-sex and same-sex twin
boys isDtwin|male = β2+β6, and the average difference in test scores between
opposite-sex and same-sex closely spaced singleton boys is DCSS|male = β2.
As a result, the double difference for boys is represented by DDmale = β6.
Similarly, for girls the average difference in test scores between opposite-
sex and same-sex twins is Dtwin|female = β2 + β4 + β6 + β7, and the average
difference in test scores between opposite-sex and same-sex closely spaced
singleton girls is DCSS|female = β2 + β4. Hence, the double difference for
girls equals DDfemale = β6 + β7. The double-difference estimators give
the effect of having an opposite-sex twin as compared to having a same-sex
twin, after correcting for socialization by subtracting the difference between
having a brother and having a sister with the CSS sample. Hence for girls
(boys) it gives the effect of having a twin brother (sister) versus having a
twin sister (brother), and controls for the effect of having a brother (sister)
versus having a sister (brother). If TTT leads to a masculanization of brain
structure, we expect to find a positive effect for DDfemale as girls with an
opposite-sex twin sibling would be exposed to higher levels of prenatal
testosterone.
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3.4 Data
3.4.1 Dutch twins
This paper uses administrative data from Statistics Netherlands covering
all registered inhabitants of the Netherlands.14 We compile our data by
matching individuals across the various datasets by their Random Iden-
tification Number (RIN), the Dutch (coded) equivalent of the U.S. social
security number. We start with the Parent-Child dataset, which matches
children to any living parent in the period 1995-2015. From the original
information on 15, 860, 240 individuals we drop stillbirths (N = 22, 290)
and individuals whose RIN is coded as missing (N = 547, 350). Siblings
are defined as all children born from the same mother.
We merge demographic information from the Municipal Population
dataset (in Dutch: Gemeentelijke Basisadministratie, GBA), which con-
tains information on the individuals’ year and month of birth, the parents’
year and month of birth, gender, and country of origin. We drop individuals
who cannot be identified in the Municipal Population dataset (N = 6, 342)
and individuals who are coded as having 15 siblings or more via either par-
ent (N = 2, 090). First, we select individuals born in the period 1993-2003,
as we only observe educational outcomes for these cohorts (more informa-
tion on educational outcomes is provided in section 4.2). This leaves us
with N = 2, 341, 814 observations. Second, we identify twins (or higher
order multiples) as siblings with the same birth date, and closely spaced
singletons (CSS) as singletons with siblings whose birth dates are within 12
months of an individual’s own birth date. The distribution of family struc-
14These data can be accessed through a remote-access facility after a confidentiality
agreement has been signed.
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tures is shown in Table 3.1. The twinning probability (3.26%) is consistent
with the incidence of twinning in the Netherlands between 1993 and 2004
(3.39%).15 We proceed with a sample of twins and CSS, dropping single-
tons without siblings, singletons with siblings born outside the 12 month
range, and higher order multiples.
Table 3.1: Frequency of family structures in 2015 GBA
Family type Frequency Percent
Only child 214,509 9.16
Singleton (closest sibling > 12 months) 2,020,799 86.29
Singleton (closest sibling ≤ 12 months) 27,628 1.18
Twin 76,416 3.26
Higher order multiple 2,462 0.11
Total 2,341,814 100.00
Notes: Frequency of family structures for individuals born 1993-
2003, whose mother can be identified in the data, and who have less
than 15 siblings through either parent.
We define a sibling pair as same-sex if the sibling is of the same sex
as the individual, and opposite-sex otherwise. In families where there are
three (or more) CSS in one family (only N = 1, 760), it is difficult to classify
the sex composition of a sibling pair. We drop these individuals from our
sample.
Also closely spaced singletons whose birth dates are within 7 months
from one another are dropped from the sample (N = 251). The distribution
of twins and CSS by gender composition is shown in the first columns of
Table 3.2.16
15Authors’ calculations based on birth figures available (online) at Statistics Nether-
lands. This number is upward biased as it does not take into account stillbirths.
16The twins-sample contains 65.7% same-sex and 34.3% opposite-sex pairs born from
1993 to 2003. Although information on zygosity is unavailable, the number of dizygotic
twins can be approximated as twice the number of opposite-sex twins according to
Weinberg’s differential method (for empirical tests see Vlietinck et al., 1988; Fellman
and Eriksson, 2006), implying that approximately 68.6% of the twins in our sample are
dizygotic.
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Table 3.2: Twins and closely spaced singletons
Observed in Observed in
GBA Test Score Data
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Females
OS Twin 13,626 13.4 7,608 14.9
SS Twin 24,222 23.7 12,601 24.7
OS CSS 6,457 6.3 2,995 5.9
SS CSS 6,015 5.9 2,839 5.6
Males
OS Twin 13,626 13.4 7,193 14.1
SS Twin 24,942 24.4 12,039 23.6
OS CSS 6,415 6.3 2,805 5.5
SS CSS 6,730 6.6 2,886 5.7
Total 102,033 100.00 50,966 100.00
Notes: Sample of twins and closely spaced singletons (C-
SS). The first column shows the distribution of opposite-sex
(OS) and same-sex (SS) pairs in the overall GBA. The sec-
ond panel shows the same distributions for the sample of
individuals for whom we observe test scores in the data.
3.4.2 Educational outcomes
Data on primary school test-scores is obtained from a high-stakes standard-
ized test performed in the eighth and final grade of elementary education
(Cito-test). Note that schools had to give permission to transfer test-scores
to Statistics Netherlands, therefore we only observe educational outcomes
for those children attending schools who gave permission.17 The data cover
the years 2006 to 2014.18 For children having multiple test-score records in
this period (e.g. due to class retention) the most recent score is preserved.
17We observe Cito-scores for approximately 50% of all children born between 1993
and 2003. Missing information can arise from the fact that the child did not take the
Cito-test, the child was attending a school that did not take the Cito-test (more than
80% of all schools in the Netherlands administer the Cito-test (Chorny et al., 2010)),
or the child did take the Cito but the school did not give permission to transfer the
test-scores to Statistics Netherlands.
18Test scores for 2015 are available but are not being used as the structure of the test
changed in 2015 and hence scores are not comparable to those in earlier years.
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When merging the test-score data to our sample of twins and CSS, we are
left with a sample of 50, 966 individuals, as can be seen in the last two
columns of Table 3.2.
The standardized test incorporates performance measures for language,
math, information processing, and world orientation.19 The scores on the
various (sub)parts are translated into an aggregated score ranging between
501 and 550. In order to be able to compare scores across different years
(and hence different tests), the aggregate score and the sub-scores for math
and reading are standardized by year in a Z-score.20
3.4.3 Descriptive statistics
Average standardized test scores differ between boys and girls, and be-
tween twins and CSS (Table 3.3).21 Boys outperform girls in math, and
girls perform significantly better in reading. This gender-specific pattern in
performance gaps is consistent with the general pattern found in the litera-
ture (see e.g. Guiso et al., 2008; Fryer and Levitt, 2010; OECD, 2015), and
it is visible for both the full sample and for the sub-samples of twins and
closely spaced singletons. For twins the gender gaps in school performance
are even more pronounced.
Table 3.4 shows that gender gaps in test performance also vary with
the gender of one’s sibling.22 Although we observe no significant differen-
ces in test scores between opposite-sex and same-sex closely spaced sin-
19The questions on world orientation are optional and hence not completed by all
children.
20Z-scores for individual i in year t are defined as Z-scoreit=(scoreit-µt)/σt, where
scoreit denotes the test (sub-)score, µt denotes the average test (sub-)score in year t,
and σt denotes the standard deviation in (sub-)scores in year t.
21Exact variable definitions are provided in Appendix Table 3.A1.
22Gender differences in the distribution of test scores are presented in Figure 3.A1
and Figure 3.A2.
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Table 3.3: Gender gaps in test performance
All children Sample of twins and CSS
Boys Girls ∆ Boys Girls ∆
Score N=636, 303 N=641, 882 N=24, 923 N=26, 043
Total 0.039 -0.009 0.05*** -0.013 -0.107 0.09***
Reading -0.079 0.124 -0.20*** -0.138 0.018 -0.16***
Math 0.185 -0.157 0.34*** 0.156 -0.223 0.38***
Twins CSS
Boys Girls ∆ Boys Girls ∆
Score N=19, 232 N=20, 209 N=5, 691 N=5, 834
Total 0.039 -0.068 0.11*** -0.188 -0.245 0.06***
Reading -0.075 0.062 -0.14*** -0.353 -0.137 -0.22***
Math 0.181 -0.200 0.38*** 0.072 -0.301 0.37***
Notes: Test scores are standardized with mean zero and standard deviation one.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
gletons, girls in opposite-sex twin pairs score significantly lower in math
and the aggregate score as opposed to same-sex twin girls. If anything,
this is suggestive evidence against the TTT hypothesis. Note however that
this simple comparison neglects potential socialization effects, as well as
the impact of other background characteristics. For example, opposite-sex
and same-sex twins differ significantly in their family background, where
opposite-sex twins are born from slightly older parents and are raised in
somewhat smaller families. These differences could hint at a preference that
parents may have for children of mixed genders (e.g. Angrist and Evans,
1998).
There are also marked differences between twins and CSS. Twins have
slightly higher test scores than CSS23, which is at least partly due to their
different family background. Higher educated mothers are more likely to
built a career before having children. Since twinning probabilities increase
with maternal age (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1980; Bronars and Grogger,
1994; Jacobsen et al., 1999) and the use of artificial reproductive technolo-
23Related to this, twins have a lower age at test, as the flip-side of better school
performance is a lower probability of repeating a grade.
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Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics
Female twins and closely spaced singletons
OS Twin SS Twin OS CSS SS CSS All females Twin -
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) CSS 1-2 3-4
Variable
Total score (Std) -0.088 -0.055 -0.238 -0.253 -0.009 *** **
Language (Std) 0.057 0.066 -0.128 -0.147 0.124 ***
Math (Std) -0.236 -0.178 -0.299 -0.304 -0.157 *** ***
Age (Months) 12.048 12.048 12.073 12.092 11.982 ***
Parity (birth order) 1.735 1.743 2.106 2.130 1.806 ***
Spacing 0 0 11.483 11.490 ***
Non-native (dummy) 0.158 0.166 0.382 0.421 0.211 *** ***
Family size 2.986 3.058 3.475 3.593 2.601 *** *** ***
Mother’s age (at birth) 31.991 31.356 28.949 28.374 30.529 *** *** ***
Father’s age (at birth) 34.632 33.935 32.406 32.091 33.313 *** *** **
Mother in DI (dummy) 0.020 0.016 0.019 0.015 0.013 **
HH-type:
2-parent 85.66 85.52 80.63 79.36 84.81 ***
1-parent 13.93 13.88 17.93 19.20 14.75
Other 0.29 0.49 1.20 1.34 0.33
Missing 0.12 0.11 0.23 0.11 0.11
N=7,608 N=12,601 N=2,995 N=2,839 N=641,882
HH-income (at age 4)* 44,023.21 43,014.93 32,906.84 31,706.77 41,144.33 *** *
Mother works (dummy)* 0.658 0.664 0.498 0.499 0.671 ***
N=6,552 N=10,660 N=2,513 N=2,314 N=543,672
Male twins and closely spaced singletons
OS Twin SS Twin OS CSS SS CSS All males Twin-
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) CSS 1-2 3-4
Variable
Total score (Std.) 0.042 0.037 -0.188 -0.189 0.039 ***
Language (Std.) -0.071 -0.077 -0.356 -0.351 -0.079 ***
Math (Std.) 0.174 0.185 0.071 0.074 0.185 ***
Age at test (Months) 12.067 12.108 12.125 12.114 12.037 *** ***
Parity (birth order) 1.730 1.756 2.138 2.137 1.805 *** *
Spacing 0 0 11.481 11.490 ***
Non-native (dummy) 0.158 0.173 0.397 0.372 0.210 *** *** *
Family size 2.974 3.068 3.491 3.519 2.597 *** ***
Mother’s age (at birth) 32.008 31.497 28.920 28.702 30.568 *** ***
Father’s age (at birth) 34.637 34.065 32.395 32.400 33.309 *** ***
Mother in DI (dummy) 0.020 0.016 0.017 0.011 0.012 * *
HH-type:
2-parent 85.97 85.98 80.46 79.49 85.18 ***
1-parent 13.69 13.53 17.83 19.44 14.41
Other 0.22 0.37 1.50 1.04 0.30
Missing 0.11 0.12 0.21 0.03 0.11
N=7,193 N=12,039 N=2,805 N=2,886 N=636,303
HH-income (at age 4)* 44,973.46 43,344.22 32,484.99 33,062.50 41,610.28 ***
Mother works (dummy)* 0.668 0.679 0.498 0.520 0.665 ***
N=6,147 N=10,151 N=2,315 N=2,417 N=535,643
* Lower number of observations as data is available for children born after 1994.
Notes: The reported means are presented for the sample which is discussed in more detail in Section 3.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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gies (ART) (Bhalotra et al., 2016), we observe that twins are born to older
mothers (and fathers) in high income families.24 This also explains why
twins have a lower parity on average. Our empirical approach in the next
section accounts for these differences in family background when estimating
the effect of the gender of a twin sibling on educational test performance.
3.5 Results
The results from the baseline specification for the aggregate test score are
presented in Table 3.5. The twin coefficient is positive and significant in the
specification without controls (column 1), and becomes smaller and insig-
nificant once controls are added (column 2). This clearly shows that twins
and CSS are born into different families. These results remain unchanged
once we focus on the smaller sample for which family income information
is available (columns 3-5). The dummy variable for having an opposite-sex
sibling is not significant in any of the specifications, suggesting limited to
no role for socialization effects as sibling gender by itself does not affect
educational outcomes. The female indicator consistently shows that girls
have significantly lower aggregate test scores than boys (by approximately
5% of a standard deviation and conditional on characteristics Xi).
The effects of opposite-sex twinning for boys (DDmale) and for girls
(DDfemale) are not significantly different from zero. If anything, the effect
for girls is negative suggesting that females with a male uterus-mate would
perform about 5% of a standard deviation worse on the aggregate score,
24Household income - i.e. the sum of the earnings of both parents in a particular year
- is measured in the year the child turns 4 years old due to income information only
being available from 1999 onwards. In the Netherlands, children start elementary school
at age 4. We do not observe income information for children born before 1995, which
explains the lower number of observations for this variable.
138 CHAPTER 3. PRENATAL TESTOSTERONE
Table 3.5: Results for aggregate test score (standardized)
Aggregate score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Twin 0.226*** -0.006 0.220*** -0.002 -0.007
(0.025) (0.021) (0.026) (0.023) (0.023)
OS 0.001 0.010 -0.006 0.004 0.005
(0.030) (0.025) (0.032) (0.027) (0.027)
Female -0.064** -0.068*** -0.065* -0.069** -0.067**
(0.032) (0.026) (0.034) (0.028) (0.028)
Twin*Female -0.029 -0.041 -0.039 -0.040 -0.039
(0.035) (0.029) (0.038) (0.031) (0.031)
OS*Female 0.014 -0.027 0.015 -0.017 -0.018
(0.039) (0.033) (0.042) (0.036) (0.036)
Twin*OS 0.004 -0.040 -0.020 -0.047 -0.047
(0.034) (0.028) (0.036) (0.031) (0.030)
Twin*OS*Female -0.052 -0.004 -0.034 -0.005 -0.005
(0.044) (0.037) (0.047) (0.040) (0.040)
DDmale 0.004 -0.040 -0.020 -0.047 -0.047
(0.034) (0.028) (0.036) (0.031) (0.030)
DDfemale -0.048 -0.045 -0.053 -0.052* -0.051*
(0.034) (0.028) (0.036) (0.030) (0.030)
N 50,966 50,966 43,069 43,069 43,069
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes
Income controls No No No No Yes
Note: Results are based on OLS model. The set of controls includes age, age
squared, family size, birth order dummies, maternal age at birth, a non-
native indicator, test-year dummies, household type dummies, indicator of
whether the mother was in DI in the year of giving birth, and a control for
the mean Cito-score at the school the child is attending in a given year.
The additional household income controls contain a control for household
income in the year the child turns four, and an indicator that the moth-
er is working in this same year. Specifications 3-5 report results for a
smaller sample, for which information on household income and maternal
employment when the child is 4 years old is available. Standard errors are
clustered on maternal ID and are in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
when controlling for the socialization effect of growing up with a brother.
This effect is contrary to what would be expected from the TTT hypothesis,
but might mask differential effects for math and reading.
The results for the reading and math sub-scores are shown in the left
and right panel of Table 3.6, respectively. Twins appears to have higher
math and reading scores than CSS, but these differences disappear once we
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include relevant controls for family background. The opposite-sex sibling
dummy is insignificant in all specifications. The gender dummy reveals
that girls have a significant advantage in reading (2% of a standard devia-
tion), whereas boys have an advantage in the math-domain (about 4% of
a standard deviation). We find no significant effect for opposite-sex twin-
ning on reading scores for either boys and girls. However, for math scores
we find that girls with a twin brother perform about 7% of a standard
deviation worse, even after controlling for socialization effects and family
background.25
The results in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 focus on mean test scores, but previous
research has shown evidence for the presence of gender differences in test-
score distributions (Halpern et al., 2007; Machin and Pekkarinen, 2008).
To check for any such effects, we also estimate quantile regression models,
but these results are very similar to the OLS estimates as can be seen in
Figure 3.A3.
The negative effect for girls with an opposite-sex twin (DDfemale) on
math might seem counter-intuitive as the TTT hypothesis would predict
that girls with a twin brother are exposed to higher concentrations of pre-
natal testosterone, and hence would display improved math performance
(and potentially worse reading performance). We do not find evidence for
this, nor do we find any effect of opposite-sex twinning for boys. In section
3.6 we discuss various explanations for our findings.
25Table 3.A2 and Table 3.A3 show that the results are robust to estimating the models
separately for boys and girls.
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3.5.1 Robustness
Although our results in the previous section suggest that girls’ math perfor-
mance is affected by having a twin brother (as opposed to a twin sister), we
should treat these results with care. There are several potential concerns
with our identification strategy, that might lead to misinterpretations. In
this section, we will discuss each of these and examine the impact they may
have on our results.
One potential concern for our identification is that maternal levels of
testosterone are known to be lower if spacing between subsequent children
is less than four years (Maccoby et al., 1979; Baron-Cohen et al., 2004). To
address this issue we restrict the sample to first born children only. This
approach also deals with some potential concerns about the validity of CSS
as an appropriate control group. First, taking first borns takes into account
that the decision to have a second child may be endogenous to the gender of
the first child (Dahl and Moretti, 2008; Blau et al., 2017), in which case CSS
would not make up an appropriate control group. Second, spacing matters
for parental time investments. First born children engage significantly more
in quality-time activities with their parents (e.g. reading and playing)
than later-born siblings (Price, 2008), which can explain the significant
effect of birth order on child outcomes found in the literature. Taking a
sample of first-borns accounts for these birth order effects, by improving
comparability between the group of twins (treated) and CSS (control). The
results in Panel B of Table 4.9 illustrate that the point estimates in this
specification are comparable to those in the baseline specification, but the
significance for DDfemale in math scores drops, which is mostly due to a
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decrease in precision as the number of observations halved.26,27
Another potential threat to our identification could be that CSS ap-
pear to be an inappropriate control group to capture socialization effects.
Our estimator might be biased if socialization effects in families with CSS
differ from those in families with twins (according to the gendermix of the
sibling pair). We address this potential concern in various ways. First, it
is important to stress that the gender of the sibling in a CSS pair does not
seem to affect test scores; the results are mainly driven by the differential
effect of sibling gender within twin pairs.28
Table 3.4 has shown that households with twins and CSS are different
in various characteristics. In particular, the native origin of the family ap-
pears to be an important difference, which might affect socialization effects
between siblings, e.g. due to differential cultural and religious factors. Fur-
thermore, there might be misreporting in the birth dates of foreign born
children which might contaminate the sample of twins or CSS.29 To check
the appropriateness of using CSS as a control group, we limit the sample
to children of native Dutch parents. The results in Panel C of Table 4.9
show that the double difference estimate for girls is larger and significant,
whereas the double difference estimate for males is lower and less precise
compared to the baseline.30 Hence, these estimates confirm our main re-
sults and, if anything, may suggest that our baseline estimate is somewhat
26The full estimation results are available in Appendix Tables 3.A4 and 3.A5.
27It does not matter whether the first born is a boy or a girl, as we find a similar
pattern when estimating the model for second borns (results available on request).
28This is consistent with Peter et al. (2018) who find no effect of sibling gender on
years of schooling for regular siblings and close siblings (defined as birth dates within
24 months). They do find an effect of sibling gender on years of schooling for dizygotic
twins (i.e. girls with a twin brother have 0.112 more years of schooling.).
29As an example, due to misreporting 20% of the Turkish population has a registered
birth date in January (Torun and Tumen, 2016).
30The full estimation results are available in Appendix Tables 3.A4 and 3.A5.
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Table 3.7: Robustness results
Aggregate score Reading score Math score
DDmale DDfemale DDmale DDfemale DDmale DDfemale
A. Baseline -0.047 -0.051* -0.040 -0.025 -0.046 -0.075**
(0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032)
N 43, 069 43, 069 43, 069 43, 069 43, 069 43, 069
B. First born only -0.033 -0.057 -0.022 -0.036 -0.051 -0.067
(0.050) (0.048) (0.052) (0.048) (0.050) (0.052)
N 19, 576 19, 576 19, 576 19, 576 19, 576 19, 576
C. Natives only -0.016 -0.090** -0.014 -0.064* -0.015 -0.112***
(0.036) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.036) (0.039)
N 34, 003 34, 003 34, 003 34, 003 34, 003 34, 003
D. Two-child family only -0.059 -0.123** -0.035 -0.073 -0.070 -0.182***
(0.055) (0.055) (0.057) (0.055) (0.056) (0.059)
N 14, 034 14, 034 14, 034 14, 034 14, 034 14, 034
E. CSS window:
18 months -0.063*** -0.047*** -0.069*** -0.024 -0.046*** -0.061***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018)
N 132, 650 132, 650 132, 650 132, 650 132, 650 132, 650
24 months -0.065*** -0.050*** -0.070*** -0.030** -0.052*** -0.062***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
N 279, 980 279, 980 279, 980 279, 980 279, 980 279, 980
36 months -0.064*** -0.054*** -0.069*** -0.029* -0.050*** -0.070***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
N 492, 264 492, 264 492, 264 492, 264 492, 264 492, 264
Notes: Results are based on OLS model. The set of controls is similar to that in Table 5 (Column 5).
Standard errors are clustered on maternal ID and are in parentheses. Full estimation results can be
found in Appendix Tables 3.A4 and 3.A5.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
conservative.
Another difference between families with CSS and families with twins
is the number of children in a household (see Table 3.4). Twins are -on
average- born in smaller families than CSS, and it might be that social-
ization between siblings (of different genders) varies between larger and
smaller families. In order to further check the appropriateness of using
CSS as a control group, we limit the sample to children of two-child fam-
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ilies only such that twins and CSS in the sample grow up in families of
equal size (Panel D of Table 4.9). The double difference estimates for boys
remains insignificant, whereas those for girls become considerably larger.
Overall, these results continue to support our conclusion that having an
opposite-sex twin is associated with lower math scores for girls, and they
show that our baseline estimate might be rather conservative.
A crucial assumption for the definition of CSS as an appropriate control
group is the 12-month window within which CSS are defined. This window
is explicitly very narrow as to increase the probability that socialization ef-
fects between closely spaced singletons are similar to those between twins,
but this comes at a cost of a relatively low number of observations which
might decrease the precision of the estimates. Panel E of Table 4.9 presents
the results of a series of estimations in which we investigate how robust our
findings are to extended windows within which CSS are defined (i.e. 18
months, 24 months and 36 months, respectively). The double difference
estimates for girls are highly robust to using different bandwidths, ranging
from 2.4 to 3.0 percent of a standard deviation for reading and ranging
from 6.1 to 7.0 percent of a standard deviation for math across the speci-
fications. For boys the estimates are less robust, as they increase in size
and significance. The positive double difference effects in math for boys
seem to result from increased precision in the estimation. However, for
the reading specification the increased significance is likely due to the fact
that the gender-specific socialization effects between CSS become different
from that between twins when sibling spacing increases, which is reflected
by the increasing estimate for having an opposite-sex sibling and the de-
creasing estimate for having an opposite-sex twin (see Appendix Tables A6
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and A7). This suggests that defining CSS using a wider window for birth
spacing reduces the suitability of CSS as a control group.
To provide further credibility for the use of CSS as a control group, we
employ a matching estimator to make the sample of CSS and twins more
comparable. The results using Kernel matching as well as Inverse Probabil-
ity Matching are presented in Table 3.A8.31 Although the effects from the
matching estimation are larger than the baseline estimates, suggesting the
latter are a conservative estimate of the true effect, our overall conclusions
remain unchanged.
All in all, we interpret the above results as supportive evidence for the
suitability of CSS as a control group. Although we do not find evidence
that the gender of a sibling affects test scores of very closely spaced siblings,
we cannot completely rule out that socialization is different between CSS
and between twins. If our effects for twins would be driven by socialization
effects32, this would imply that parents or teachers would have to differ-
entially invest in the education/training of twins based on the gender of a
twin sibling, but would not respond to the sibling gender for singletons.
3.6 Mechanisms at work
The result that girls with a twin brother perform 7% of a standard devi-
ation lower on math seems somewhat counterintuitive, as from the TTT
31We employ Kernel matching (Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of 0.06), and
weights to the observations are assigned with the Kernel matching procedure (column
1, 3 and 5). Inverse Probability Matching (IPM) is also used, but as this method is very
sensitive to very high and low propensity scores a more robust type will be used that
only includes observations with a propensity score between 0.1 and 0.9 (column 2, 4,
and 6).
32Socialization effects are stressed as important in a related study by Peter et al.
(2018).
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hypothesis one would expect that these girls would be more male-typical
and hence their educational performance would also appear as being more
male-typical. In this section we investigate four potential mechanisms that
may explain our findings.
First, we explore the role that TTT may have on other birth outcomes,
that may in turn affect educational outcomes later in life. The medical lit-
erature has shown that boys typically have a higher birth weight than girls
(Bouckaert et al., 1992; Voldner et al., 2009), and the economic literature
has provided evidence that birth weight is a robust predictor of cognitive
development and academic outcomes (Autor et al., 2017; Bharadwaj et al.,
2018). If sharing the intra-uterine environment with an opposite-sex fe-
tus would affect birth weight through TTT, then this could have a direct
impact on educational outcomes later in life. Miller and Martin (1995)
show that birth weight in mice is higher for females located between two
male fetuses as opposed to females located between two female fetuses.
For humans, however, the evidence is mixed and inconclusive (Orlebeke
et al., 1993; Glinianaia et al., 1998; Loos et al., 2001; Blickstein and Kalish,
2003). Table 3.8 shows the results from a model in which we look at birth
weight as the relevant outcome.33 We find that girls indeed have lower
birth weight than boys, and that birth weight is higher for girls with a
twin brother. Evidently, this cannot explain our baseline effects for girls
with a twin brother. If anything, the positive birth weight effect for girls
with an opposite-sex twin sibling would translate into higher math scores,
33Data on birth outcomes is available from 2004 to 2014 (PRNL dataset). The identi-
fication of twins and CSS is exactly the same as described in section 4.1, but we merge
the remaining twins and CSS to the data on birth outcomes. Note that these twins and
CSS are not the same as observed in the test-score data, as we only have information
for individuals born from 2004 to 2014. The procedure leaves a sample of 63, 253 twins
and 17, 410 CSS.
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not lower scores. Furthermore, when looking at gestational age - another
important birth outcome - there is more evidence for a positive effect from
opposite-sex twinning for girls. Given that the effect on birth weight for
males with a twin sister also does not seem to translate into higher test
scores later in childhood, we interpret these results as evidence that other
birth related outcomes cannot explain our baseline findings.
Table 3.8: Birth outcomes
Birth weight Birth weight Gestation Gestation
(grams) (grams) (days) (days)
DDmales 66.274*** 64.586*** 2.375*** 2.324***
(18.235) (17.903) (0.537) (0.535)
DDfemales 71.525*** 70.108*** 2.541*** 2.428***
(17.814) (17.607) (0.527) (0.527)
N 80, 663 80, 663 80, 663 80, 663
Controls N Y N Y
Notes: Results are based on OLS model. Controls are birth order
dummies, maternal age at birth, non-native dummy, and year of
birth dummies. Standard errors are clustered on maternal ID and
are in parentheses. Full estimation results are available in Ap-
pendix Table 3.A9
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
A second, alternative, explanation could be that TTT wires the brain
differently (Jordan-Young, 2010) leading to gender differences in various
psychological traits, but that these non-cognitive skills impact educational
outcomes in a more complex way than our baseline model allows for. For
example, externalizing behavior (e.g. getting angry, fighting, acting im-
pulsively) that is more prevalent among boys is a robust predictor of eight
grade suspension (Bertrand and Pan, 2013). If having an opposite-sex twin
impacts grade retention, then this might offset any potential impact on test
scores. Table 3.9 shows, however, that opposite-sex twinning does not seem
to be related with any measure of grade retention.34 Furthermore, a poten-
34We use two proxies for grade retention as a direct measure is unavailable. We use
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Table 3.9: Other educational outcomes of interest
Grade retention Teacher assessment
DDmale DDfemale DDmale DDfemale
School advice:
I(Multiple records) -0.001 0.001 - At least lower/general pre- 0.011 -0.012
(0.003) (0.002) vocational track (0.011) (0.011)
N 43, 069 43, 069 N 30, 944 30, 944
I(age ≥ 13) 0.004 0.006 - At least general pre- 0.007 -0.004
(0.005) (0.005) vocational track (0.013) (0.013)
N 43, 069 43, 069 N 30, 944 30, 944
- At least general/higher 0.009 0.002
pre-vocational track (0.016) (0.017)
N 30, 944 30, 944
- At least higher pre- 0.013 -0.003
vocational track (0.017) (0.017)
N 30, 944 30, 944
- At least higher pre- -0.018 -0.006
vocational/general track (0.019) (0.019)
N 30, 944 30, 944
- At least general track -0.028 -0.025
(0.018) (0.018)
N 30, 944 30, 944
- At least general/academic track -0.029 -0.022
(0.018) (0.018)
N 30, 944 30, 944
- At least academic track -0.042*** -0.006
(0.016) (0.016)
N 30, 944 30, 944
Notes: Results are based on OLS model. The set of controls is similar to that in Table 5. We proxy grade
eighth retention with an indicator for having multiple Cito-records in our data. In addition, we proxy
any grade retention with an indicator that the child is 13 years or older at the time of taking the test.
Standard errors are clustered on maternal ID and are in parentheses. The teacher assessment outcomes
are indicators for having a school advice greater or equal to category X. There are nine categories and
they range from advice for the lower vocational track (1) to the pre-university track (9).
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
tial differential impact of non-cognitive skills on overall school performance
is also not reflected in the teachers’ assessment of the student’s overal-
an indicator for having multiple Cito records in the data for retention in the final grade
of elementary school. We proxy any grade retention with an indicator variable for being
13 years or older at the time of taking the test.
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l ability.35 Hence, we conclude from this that our negative findings for
opposite-sex twinning for girls are not driven by non-cognitive skills that
impact other educational outcomes in a way that would offset the impact
on test scores.
A third, but related, argument is that the impact of non-cognitive skills
on educational outcomes may differ by gender. For example, Bertrand and
Pan (2013) show that there are gender differences in the non-cognitive re-
turns to parental inputs, and that the non-cognitive development of boys
is much more responsive to adverse parental investments resulting from
parental divorce than that of girls. Also Autor et al. (2017) and Brenøe
and Lundberg (2018) find that family disadvantage disproportionally nega-
tively affects the behavior and school outcomes of boys relative to girls. In
Table 3.10 we investigate how our results vary with the household situation.
Strikingly, our findings seem to be concentrated among non-divorced and
two-parent households. Hence, differences in how boys and girls deal with
adverse shocks in household composition or stability do not seem to explain
our negative effects of opposite-sex twinning for girls. In fact, a negative
effect of opposite-sex twinning also appears for boys in these “traditional”
families. This might be suggestive evidence for the fact that boys with a
twin brother receive a ‘double dose’ of prenatal testosterone (Resnick et al.,
1993; Peper et al., 2009), and hence perform better than boys with a twin
sister.
A further inspection of various subsamples confirms that the effect of
opposite-sex twinning may not be uniformly distributed, but may rather
35The teacher assessments of the child’s ability is communicated to students by means
of a ‘school advice’ for a secondary school track.
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Table 3.10: By household characteristics
Aggregate score Reading score Math score
DDmale DDfemale DDmale DDfemale DDmale DDfemale
Baseline -0.047 -0.051* -0.040 -0.025 -0.046 -0.075**
(0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032)
N 43, 069 43, 069 43, 069 43, 069 43, 069 43, 069
By household type:
Two-parent HH -0.070** -0.066** -0.060* -0.059* -0.063* -0.069*
(0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.034) (0.033) (0.035)
N 36, 404 36, 404 36, 404 36, 404 36, 404 36, 404
One-parent HH 0.068 -0.011 0.076 0.115 0.020 -0.134*
(0.076) (0.075) (0.077) (0.075) (0.078) (0.080)
N 6, 383 6, 383 6, 383 6, 383 6, 383 6, 383
Household stability:
Non-divorced -0.083** -0.094*** -0.064* -0.078** -0.085** -0.095**
(0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.035) (0.035) (0.037)
N 33, 374 33, 374 33, 374 33, 374 33, 374 33, 374
Divorced 0.169** 0.089 0.131 0.194** 0.150* -0.058
(0.084) (0.083) (0.090) (0.083) (0.083) (0.088)
N 5, 370 5, 370 5, 370 5, 370 5, 370 5, 370
Not married -0.062 0.071 -0.078 0.055 -0.032 0.060
(0.095) (0.091) (0.097) (0.092) (0.098) (0.097)
N 4, 325 4, 325 4, 325 4, 325 4, 325 4, 325
By HH income:
Low-income -0.010 -0.030 -0.012 0.009 -0.005 -0.074*
(0.038) (0.037) (0.040) (0.037) (0.039) (0.039)
N 25, 429 25, 429 25, 429 25, 429 25, 429 25, 429
High-income -0.095* -0.133** -0.058 -0.125** -0.128*** -0.116**
(0.050) (0.052) (0.052) (0.053) (0.049) (0.056)
N 17, 640 17, 640 17, 640 17, 640 17, 640 17, 640
By subsidy factor:
Disadvantaged -0.010 -0.013 -0.077 0.040 0.074 -0.046
(0.074) (0.069) (0.076) (0.070) (0.075) (0.072)
N 6, 352 6, 352 6, 352 6, 352 6, 352 6, 352
Non-disadvantaged -0.028 -0.080** -0.006 -0.059 -0.052 -0.102**
(0.036) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.036) (0.039)
N 30, 647 30, 647 30, 647 30, 647 30, 647 30, 647
Notes: Results are based on OLS model. The set of controls is similar to that in Table 5. A
household is high-income if household income at age 4 is greater or equal to the average
household income at age 4 of all children observed in the test-score data. Standard errors
are clustered on maternal ID and are in parentheses. Full estimation results are available in
Appendix Table 3.A10, 3.A11, and 3.A12.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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depend on the environment in which a child is being raised.36 Table 3.10
shows that children from high income households and children from more
advantaged backgrounds are more likely to experience a negative impact
of opposite-sex twinning on test scores. This evidence clearly suggests
that our results are not purely biological but that they are also strongly
subject to environmental influences. Recently research has shown that
gender achievement gaps are more pronounced in areas characterized by a
higher socioeconomic background of its inhabitants (Reardon et al., 2018).
One explanation for this finding is that traditional gender norms may be
more stereotypical in these areas, e.g. if the man is the main breadwinner
in the family. Lippmann and Senik (2018) find a smaller gender math
gap in East Germany and former Soviet countries, areas with more equal
gender norms due to socialism, and thereby argue that gender norms are
an important determinant of the gender math gap.
An explanation could be that TTT leads to more male-typical char-
acteristics for girls, in behavior as well in morphological attributes (e.g.
Cohen-Bendahan et al., 2004; Peper et al., 2009; Vuoksimaa et al., 2010a).
And that being (perceived as) different from a typical girl (or boy) - i.e.
different from the norm - may have a much larger impact on children if
they were raised in a family with traditional gender norms. Hereby, feeling
different may give rise to a behavioral response that offsets the potential
effect of TTT on math scores. The results in Table 3.10 provide support
for this hypothesis as the effects are concentrated among children growing
up in “traditional” families in terms of a two married parents household.
Arguably these are also households in which gender norms are strongest
36The importance of environmental factors has earlier been stressed by e.g. Bjo¨rklund
et al. (2006).
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(Reardon et al., 2018). However, to get a better understanding of this mech-
anism we exploit regional differences in traditional gender norms across the
Netherlands. Specifically, we make a distinction between children living in
municipalities in the ‘Bible Belt’, an area with a high number of conser-
vative Christians, and those living outside this area. Municipalities are
defined as more or less religious based on the share of votes for the ortho-
dox Calvinist political party (in Dutch: Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij,
SGP) in the 2017 national parliamentary elections.37 The SGP is known for
its valuation of traditional gender norms, i.e. considering the man as the
head of a household. First, we find suggestive evidence for a larger gender
math gap in test scores in more religious versus less religious areas (-40.5%
of a standard deviation versus -38.6% of a standard deviation).38 This is
consistent with Lippmann and Senik (2018) and Reardon et al. (2018) who
find larger gender gaps in areas with more traditional gender norms, and
this suggests that more traditional gender norms prevail in more religious
areas. Second, Table 3.11 shows that the double-difference estimators are
more negative for girls living in more religious areas.39 This illustrates that
our baseline effects are concentrated among girls living in municipalities
that are characterized by more traditional gender norms, suggesting that
the effect of biological factors on gender differences in test scores material-
izes more in more traditional environments. Hence, adherence to a social
37To identify children who are living in the biblebelt, we match the child’s municipal-
ity of residence at the time of taking the test to the share of votes to the conservative
Christian party (SGP) during the 2017 Dutch national elections in that same municipal-
ity. A municipality is defined as ‘more religious’ if the vote share for this particular party
exceeds 1% (which holds for about 29% of the municipalities in our sample). We cannot
match the child to the share of SGP votes for 114 children (0.2%) of the sample, which
leaves 50,839 observations in our sample, and 42,961 in the full control specification.
38See column 5 and 6 of Table 3.A13.
39The full estimation results are available in Table 3.A13.
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norm plays an important role here. This argument aligns closely with an
earlier study by Gielen et al. (2016), who find a marginal negative earnings
effect for females with a twin brother, which the authors explain by labor
market discrimination against females with attributes that are perceived as
more masculine, i.e. females that do not adhere to the norm. In this study
we argue that the feeling of being different, due to TTT, might give rise
to a behavioral response, which may impact test scores. Insecurity about
feeling different may harm the child’s self-confidence, which can directly
impact confidence at school. However, parents may adjust their parental
investments to help their child cope with this insecurity (e.g. providing
any type of mental health investments), which may come at a cost of ed-
ucational investments (Yi et al., 2015). Unfortunately, our data does not
allow us to distinguish confidence from asymmetric parental investments,
and this is left for future research.
Table 3.11: By traditional gender norms
Aggregate score Reading score Math score
DDmale DDfemale DDmale DDfemale DDmale DDfemale
Baseline -0.047 -0.051* -0.040 -0.025 -0.046 -0.075**
(0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032)
N 43, 069 43, 069 43, 069 43, 069 43, 069 43, 069
Less religious -0.056 -0.040 -0.053 0.000 -0.044 -0.065*
(0.036) (0.036) (0.038) (0.036) (0.036) (0.038)
N 30,504 30,504 30,504 30,504 30,504 30,504
More religious -0.032 -0.089 -0.019 -0.091 -0.058 -0.115*
(0.056) (0.057) (0.059) (0.058) (0.056) (0.061)
N 12,457 12,457 12,457 12,457 12,457 12,457
Notes: Results are based on OLS model. The set of controls is similar to that in Table
5. Standard errors are clustered on maternal ID and are in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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3.7 Conclusion
Gender gaps in educational performance are typically explained by gender-
biased environments and socialization; the literature has paid little atten-
tion to the potential role of biology in creating these gender differences.
This paper is the first to examine the role of biology as an additionally
important factor and it specifically focuses on the role of prenatal testos-
terone in explaining gender differences in performance in 8th grade of pri-
mary school. Prenatal testosterone is not only responsible for the sexual
differentiation of the male fetus, but is also said to wire the brain with mas-
culine behavioral patterns. Since male-typical cognitive skills are related
to boys’ advantage in math, biological factors may well explain some part
of the gender gap in math and reading test scores. If there is such a role
for biology, the role of any discriminatory or gender-biased social factors is
currently being overstated.
Boys are exposed to elevated levels of prenatal testosterone between
the eighth and twenty-fourth week of gestation. Based on evidence from
the biological literature for other mammals it is hypothesized that also in
humans prenatal testosterone can transfer in-utero from the male twin to
his uterus mate. This would imply that individuals with a male co-twin
are exposed to higher levels of prenatal testosterone than individuals with
a female co-twin. We argue that opposite-sex twinning can be exploited as
a natural experiment generating quasi-experimental variation in prenatal
testosterone exposure to test the link between prenatal testosterone and
primary school test scores.
Using Dutch administrative data on all twins and a control group of
closely spaced singletons (CSS), we find that girls with an opposite-sex
3.7. CONCLUSION 155
twin sibling score 7% of a standard deviation lower on math, with no effects
found on an aggregate and reading score. If opposite-sex twinning is indeed
a good proxy for exposure to prenatal testosterone, these findings suggest
that more prenatal testosterone leads to lower math test scores for girls.
This result is rather counterintuitive as one would expect improved math
performance for girls with increased exposure to prenatal testosterone. A
series of robustness and sensitivity analysis shows that this effect is con-
centrated among children who are raised in families with more traditional
gender norms. Possibly, children in these families are more sensitive to
adhering to a social norm than children who grow up in less traditional
families. A feeling of being different may result in adverse behavioral re-
sponses or behavior, which may divert the attention of the child and his
parents away from performing well in school.
Our findings imply that biological factors seem to play a role in child-
ren’s educational performance, but that these effects materialize depending
on environmental factors. If these effects influence the type of education a
child enrols for as adolescents, they may translate into different economic
outcomes in adulthood, such as wage differences as was found earlier in
Gielen et al. (2016). As such, a better understanding of the role of biologi-
cal factors in generating gender differences in economic outcomes is crucial
for the discussion on (the presence of) labor market discrimination and the
required measures to limit it.
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Appendix
Table 3.A1: Variable descriptions
Variable Dataset Definition Units
A. Educational outcomes
Total score CITO Final aggregate Cito-score Standardized
Language score CITO Cito language score Standardized
Math score CITO Cito math score Standardized
School advice CITO Teacher advice for a track in secondary Categorial,
education. Hierarchical with one representing 1 to 9
the lowest school advice (lower vocational
education) and nine representing the
highest track (pre-university education).
B. Demographic variables
Age GBA Age at taking the test Months
Parity GBA Birth order Categorical
Spacing GBA Difference between sequential Months
births
Nonnative GBA Non-Dutch indicator 0/1 dummy
Family size GBA Family size (number of siblings
plus one) via mother.
Mother’s age GBA Maternal age at birth Months.
Father’s age GBA Paternal age at birth Months.
C. Household characteristics
HH-type Huishoudens Household type at the time
of taking the test. Categorical
HH-income Baanpersjaartab & Household income in the year Euros/year
Zelfstandigentab the child has its fourth birthday
(combined income of parents
from labor income and self-
employment)
Mother working Baanpersjaartab & Mother has positive earnings in 0/1 dummy
Zelfstandigentab the year the child has its fourth
birthday
Mother in DI AOTOPERSOON- Mother has positive DI benefits 0/1 dummy
BUS in the year the child has its fourth
D. Birth outcomes
Birth weight PRNL Raw birth weight. Grams
Gestation PRNL Gestational length. Days
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Table 3.A2: Results for aggregate test score (scale: 501-550) -
by gender
A. Males
Aggregate score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Twin 0.226*** -0.002 0.220*** 0.003 -0.001
(0.025) (0.021) (0.026) (0.023) (0.023)
OS 0.001 0.011 -0.006 0.004 0.005
(0.030) (0.025) (0.032) (0.027) (0.027)
Twin*OS 0.004 -0.040 -0.020 -0.047 -0.047
(0.034) (0.028) (0.036) (0.031) (0.030)
N 24,923 24,923 21,030 21,030 21,030
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes
Income controls No No No No Yes
B. Females
Aggregate score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Twin 0.197*** -0.051** 0.180*** -0.045* -0.051**
(0.025) (0.022) (0.027) (0.023) (0.023)
OS 0.015 -0.016 0.009 -0.011 -0.010
(0.030) (0.025) (0.032) (0.027) (0.027)
Twin*OS -0.048 -0.046* -0.053 -0.054* -0.054*
(0.034) (0.028) (0.036) (0.030) (0.030)
N 26,043 26,043 22,039 22,039 22,039
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes
Income controls No No No No Yes
Notes : Results are based on OLS. The set of controls is similar to that
in Table 5. Standard errors are clustered on maternal ID and are in
parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.A4: Robustness results for aggregate test score (s-
tandardized) - sub-sample estimates
Aggregate score
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline First born Native kids Two-child
families
Twin -0.007 0.016 -0.016 0.017
(0.023) (0.036) (0.026) (0.044)
OS 0.005 -0.016 -0.005 0.015
(0.027) (0.046) (0.033) (0.050)
Female -0.067** -0.042 -0.088** -0.013
(0.028) (0.045) (0.035) (0.054)
Twin*Female -0.039 -0.054 -0.018 -0.067
(0.031) (0.049) (0.038) (0.059)
OS*Female -0.018 -0.001 0.034 0.020
(0.036) (0.063) (0.044) (0.066)
Twin*OS -0.047 -0.033 -0.016 -0.059
(0.030) (0.050) (0.036) (0.055)
Twin*OS*Female -0.005 -0.025 -0.074 -0.065
(0.040) (0.068) (0.049) (0.073)
DDmale -0.047 -0.033 -0.016 -0.059
(0.030) (0.050) (0.036) (0.055)
DDfemale -0.051* -0.057 -0.090** -0.123**
(0.030) (0.048) (0.037) (0.055)
N 43,069 19,576 34,003 14,034
Controls Y Y Y Y
Income controls Y Y Y Y
Notes: Results are based on OLS model. The set of controls is similar to that in
Table 5. Standard errors are clustered on maternal ID and are in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.A6: Robustness results for aggregate test score (stan-
dardized) - different age bandwidth for CSS
Aggregate score (std)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
12 months 18 months 24 months 36 months
Twin -0.007 -0.072*** -0.082*** -0.055***
(0.023) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010)
OS 0.005 0.019** 0.021*** 0.019***
(0.027) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004)
Female -0.067** -0.048*** -0.055*** -0.053***
(0.028) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004)
Twin*Female -0.039 -0.060*** -0.054*** -0.056***
(0.031) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014)
OS*Female -0.018 -0.036*** -0.035*** -0.030***
(0.036) (0.011) (0.007) (0.005)
Twin*OS -0.047 -0.063*** -0.065*** -0.064***
(0.030) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015)
Twin*OS*Female -0.005 0.016 0.015 0.010
(0.040) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020)
DDmale -0.047 -0.063*** -0.065*** -0.064***
(0.030) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015)
DDfemale -0.051* -0.047*** -0.050*** -0.054***
(0.030) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
N 43,069 132,650 279,980 492,264
Controls Y Y Y Y
Income controls Y Y Y Y
Notes: Results are based on OLS model. The set of controls is similar to that in Table
5. Standard errors are clustered on maternal ID and are in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.A8: Robustness: matching estimators
Aggregate score Reading score Math score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Twin 0.018 -0.030 0.042 -0.004 -0.003 -0.056**
(0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.025)
OS 0.014 0.000 0.016 0.005 0.002 -0.018
(0.034) (0.030) (0.036) (0.033) (0.033) (0.029)
Female -0.051 -0.083*** 0.211*** 0.188*** -0.355*** -0.400***
(0.036) (0.032) (0.037) (0.033) (0.037) (0.032)
Twin*Female -0.058 -0.023 -0.082** -0.043 -0.026 0.016
(0.039) (0.036) (0.039) (0.037) (0.040) (0.037)
OS*Female 0.006 -0.005 0.001 -0.010 0.021 0.024
(0.046) (0.041) (0.048) (0.044) (0.048) (0.042)
Twin*OS -0.056 -0.039 -0.049 -0.030 -0.054 -0.034
(0.037) (0.035) (0.039) (0.038) (0.037) (0.035)
Twin*OS*Female -0.026 -0.028 -0.003 -0.007 -0.045 -0.064
(0.050) (0.048) (0.051) (0.050) (0.052) (0.049)
DDmale -0.056 -0.039 -0.049 -0.030 -0.054 -0.034
(0.037) (0.035) (0.039) (0.038) (0.037) (0.035)
DDfemale -0.081** -0.066* -0.052 -0.038 -0.099** -0.098**
(0.037) (0.036) (0.038) (0.036) (0.040) (0.038)
N 43,068 33,029 43,068 33,029 43,068 33,029
Kernel M Y N Y N Y N
Inverse Prob. N Y N Y N Y
Notes: Results are based on OLS model. The set of controls is similar to that in Table 5. Propensity scores
based on age, birth order, non-native indicator, household type, whether the mother was in DI in the
year of giving birth, household income (age 4), mother working (age 4), mean Cito-score of the school
the child is attending. Kernel matching based on Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of 0.06). The
results of inverse probability matching excludes observations with propensity scores lower than 0.1 and
higher than 0.9. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
164 CHAPTER 3. PRENATAL TESTOSTERONE
Table 3.A9: Birth outcomes
Birth weight Birth weight Gestation Gestation Gestation Gestation
(grams) (grams) (in days) (in days) (in weeks) (in weeks)
Twin -826.690*** -807.474*** -18.594*** -18.016*** -2.638*** -2.552***
(13.588) (13.624) (0.398) (0.406) (0.057) (0.058)
OS 28.970* 29.118* 0.566 0.547 0.083 0.080
(16.401) (16.157) (0.466) (0.467) (0.067) (0.067)
Female -75.761*** -77.025*** 2.066*** 1.977*** 0.306*** 0.293***
(17.617) (17.461) (0.492) (0.494) (0.070) (0.071)
Twin*Female -9.447 -10.567 -1.272** -1.227** -0.192** -0.186**
(19.259) (19.007) (0.564) (0.563) (0.081) (0.081)
OS*Female -41.317* -39.087* -0.992 -0.880 -0.159* -0.143
(21.184) (20.953) (0.612) (0.616) (0.088) (0.088)
Twin*OS 66.274*** 64.586*** 2.375*** 2.324*** 0.343*** 0.337***
(18.235) (17.903) (0.537) (0.535) (0.077) (0.077)
Twin*OS*Female 5.252 5.522 0.166 0.104 0.041 0.032
(22.932) (22.625) (0.671) (0.673) (0.096) (0.097)
DDmales 66.274*** 64.586*** 2.375*** 2.324*** 0.343*** 0.337***
(18.235) (17.903) (0.537) (0.535) (0.077) (0.077)
DDfemales 71.525*** 70.108*** 2.541*** 2.428*** 0.384*** 0.368***
(17.814) (17.607) (0.527) (0.527) (0.076) (0.076)
N 80, 663 80, 663 80, 663 80, 663 80, 663 80, 663
Controls N Y N Y N Y
Notes: Results are based on OLS model. Controls are birth order dummies, maternal age at birth,
non-native dummy, and year of birth dummies. Standard errors are clustered on maternal ID and
are in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.A13: By traditional family norms
Aggregate score Reading score Math score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Less More Less More Less More
Religious Religious Religious Religious Religious Religious
Twin -0.015 0.014 0.026 0.018 -0.056** 0.011
(0.027) (0.041) (0.028) (0.042) (0.027) (0.042)
OS 0.004 0.014 0.010 0.004 -0.019 0.035
(0.032) (0.049) (0.034) (0.052) (0.032) (0.049)
Female -0.064* -0.070 0.217*** 0.205*** -0.386*** -0.405***
(0.033) (0.052) (0.035) (0.054) (0.034) (0.055)
Twin*Female -0.045 -0.036 -0.090** -0.062 0.010 0.021
(0.037) (0.058) (0.038) (0.060) (0.038) (0.061)
OS*Female -0.034 0.026 -0.050 0.049 0.001 0.014
(0.042) (0.067) (0.044) (0.070) (0.044) (0.070)
Twin*OS -0.056 -0.032 -0.053 -0.019 -0.044 -0.058
(0.036) (0.056) (0.038) (0.059) (0.036) (0.056)
Twin*OS*Female 0.016 -0.057 0.054 -0.072 -0.021 -0.057
(0.048) (0.076) (0.050) (0.079) (0.050) (0.079)
DDmale -0.056 -0.032 -0.053 -0.019 -0.044 -0.058
(0.036) (0.056) (0.038) (0.059) (0.036) (0.056)
DDfemale -0.040 -0.089 0.000 -0.091 -0.065* -0.115*
(0.036) (0.057) (0.036) (0.058) (0.038) (0.061)
N 30,504 12,457 30,504 12,457 30,504 12,457
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Income controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Results are based on OLS model. The set of controls is similar to that in Table 5. Standard errors
are clustered on maternal ID and are in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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(a) Male Twins (b) Male CSS
(c) Female Twins (d) Female CSS
Figure 3.A1: Test-score distributions for math, by gender, sibling-type and
sibling gender.
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(a) Male Twins (b) Male CSS
(c) Female Twins (d) Female CSS
Figure 3.A2: Test-score distributions for reading, by gender, sibling-type
and sibling gender.
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(a) Total score
(b) Reading score (c) Math score
Figure 3.A3: Quantile regression, and 95% confidence interval

Chapter 4
Last but (not) least? Aversion
to the lowest educational track
1
4.1 Introduction
When it comes to perceptions about several socioeconomic outcomes, in-
dividuals tend to not only care about their position in absolute terms, but
also about their position relative to others. To illustrate, conditional on
the individual’s own earnings, the income of others in the neighborhood af-
fects wellbeing negatively (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004; Luttmer, 2005).
When employees learn that they earn less than comparable colleagues, job
satisfaction is lower (Card et al., 2012). The literature tends to focus on
the effects of relative income on utility, but these relative effects may also
play a role in other life outcomes. Very little is known about potential non-
linearities across the distribution, and the findings in the literature diverge.
Blanchflower and Oswald find that effects are strongest for the top of the
1I wish to thank Anne Gielen and Dinand Webbink for useful discussions and support.
This paper benefited from comments made by Lammertjan Dam, David Figlio, Aenneli
Houkes-Hommes, Sacha Kapoor, Kevin Lang, Olivier Marie, Jesse Rothstein, Ulf Zo¨litz,
and seminar participants at Erasmus School of Economics, CPB Netherlands Bureau
for Economic Policy Analysis, and the 28th EALE Conference (Ghent). All errors and
emissions are my own.
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distribution, Card et al. find stronger effects for those in the bottom, and
Luttmer finds no differences across the distribution. Kuziemko et al. (2014)
focus on one type of non-linearity, namely: last place aversion. Last place
aversion refers to a setting in which individuals have a particular dislike
for being in last place. Whereas Kuziemko et al. examine distributional
preferences in income, I study last place aversion in an educational context
by exploiting a reform that exogenously changed the lowest track in Dutch
secondary education. Last place aversion may have persistent consequences
in this setting as of the importance of ability tracking for later life outcomes
(e.g. Betts, 2011).
This paper studies last place aversion in an educational context, and
specifically focuses on a reform that changed the lowest tracks in Dutch
secondary education. The reform was introduced in 1999 and merged the
then two lowest secondary school tracks. The second-to-lowest track sud-
denly became the lowest track, and hence this represents a unique setting
to study last place aversion. In the Netherlands, children are tracked after
6th grade when they are about age twelve. The outcomes studied in this
paper are the variables that determine track allocation in 6th grade: (1)
the child’s performance on a high-stakes standardized cognitive test, and
(2) a track recommendation made by the primary school teacher.
These outcomes are expected to change after the reform if last place
aversion plays a role. Students and parents can influence track allocation
in secondary school by affecting the two variables that determine track
allocation. To illustrate, parents can invest in homework assistance to im-
prove the child’s test performance, children may experience increased test
motivation, and parents may put pressure on primary school teachers in
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order for them to give a higher track recommendation. Anecdotal evidence
in newspaper articles suggest that these types of behaviors take place after
the introduction of the new lowest track. The Dutch Inspectorate of Edu-
cation reports that about 52% of schools experience parental pressure when
determining the track recommendation, of which 44% is aimed at receiving
higher track recommendations. Last place aversion to the new lowest track
is mentioned as one of the explanations for this finding (Inspectie van het
Onderwijs, 2014).
To study if the reform led to last place aversion, and consequently to
differences in the variables that determine track allocation, I employ a
difference-in-difference strategy. I combine the timing of the reform with
the fact that only children who are expected to attend the lowest track
are affected by the reform. The data comes from the longitudinal PRIMA
survey, which was administered biannually from 1994 to 2005. It is repeated
cross-sectional data with three waves of data before the reform and three
years of data after the reform. The dataset contains information on a low-
stakes standardized cognitive test that is not important for track allocation
in secondary school. This test-score is used to determine which children
are likely to attend the lowest track, and hence are in the treatment group.
A treatment group with children who are likely to attend the lowest track
based on their reading and math score is established. The control group
consists of children who are just above the bar.
The results of the difference-in-difference approach show that children
who are likely to attend the lowest track have a significantly lower chance of
receiving a track recommendation higher than the lowest track. The effect
is particularly large for those in the treatment group based on their math
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score: a 6.5 percentage points lower probability compared to a mean enroll-
ment of 44.5%. Those who are expected to attend the lowest track based
on their math score also have a significantly lower score on the high-stakes
standardized cognitive test after the reform (lower by 5% of a standard
deviation). No significant effects are found for children who are expected
to attend the lowest track based on their reading score. If anything, they
have higher test-scores after the reform.
I examine what mechanisms can explain the results found. First, several
types of behavioral responses could lead to differences in the variables that
determine track allocation, ranging from indirectly trying to influence the
high-stakes standardized test-scores to directly influencing the teacher for a
higher track recommendation. To examine the importance of these channels
I add a control for the high-stakes test score to the specification with the
track recommendation as the relevant outcome. The results suggest that
lower track recommendations cannot be explained by lower test-scores.
Second, I examine what is driving the lower test-scores after the reform
for children who are expected to attend the lowest track. The main analysis
is performed on the aggregate score, but separate scores for math and
reading are available for a sub-sample. What stands out is that the effects
are stronger for the child’s weakest subject. To illustrate: if a child is bad
at math, he or she scores lower at math after the reform. The pressure to
perform well might be higher for the child’s weakest subject, which may
explain why scores are lower.
Finally, I find that the effects are larger, i.e. more negative, among
children in families with higher-educated parents. Literature shows that
higher-educated parents have a higher valuation of education (Hastings
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et al., 2005; Burgess et al., 2015), are more aware of differences in the quality
of education (Sacerdote et al., 2011; Borghans et al., 2015), prefer grade
retention over transition to a lower track (Kloosterman and de Graaf, 2010),
and invest more in homework assistance (Rønning, 2011). I hypothesize
that a feeling of last place aversion is stronger in these families, and hence
a higher pressure to perform well may lead to lower test-scores.
This paper adds to the literature in several ways. First, I add to the
literature on how individual wellbeing is affected by their position relative
to others (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004; Luttmer, 2005; Card et al.,
2012), but in particular to the literature on last place aversion. Kuziemko
et al. (2014) provide evidence for last place aversion in a laboratory setting.
In a first experiment they show that participants are more likely to choose
gambles that let them move up in the income distribution if they are in last
place as opposed to other places in the distribution. In a second experiment
they show that in a modified dictator game participants in second-to-last
place are more likely to give money to the person ranked above them than
to the person ranked below to preserve their rank. Finally, they show
that individuals earning slightly above minimum wage are more likely to
oppose minimum wage increases, and individuals earning below the median
but above poverty are more likely to oppose redistribution compared to
what their background characteristics would suggest. Both distributional
preferences are consistent with last place aversion. There is little evidence
on last place aversion, and this is to the best of my knowledge the first
application to an educational context. My findings suggest that last place
aversion does not yield higher test-scores or higher track recommendations.
If anything, children do worse, and I find suggestive evidence that children
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perform especially worse if the pressure is higher.
Second, I add to the literature on the influence of parental inputs on
child performance (Figlio and Lucas, 2004; Houtenville and Conway, 2008;
Rønning, 2011). This paper adds especially to the literature that examines
interactions between parental inputs and external factors. To illustrate,
parental involvement in the child’s education increases with the introduc-
tion of Head Start (Gelber and Isen, 2013), decreases with increases in
school resources (Houtenville and Conway, 2008), and increases if teach-
ers employ tougher grading (Figlio and Lucas, 2004). This paper adds to
this literature by studying how changes in the institutional setting of an
educational system affect parental behaviors, which may affect the child’s
educational outcomes.
Third, I add to the literature on the potential effects of tracking. The lit-
erature shows that tracking exacerbates existing differences between child-
ren (see for an overview Betts, 2011). However, very little is known about
potential unintended effects of tracked educational systems. These unin-
tended effects can arise if parents and/or children want to avoid the lowest
educational track. This may lead to a potential mismatch between the
ability of the child and the educational track he is enrolled. This paper
shows that last place aversion leads to lower track recommendations and
lower test scores for those expected to attend the lowest track. Given the
persistent effects of ability tracking, this may have long-run consequences.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next Section outlines the
institutional setting of the reform. The empirical strategy and the data
are discussed in Section 3 and 4 respectively. The results are provided in
Section 5, and Section 6 explores several mechanisms that could explain
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the results found. This paper ends with a conclusion in Section 7.
4.2 Background and the reform
4.2.1 Tracking in the Netherlands
Within the Dutch educational system children attend eight years of pri-
mary education starting at age four. The first two years of primary school
are kindergarten, and children generally start learning to read and write
in the third year of primary school, which is equivalent to first grade (Fer-
on et al., 2016). After finishing primary education, children are tracked
into different educational levels in secondary school at approximately age
twelve (transition from 6th grade to 7th grade).2 Secondary education takes
four to six years depending on the level of the track. In the studied time
period, track allocation in secondary school is based on two variables that
are determined by the end of primary school: (1) the child’s score on a
high-stakes standardized cognitive test taken in 6th grade, and (2) a track
recommendation by the primary school teacher.
The standardized cognitive test that is important for track allocation is
better known as the Cito-test. Administering the Cito-test is not manda-
tory for schools, but more than 80% of Dutch schools administer the test
(Chorny et al., 2010). The test is administered in 6th grade in February,
and the test procedure is similar for all children.3 The test covers four
main areas: reading, math, information processing and world orientation
(the latter is optional), and children can obtain scores ranging from 501
2This is at a younger age than in other OECD countries, which usually track children
starting from age 14-16 (Feron et al., 2016).
3The test is developed by the Centraal Instituut for Toetsontwikkeling (CITO). The
test is no longer administered in February from 2015.
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to 550. The test is very important as the test-scores are used as input by
the primary school teacher when determining their track recommendation,
and secondary schools can set score-thresholds as to determine which child
is allowed in which track.4,5
The track recommendation made by the teacher is based on their ex-
perience with the student and their evaluation of the child’s ability. It is
not only based on the child’s performance in the 6th grade, but also in
earlier grades. Observable family and socioeconomic characteristics may
also influence the teacher recommendation (Feron et al., 2016). Teachers
know the standardized cognitive test score at the time of determining the
appropriate track recommendation for each child. The final track alloca-
tion decision is made by the secondary school the child will attend starting
from 7th grade. This decision is based on both the cognitive test score as
well as the teacher’s track recommendation.
4.2.2 The reform
Before the reform in 1999, Dutch secondary education consisted out of four
tracks (Table 4.1). An academic track (abbreviated in Dutch: vwo) that
prepared students for university education in six years. A general track
(havo) that prepared students for higher vocational education in five years.
General secondary education (mavo) that prepared students for vocational
education in four years, and lower vocational education (lbo) that prepared
students for vocational education in four years. The two lowest tracks both
prepared students for vocational education, although lower vocational ed-
4The scores are also important for schools as they are used to measure school quality
(Chorny et al., 2010; Feron et al., 2016).
5A guideline by Van Boxtel et al. (2011) for these track allocation based on the Cito
cognitive test score is provided in Table 4.A1.
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ucation had a more practical focus as compared to general vocational edu-
cation. There are two tracks for special needs students, which are separate
from the main system. I list these tracks as special (ivbo) and special+
(vso), where children receive more support when they are enrolled in the
latter track.
This system changed with the implementation of a reform in 1999 as is
shown in Table 4.1. The reform combined the previous two lowest tracks
in secondary education, i.e. general vocational education (mavo) and lower
vocational education (lbo) into the pre-vocational track (vmbo). The re-
form left the academic track and the general track unaffected. The newly
established pre-vocational track prepares students for vocational education
in four years. The main goal of the reform was to improve the transi-
tion from pre-vocational education to vocational education and the labor
market (Ministry of Education, 2005).
The newly introduced pre-vocational track again consists out of four
sub-tracks that are different in level and practical orientation. The theo-
retical (vmbo-tl) and mixed track (vmbo-gl) are comparable to what was
previously known as the general vocational track (mavo). The middle man-
agement (vmbo-kbl) and basic track (vmbo-bbl) are comparable to what
was previously known as the lower vocational track (lbo). The ordering of
the sub-tracks in Table 4.1 corresponds to tracks with a more theoretical
focus (vmbo-tl) to sub-tracks with a more practical focus (vmbo-bbl). The
new system also includes tracks for children that necessitate special care,
which are vmbo-lwo (special) and vmbo-pro (special+).6 The perception
that the reform made it more difficult to transition from the pre-vocational
6The Ministry of Education (2005) reports that about 60% of students attended the
pre-vocational track (vmbo) in 2004.
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track to higher levels, combined with the fact that the reform brought to-
gether pupils from different levels contributed to the image problems of
the pre-vocational track, which could have enhanced last place aversion
(Ministry of Education, 2005; Kloosterman and de Graaf, 2010).
4.3 Empirical strategy
This paper examines last place aversion in an educational context and uses
the reform that caused an exogenous change in the tracks in Dutch sec-
ondary education. Tracks that were previously ranked before-last, suddenly
became the lowest track. The reform will only affect children who are ex
ante expected to attend the new defined lowest track, which will be ex-
ploited in a difference-in-difference framework. The difference-in-difference
framework allows me to control for factors that are common across survey
waves. The outcomes of interest are the variables that determine track al-
location in secondary school, namely (1) the track recommendation by the
primary school teacher, and (2) the score on the high-stakes cognitive stan-
dardized test.7 Scores on a low-stakes test that is unimportant for track
allocation in secondary school are used to identify the group of students
that is likely to be affected by the reform.
The difference-in-difference approach compares children who were in 6th
grade before the reform with those who were in 6th grade after the reform.
The lowest educational track is different for these two groups. Behavioral
responses as to avoid the lowest track will only be prevalent among those
who are expected to attend the lowest track. This regards efforts made
7Information on the actual track allocation in secondary school is not available in
the data.
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by the child, but similarly parents will only get involved in their child’s
education if they have the belief that they can improve their outcomes
(Hoover-Dempsey and Sandler, 1997). Hence, the treatment group consists
of individuals who have a high likelihood of attending the lowest track, and
the control group consists of individuals with a low likelihood of attending
the lowest track.
To identify which students are more or less likely to attend the low-
est track, I use test-scores on a low-stakes cognitive standardized test that
is unimportant for track allocation in secondary education. Specifically, I
focus on the lowest teacher recommendation that is just above the newly
established lowest track. This is the lowest possible track recommendation
that would be capable of letting the child avoid attending the lowest track.8
I then focus on the equivalent track before the reform. The median low-
stakes test score for children receiving this pre-reform track recommenda-
tion serves as threshold xi for determining whether children are more likely
to attend the lowest track (below xi) or less likely (above xi).
9 A necessary
assumption for this set-up of treatment and control group is that this low-
stakes test score is independent of treatment. This assumption is likely to
hold, because (1) the classification is based on the pre-reform distribution,
and (2) the low-stakes test is not taken into account for track allocation in
secondary education.
Equation 4.1 is estimated for the outcome variables (yit) that determine
track allocation in secondary school: the track recommendation, and the
8This corresponds to the combination track of the vocational general track and the
general track (T6) as is shown in Table 4.3.
9An in-depth discussion of the setting up of treatment and control group is provided
in Section 4.4. Robustness checks with respect to the chosen threshold are provided in
Section 4.5.3 and do not change the conclusions.
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high-stakes cognitive test score for child i in year t. The track recommenda-
tion variable is categorical with nine possible outcomes, and is transformed
to a dummy representing whether the child received a track recommen-
dation above a specified track. I focus on the lowest possible track that
will let the child avoid the lowest track.10 The high-stakes test score is
standardized with mean zero and standard deviation one. Equation 4.1
includes an indicator for being in 6th grade after the reform (Reformt),
a treatment group indicator stating that a child is more likely to attend
the lowest track (Treatmenti), and the difference-in-difference coefficient
of interest (Reformt∗Treatmenti) that represents the effects of the reform
for those who are most likely affected by the reform. Vector Xi includes
control variables at the individual level, and εit is the individual-specific
error term, which is clustered at the school-level.
yit = γ0 + γ1Reformt + γ2Treatmenti+
γ3(Reformt ∗ Treatmenti) + Xiδ + εit
(4.1)
4.3.1 Validity of the identification strategy
For this approach to be valid a couple assumptions need to hold. First,
the policy intervention should be exogenous. Although the changes in the
educational system were announced prior to the actual implementation11,
it is impossible for parents and children to manipulate whether or not they
are subject to the reform. Parents and children cannot decide that their
10The set-up of outcome variables is discussed in more detail in Section 4.4.
11Act 25.410 was submitted on 19 June 1997, and accepted by Parliament on
19 May 1998. See: https://www.eerstekamer.nl/wetsvoorstel/25410_regeling_
leerwegen_mavo_en.
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child skips a class to avoid attending the newly introduced lowest vocational
track.
Second, there should not be other reforms that were implemented during
same time period that could also influence the outcomes of interest. A
reform was implemented in 1998 that integrated children with special needs
in normal classes. This led to an increase in the number of children in
a special needs track from 73,000 in 1998 to 81,000 in 2004 (Ministry of
Education, 2005). I perform a robustness check in which I leave out children
that are in special needs education, which does not alter my conclusions
(see Section 4.5.3). A reform that changed the curriculum of the general
(havo) and academic track (vwo) was implemented in 1998/1999. The
reform changed the curriculum in the last two (or three for the academic
track) years of education, as students had to make a choice for a study field:
i.e. science, health, social sciences or humanities. This reform could have
affected the perceived transition probabilities from the vocational track to
these higher tracks, which could have contributed to an increased level of
last place aversion.
Third, the dataset used in this paper is a repeated cross-section, im-
plying that the distributions of ability must be similar before and after the
reform. Hence, a different composition of students should not be driving
the results found. This is particularly important as the composition of in-
cluded schools changes by survey wave. Figure 4.1 shows the distributions
of the low-stakes PRIMA test before and after the reform.12 As this test is
not important for track allocation it is likely unaffected by the reform. The
distributions for reading and math look very similar before and after the
12The distributions by survey wave are shown in Figure 4.A1.
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reform, although a Kolgomorov-Smirnov test rejects the null of equality of
distributions. To take into account that the composition of schools changes
over the waves, I perform a robustness check in which I only include schools
that are present in all waves which does not change my conclusions (see
Section 4.5.3).
Finally, the key assumption for a difference-in-difference strategy is that
the trends in outcomes would have been similar in the treatment and control
group in absence of treatment, which is also known as the common trend
assumption. Unfortunately I can not go more than three years back due
to data availability. Figure 4.2 shows the common trend plots for the two
outcomes of interest for the treatment groups based on the reading and
math score for the available data. The pre-trends in outcomes before the
reform look similar in treatment and control group.
4.4 Data
The data on cognitive test scores and the teacher assessments used in this
paper comes from the longitudinal PRIMA survey. The survey started to
learn more about the ability of primary school children in the Netherlands
(Kamphuis et al., nd). The survey was administered biannually from 1994
to 2005, and data from all six waves are used (1994-1995, 1996-1997, 1998-
1999, 2000-2001, 2002-2003, and 2004-2005). This implies that I have three
waves of data before the reform and three waves of data after the reform.
Each wave of survey data contains information on about 60,000 students
from about 600 schools.13 The survey is completed for students in year 2, 4,
13The sample composition changed per wave, but Roeleveld and Vierke (2003) find
no significant differences between schools that exited the PRIMA-project and schools
that did not drop out.
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6, and 8 of Dutch primary education, which is equivalent to grade 0, grade
2, grade 4 and grade 6. The PRIMA survey contains information on the
standardized cognitive Cito-test, the teacher recommendation of the child,
information on the socioeconomic background of the child, and finally also
the child’s performance on a standardized test unrelated to track allocation
in secondary school.
The outcomes of interest are the variables that determine track alloca-
tion in secondary school, i.e. the child’s performance on the standardized
cognitive test taken in the final year of primary education (Cito-test), and
the track recommendation made by the child’s teacher. Note that I only
observe the variables that determine track allocation in secondary school,
but unfortunately cannot observe the actual track assignment in secondary
school. Scores for the standardized cognitive Cito-test range from 501-550,
and are standardized by wave with mean zero and a standard deviation of
one.
The teacher’s track recommendation variable can take on multiple val-
ues. Teachers can give track recommendations for one track (e.g. the
academic track (vwo)), but can also specify combined recommendations
(e.g. a combination between the academic track (vwo) and the general
track (havo)). The possible outcomes of the teacher track recommenda-
tion before and after the reform are documented in Table 4.2. There are
eleven possible track recommendation outcomes before the reform and fif-
teen potential outcomes after the reform. A classification is made to map
the track recommendations before the reform into track recommendations
after the reform. I use the mapping as suggested by Timmermans et al.
(2013), who match each track to the amount of years a child is expected to
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attend education based on his or her track recommendation. The resulting
classification in shown in Table 4.3 and has nine possible track recommen-
dations. The track recommendation variable is coded according to this
classification with T1 representing the lowest track recommendation, and
T9 representing the highest track recommendation.
The PRIMA survey also contains information on a low-stakes standard-
ized test that is not important for track allocation in secondary school: the
PRIMA-test. It is a cognitive test that focuses on reading and math skills,
and it is identical for different grades in different years (Chorny et al.,
2010). The PRIMA-test has an ordinal score (Leuven et al., 2010), and
scores are standardized by wave and by grade with mean zero and a stan-
dard deviation equal to one.
This low-stakes standardized test is used to define a treatment and con-
trol group. The idea is that children are only affected by the reform, and
hence last place aversion, if they are expected to attend the lowest track.
Hence there could be behavioral responses that affect the variables that
determine track allocation such that the newly developed lowest track is
avoided. When referring back to Table 4.3 the lowest track recommenda-
tion that would make a child avoid the lowest track is the combination
advice of the vocational general and the general track (T6). I then ex-
amine the average low-stakes PRIMA for children receiving a T6 advice
before the reform. This is an indicator for the average ability level that
would correspond to a track recommendation just above the lowest track,
and hence would be an indicator of which children are more likely to dis-
play behavioral responses after the reform. Table 4.4 shows the different
tracks and the corresponding mean scores on the low-stakes cognitive PRI-
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MA test. Higher track recommendations are associated with higher mean
and median scores on both math and reading. I use the median scores to
set up two treatment groups, one based on the math score and one based
on the reading score. This implies that a child is assigned to the treatment
group when having a PRIMA reading score below 0.165, and a PRIMA
math score below 0.234.14
The dataset also includes information on gender and age (in months),
and information on the socioeconomic background of the child. The child’s
socioeconomic background is proxied with the subsidy-factor, which re-
presents the amount of (extra) funding schools receive for each student.
Schools receive higher subsidies for children from lower socioeconomic stra-
ta. Three main groups can be distinguished: (i) non-disadvantaged stu-
dents have a subsidy factor equal to 1, (ii) native students with lower
educated parents have a subsidy factor of 1.25, (iii) the subsidy factor
for students from ethnic minorities is equal to 1.9.15 The value of the
subsidy-factor represents the amount of extra funding schools receive for
each student, i.e. schools receive 25% extra funding for students whose
subsidy-factor is equal to 1.25 (Chorny et al., 2010). I create a dummy
which is equal to zero if the child is not disadvantaged (subsidy-factor e-
qual to one) and one if the child is disadvantaged (subsidy-factor higher
than one). The data also includes information on the educational level of
the parents.
This paper focuses on variables determining the transition from prima-
ry school to secondary school and therefore only uses data from students
14The results are robust to using different definitions of the treatment group (Sec-
tion 4.5.3).
15There are groups of pupils with subsidy factors equal to 1.4 and 1.7, but these
categories each only account for less than 1% of the sample.
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in the 6th grade. The data for the sample of students in only the 6th grade
contains information on 84, 895 individuals from 1, 592 schools. Children
with missings on key demographic variables, i.e. with missing age (N =
4, 061), missing gender (N = 7, 238), and missing information on socio-
economic background (N = 6, 185) are dropped from the sample. In the
remaining sample of 74, 664 children, I observe the high-stakes standard-
ized cognitive test scores for 47, 713 children, the teacher recommendation
for 59, 981 children. The lower number of observations for the Cito-test is
not surprising as administering the test is not mandatory for schools. The
low-stakes standardized cognitive test for math and reading performance
is observed for 68, 554 and 71, 011 children respectively.
This paper focuses on the variables that determine track allocation in
secondary school. For the estimation sample I drop children for whom
either the track recommendation, the Cito-score, or the low-stakes stan-
dardized test scores for math and reading are missing (N = 32, 286). This
high number is mainly caused by a high number of missing for the Cito-
score (N = 26, 951). An overview of the differences between the full sample
and the estimation sample is documented in Table 4.A2. Children in the es-
timation sample have higher test scores, but are very similar in background
characteristics as compared to the full sample.
Descriptive statistics for estimation sample by treatment assignment
are shown in Table 4.5. Children in the treatment group have significantly
lower test-scores as compared to those in the control group, and they are
significantly less likely to have a track recommendation above T6. Children
in the treatment group are also significantly older, which suggests that
grade retention is more prevalent in this group. Children in the treatment
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group are significantly more disadvantaged and the share of children that
has at least one parent with higher education is significantly lower.
4.4.1 Track assignment variables pre- and post-reform
The reform changed the lowest track, and if last place aversion plays a
role in this educational context, the expectation is that the variables that
determine track allocation in secondary school are affected by the reform.
The distribution of track recommendations before and after the reform
is shown in Figure 4.3 (the classification of track recommendations refers
to Table 4.3). The lowest track recommendation that would avoid the
lowest track is T6 (the combination advice to the vocational track and the
general track). The figures show that there is a shift in the type of track
recommendations children receive (note that the figure does not control for
the underlying ability of children).16
More children receive a T5 track recommendation, and less children
receive track recommendations T2 and T4. It is not the case that more
children get a T6 recommendation, and hence receive a track recommen-
dation that would allow them to just escape the lowest track. Another
change occurs in T1, which is the track recommendation for children in
special education. The amount of children receiving a recommendation in
this category almost doubled, which can be explained by a policy reform
implemented in 1998 that integrated children with learning- and behavioral
difficulties into the vocational track.
The distribution of the high-stakes standardized Cito-test before and
after the reform is shown in Figure 4.4. The pre-reform distribution looks
16The Kolgomorov-Smirnov test rejects the null hypothesis of equality of the track
recommendation distributions before and after the reform (at the 1% level).
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rather smooth, whereas the post-reform distribution shows some irregulari-
ties.17 Note that these irregularities cannot be explained by a manipulation
of test-scores by teachers, as test sores are centrally determined by the Cen-
traal Instituut voor Toetsontwikkeling (CITO) after the test is sent in by
the teacher. Three main irregularities are visible in the figure. The first
is visible after a score of 524, which is the score necessary for qualifying
for a vocational lower track recommendation (vmbo-kb).18 The second is
visible after a score of 529, which is the score corresponding to a vocational
general track recommendation (vmbo-tl). Finally, a bump is visible after
a score of 537 which is the score corresponding to a general track recom-
mendation (havo). This suggests that there may have been investments
in extra tutoring to get the child the score that matches with the desired
track.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 OLS estimates
Table 4.6 shows the results from OLS models regressing the outcome vari-
able on a dummy representing the introduction of the reform. The dummy
is insignificant in the specification without controls for both outcome vari-
ables (column 1). Column 2 adds controls for the child’s background char-
acteristics (i.e. age, gender, and an indicator for being disadvantaged), after
which the reform-dummy becomes significant for both outcome variables.
Conditional on demographic characteristics, children have a 2.9 percentage
17The Kolgomorov-Smirnov test does not reject the null of equality of Cito-score
distributions.
18The thresholds connecting the Cito-score to the track types are shown in Table 4.A1.
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point lower probability of attending a track above the lowest track, and
children have a lower Cito-score by 7% of a standard deviation after the
reform.
However, when adding controls for the ability of the child, i.e. their
performance on the low-stakes standardized test, the sign of the coefficients
changes. Conditional on background characteristics and ability, children
have a 1.2 percentage points higher chance of attending a track above the
lowest track after the reform, and a higher Cito-score by 3.5% of a standard
deviation. It could be that wave-specific effects, e.g. different schools
included in the sample, are driving the effects found in a simple before-
after comparison. I employ a difference-in-difference strategy to control for
these wave-specific factors.
4.5.2 Difference-in-difference estimates
The difference-in-difference approach compares children who took the test
before the reform with those who took the test after the reform, and uses
the fact that some children are more likely to be affected by the reform (i.e.
the treatment group).
The results of this approach for track recommendation as the relevant
outcome are shown in Table 4.7. The outcome variable is a dummy rep-
resenting that the track recommendation is equal or higher than T6. The
child would be able to just avoid the lowest track with this track recommen-
dation. Column 1 and 2 use the treatment definition based on the PRIMA
reading score, whereas column 3 and 4 use the treatment definition based on
the math PRIMA score. The coefficient of interest (Treatment ∗Reform)
is very similar in the specification with and without controls. Children who
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are likely to attend the lowest track based on their reading score have a 1.9
percentage points lower probability of receiving a track recommendation
above the lowest track after the reform. The effect is more negative in the
treatment specification based on the math score: children who are likely
to attend the lowest track have a 6.5 percentage points lower probability
of receiving a track recommendation above the lowest track. This effect is
large compared to a mean of 44.5%.
Table 4.8 shows the results with the high-stakes cognitive Cito-score is
the relevant outcome variable. The coefficient of interest is insignificant
when treatment assignment is based on the reading score. When treat-
ment is based on the math score, children in the treatment group have a
significantly lower cognitive test-score after the reform (5% of a standard
deviation). This result is consistent with the finding for the track recom-
mendation. The Cito-score matters for the teacher’s track recommenda-
tion, and hence track recommendations could be lower if test-scores are
lower. I examine the robustness of these results and possible mechanisms
that can explain these results in the following sections.
4.5.3 Robustness checks
The difference-in-difference estimates show that children who are likely to
attend to lowest track have lower test scores after the reform, and are
less likely to have a track recommendation above the lowest track. This
section discusses robustness checks with respect to the chosen identification
strategy.
First, I check the robustness of the results to the chosen treatment
group. The treatment group is defined based on the median pre-reform
4.5. RESULTS 195
PRIMA-score of the distribution that corresponds to a track recommen-
dation above the lowest track. Table 4.9 shows the robustness of this
definition to the mean score, the 25th, and 75th percentile scores. The
point-estimates are very similar as compared to the baseline specification.
I also perform a robustness check in which I use the baseline specification
of the treatment group, but leave out children with PRIMA-scores between
the 25th and 75th percentile. Children who are on the border between be-
ing less or more likely to attend the lowest track are dropped, and this thus
creates a more clean treatment and control group. This practice yields sim-
ilar results, and if anything the point-estimates are larger (more negative
for both outcome variables).
Second, as the composition of schools changes over the survey waves
that are included, I restrict my sample to schools that are present in all
six waves. Table 4.9 shows that the results based on the reading treatment
group are very similar. Those for the math treatment group increase in
magnitude. To illustrate, children in the treatment group have a 11.9
percentage points lower probability of receiving a track recommendation
above the lowest track, and they have a lower test score by 8.5% of a
standard deviation. Point estimates are very similar after adding school
fixed effects as well.
Third, I perform a robustness check in which I leave out children who
received a track recommendation for a special or special+ track. Another
reform was implemented in the year prior to the reform that integrated
these students in regular classes. Leaving out these students yields fairly
similar results. Thus, the results are not sensitive to the inclusion of these
special care students.
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Finally I also execute a placebo check in which I impose that the intro-
duction of the reform occurred between survey waves two and three, instead
of the actual introduction between survey wave three and four. The result-
s in Table 4.9 show that the coefficient of interest is significantly different
from zero for the Cito-score and for the track recommendation (when treat-
ment is based on the math score). Hence, there are also responses for those
most likely to attend the lowest track a survey wave prior to the reform.
This could have to do with another reform was introduced in the academic
year of 1998 which changed the curriculum of the highest academic tracks.
The perceived ease of transitioning from the lowest educational track to
these higher tracks could have been affected by this reform, which may
explain the significant point-estimates for this placebo check.
4.6 Mechanisms at work
Children who are likely to attend the lowest track (treatment group) are
less likely to avoid the lowest track, and have lower test-scores after the
reform. This section explores several explanations for this finding.
First, it is interesting to see what happens to the child’s track recom-
mendations, given that children in the treatment group are less likely to
receive a track recommendation of T6 or higher. I estimate the difference-
in-difference models for dummy outcome variables that indicate that a child
received a track recommendation equal or above T3, T4, T5, T7, and T8.
Table 4.10 shows that children who are expected to attend the lowest track
are more likely to receive a T5 or higher track recommendation after the
reform, hence it seems that the reform does not lead to increased track
4.6. MECHANISMS AT WORK 197
recommendations above the lowest track, but rather to more recommenda-
tions for the highest sub-track of the new lowest track.
Second, I examine whether lower test scores can explain the lower track
recommendations. If last place aversion causes parents and children to
exert extra effort in order to avoid the lowest track, they have a couple
of possibilities at their disposal. One way to avoid the lowest track is by
performing very well on the high-stakes standardized cognitive test. In-
vestments in homework assistance, or higher test motivation, could lead
to higher scores. Parents can also influence the track recommendation by
putting pressure on the primary school teacher in order for them to give
a higher recommendation. It is very hard to separate the two channels
with the available data. I add a control for the high-stakes standardized
test-score to the model with the track recommendation as outcome vari-
able. The coefficient of interest is hypothesized to be no longer significant
with the inclusion of this control if only the high-stakes test score matters
for the track recommendation. Table 4.11 shows that the point estimates
are still negative and significant when the Cito-score is added as an extra
control. This suggests that teachers give a lower track recommendation
even conditional on the child’s performance on the high-stakes test.
Third, I examine heterogeneity by subject matter. The Cito-score is an
aggregate score, and it measures performance in reading, math, and infor-
mation processing. The treatment groups are defined based on math and
reading performance on a low-stakes cognitive standardized, and hence it
is interesting to see whether and how the results change when a distinction
is made between math and reading performance in the outcome variable.
This is particularly interesting as Table 4.11 shows that the point-estimates
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are somewhat different when estimating the models for a sample of girl-
s and boys. For example, the effects for girls on both outcome variables
are stronger when treatment is determined by the math score. This could
potentially be explained by gender differences in educational performance
(e.g Fryer and Levitt, 2010).
The Cito-scores for math and reading performance are not available in
all survey waves, which explains the lower number of observations. Scores
are standardized by wave with mean zero and standard deviation of one.
Table 4.12 shows the results of estimating the models for these new outcome
variables. The first row pools the sample of boys and girls and shows that
the point-estimate for reading is only negative and significant for those who
are in the treatment group based on their reading score. Similarly the point
estimate for math is only significantly negative for those who are in the
treatment group based on their math score. When separating by gender,
it is interesting to see that the negative effect on reading performance
(based on the reading treatment) is primarily driven by boys. Whereas
the negative effect on math performance (based on the math treatment)
is stronger for girls. The child’s weakest subject may be the one where
pressure to perform well is higher. Hence, these results suggest that children
do particularly worse after the reform in their weakest subject, the one
where the pressure to perform well is hypothesized to be higher.
Finally, last place aversion could be stronger among children born in
families with highly educated parents. Higher educated parents have a
higher valuation of education (Hastings et al., 2005; Burgess et al., 2015),
and may be more aware of differences in educational quality (Sacerdote
et al., 2011; Borghans et al., 2015). Kloosterman and de Graaf (2010) show
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that in the Netherlands, higher educated parents prefer grade retention for
their child instead of moving one track down. I examine heterogeneity by
parental education level. I define parents to be highly educated if at least
one of the two attended either higher vocational or university education.19
Table 4.11 shows that the point-estimates are more negative for children
with higher-educated parents. This is suggestive evidence for the fact that
children are more negatively affected by the reform if the pressure to per-
form well is higher.
4.7 Conclusion
Last place aversion describes a situation in which individuals dislike being
in last place. This paper studies how last place aversion affects the child’s
educational outcomes, and specifically outcomes that are important for
ability tracking in secondary education. I exploit a Dutch educational
reform that merged the two lowest tracks in secondary education. Hereby a
track that was previously not the lowest track, suddenly became the lowest
track. I combine the timing of the reform with the fact that only children
who are expected to attend the lowest track are affected by the reform.
The children who are expected to attend the lowest track are identified by
their performance on a standardized cognitive test that is unimportant for
track allocation. The outcomes of interest are the variables that determine
track allocation in secondary school: the child’s performance on a high-
stakes standardized cognitive test, and the child’s track recommendation
provided by the primary school teacher.
19Note that the number of observations is lower as information on parental education
is not available for all children.
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I find that children who are expected to attend the lowest track are
less likely to receive a track recommendation above the lowest track, and
perform worse on the high-stakes standardized test. The lower track re-
commendations cannot fully be explained by lower test performance. If this
reform represents a good setting to study last place aversion, these find-
ings suggest that last place aversion leads to lower educational outcomes.
Furthermore, the effects are concentrated among the child’s weakest sub-
ject matter, which may be the subject for which the pressure to perform
well is higher. I also find that the effects are stronger in higher-educated
families: families where last place aversion is hypothesized to be stronger.
This suggests that last place aversion leads to worse performance, as the
pressure to perform well is higher.
There are a few limitations of this paper. Unfortunately the data on-
ly contains information on the variables that determine track allocation
but not on actual track allocation in secondary school. Also, I cannot ob-
serve outcomes during secondary school (e.g. track switching) or outcomes
after secondary school (e.g. wages). Moreover, I can only provide sugges-
tive evidence that the effects are stronger when the pressure to perform is
higher. With the current data it is impossible to observe parental invest-
ment/pressure, and particularly leading up to the examinations in the final
year of primary education. Future research should address how last place
aversion shapes parental investments, how it affects actual track allocation
in secondary school, and outcomes later in life.
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Table 4.1: Pre- and Post-reform Dutch secondary school tracks
Pre-reform Post-reform
(1) (2)
Academic track VWO VWO
General track HAVO HAVO
Vocational track MAVO VMBO Theoretical (vmbo-tl)
Mixed (vmbo-gl)
LBO Middle (vmbo-kbl)
Basic (vmbo-bbl)
Special needs education
Special track Special (IVBO) Special (vmbo-lwo)
Special+ (VSO) Special+ (vmbo-pro)
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Table 4.2: Track recommendation outcomes, pre- and post-reform
Pre-reform Post-reform
Academic vwo Academic vwo
General/academic havo/vwo General/academic havo/vwo
General havo General havo
General/general vocational mavo/havo Vocational theor./general vmbo-tl/havo
General vocational mavo Vocational theoretical vmbo-tl
Lower/general vocational vbo/mavo Vocational mixed/theoretical vmbo-gl/tl
Lower vocational vbo Vocational mixed vmbo-gl
Vocational special ivbo/vbo Vocational middle/mixed vmbo-kbl/gl
Vocational special ivbo Vocational middle vmbo-kbl
Vocational special+/special vso/ivbo Vocational basic/middle vmbo-bbl/kbl
Vocational special+ vso Vocational basic vmbo-bbl
Vocational special/basic vmbo-lwo/bbl
Vocational special vmbo-lwo
Vocational special/special+ vmbo-pro/lwo
Vocational special+ vmbo-pro
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Table 4.3: Track recommendation, pre- and post-reform mapping
Pre-reform Post-reform
T9 Academic vwo vwo
T8 Academic/general havo/vwo havo/vwo
T7 General havo havo
T6 Vocational general/general mavo/havo vmbo-gl/-tl/havo
T5 Vocational general mavo vmbo-gl/tl
T4 Vocational lower/general vbo/mavo vmbo-bbl/kbl/gl/tl
T3 Vocational lower vbo vmbo-bbl/kbl
T2 Vocational special ivbo/vbo vmbo-lwo/bbl/kbl
T1 Vocational special/special+ vso/ivbo vmbo-pro/lwo
Notes: Classification based on Timmermans et al. (2013).
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Table 4.4: Treatment and control group classification
Track PRIMA Reading PRIMA Math
Mean Median N Mean Median N
T9 1.291 1.252 1,914 1.341 1.278 1,886
T8 0.872 0.791 2,906 0.898 0.862 2,873
T7 0.545 0.496 3,455 0.600 0.546 3,402
T6 0.222 0.165 3,445 0.243 0.234 3,413
T5 -0.061 -0.058 5,028 -0.064 -0.086 4,977
T4 -0.320 -0.329 2,878 -0.376 -0.402 2,846
T3 -0.596 -0.594 5,619 -0.665 -0.691 5,502
T2 -0.966 -0.961 411 -1.137 -0.139 389
T1 -1.107 -1.137 1,100 -1.291 -1.334 995
Notes: The full sample pre-reform scores are reported.
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Table 4.5: Descriptive statistics: treatment versus control
Reading based Math based
Treatment Control Treatment Control
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1)-(2) (3)-(4)
N=23,381 N=18,997 N=23,755 N=18,623
Track ≥ T6 (0/1) 0.225 0.715 0.187 0.773 *** ***
(0.418) (0.452) (0.390) (0.419)
Cito test-score -0.450 0.687 -0.512 0.789 *** ***
(0.870) (0.690) (0.824) (0.591)
PRIMA reading score -0.617 0.933 -0.316 0.580 *** ***
(0.549) (0.699) (0.832) (0.946)
PRIMA math score -0.323 0.566 -0.605 0.943 *** ***
(0.871) (0.888) (0.626) (0.597)
Age (average) 12.183 11.967 12.176 11.971 *** ***
Female (0/1) 0.498 0.500 0.553 0.431 ***
Disadvantaged (0/1) 0.638 0.330 0.607 0.363 *** ***
One parent higher 0.077 0.211 0.081 0.209 *** ***
educated (0/1)
Notes: Standard deviations in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Based on the
estimation sample.
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Table 4.6: OLS estimates
I(T≥T6)
(1) (2) (3)
Introduction vmbo -0.003 -0.029∗∗∗ 0.012∗
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
Demographic controls N Y Y
Ability controls N N Y
R2 0.000 0.133 0.450
N 42,378 42,378 42,378
Cito-score
(1) (2) (3)
Introduction vmbo -0.009 -0.070∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.018) (0.011)
Demographic controls N Y Y
Ability controls N N Y
R2 0.000 0.184 0.726
N 42,378 42,378 42,378
Notes: Estimated by OLS, estimation sample. I(T ≥ T6) repre-
sents a dummy variable which is equal to one when the child
received a track recommendation greater or equal than the
combination advice of the vocational general and the general
track (T6). Demographic controls include gender, age (lin-
ear and quadratic) and an indicator for being disadvantaged.
The ability controls include the low-stakes PRIMA test-score
for math and reading. Standard errors are within brackets
and are clustered at the school level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.7: Difference-in-difference results: track recommendation
I(T≥T6)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reform -0.003 0.023∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Treatment -0.406∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗ -0.502∗∗∗ -0.217∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011)
Treatment*Reform -0.014 -0.019∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Demographic controls Y Y Y Y
Ability controls N Y N Y
Treatment Reading Reading Math Math
Mean dep. var. 0.445 0.445 0.445 0.445
R2 0.284 0.458 0.390 0.476
N 42,378 42,378 42,378 42,378
Notes: Estimated by OLS, estimation sample. I(T ≥ T6) represents a dummy
variable which is equal to one when the child received a track recommenda-
tion greater or equal than the combination advice of the vocational general
and the general track (T6). Demographic controls include gender, age (lin-
ear and quadratic) and an indicator for being disadvantaged. The ability
controls include the low-stakes PRIMA test-score for math and reading. S-
tandard errors are within brackets and are clustered at the school level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.8: Difference-in-Difference: Cito-score
Cito-score (std)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reform -0.044∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗ -0.026∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011)
Treatment -0.982∗∗∗ -0.150∗∗∗ -1.158∗∗∗ -0.154∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.012) (0.015) (0.026)
Treatment*Reform 0.032∗ 0.017 -0.021 -0.050∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.013) (0.019) (0.016)
Demographic controls Y Y Y Y
Ability controls N Y N Y
Treatment Reading Reading Math Math
Mean dep. var. 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060
R2 0.397 0.728 0.503 0.729
N 42,378 42,378 42,378 42,378
Notes: Estimated by OLS, estimation sample. Demographic controls include
gender, age (linear and quadratic) and an indicator for being disadvantaged.
The ability controls include the low-stakes PRIMA test-score for math and
reading. Standard errors are within brackets and are clustered at the school
level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.9: Robustness results
I(T≥T6) Cito-score (std)
Reading Math Reading Math
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline -0.019** -0.065*** 0.017 -0.050***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.013) (0.016)
N 42,378 42,378 42,378 42,378
Treatment - mean -0.019** -0.065*** 0.015 -0.058***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.016)
N 42,378 42,378 42,378 42,378
Treatment - 25th perc. -0.017* -0.055*** 0.037*** -0.032*
(0.009) (0.010) (0.014) (0.018)
N 42,378 42,378 42,378 42,378
Treatment - 75th perc. -0.001 -0.061*** 0.027** -0.086***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.016)
N 42,378 42,378 42,378 42,378
Treatment - excl. 25-75th perc. -0.010 -0.077*** 0.044*** -0.075***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.020)
N 27,193 27,696 27,193 27,696
Schools all waves -0.020 -0.119*** 0.033 -0.085***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.029) (0.029)
N 9,066 9,066 9,066 9,066
Schools all waves (fixed effects) -0.010 -0.104*** 0.033 -0.091***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.027) (0.028)
N 9,066 9,066 9,066 9,066
Without special(+) -0.025*** -0.071*** 0.036*** -0.029*
(0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.016)
N 39,482 39,482 39,482 39,482
Placebo (reform at T=2) -0.005 -0.090*** 0.061*** -0.078***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.015) (0.017)
N 42,378 42,378 42,378 42,378
Notes: Double-difference estimate Treatment ∗ Reform is reported, full control specifi-
cation.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.10: Other track recommendations
Reading Math
(1) (2)
Outcome: I(T≥T3) -0.041*** -0.049***
(0.006) (0.006)
N 42,378 42,378
Outcome: I(T≥T4) -0.036*** -0.063***
(0.009) (0.010)
N 42,378 42,378
Outcome: I(T≥T5) 0.033*** 0.026***
(0.008) (0.010)
N 42,378 42,378
Outcome: I(T≥T6) -0.019** -0.065***
(0.008) (0.009)
N 42,378 42,378
Outcome: I(T≥T7) -0.032*** -0.080***
(0.009) (0.010)
N 42,378 42,378
Outcome: I(T≥T8) -0.038*** -0.062***
(0.010) (0.011)
N 42,378 42,378
Notes: Double-difference estimate Treatment ∗
Reform is reported, full control specification.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.11: Mechanisms at work
I(T≥T6) Cito-score (std)
Reading Math Reading Math
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline -0.019** -0.065*** 0.017 -0.050***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.013) (0.016)
N 42,378 42,378 42,378 42,378
+Cito control -0.025*** -0.051***
(0.008) (0.008)
N 42,378 42,378
Boys -0.018 -0.052*** -0.000 -0.047**
(0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.020)
N 21,218 21,218 21,218 21,218
Girls -0.020* -0.083*** 0.037** -0.058***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.018)
N 21,160 21,160 21,160 21,160
Lower-educated -0.016* -0.060*** 0.016 -0.061***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.016)
N 33,858 33,858 33,858 33,858
Higher-educated -0.021 -0.083*** -0.029 -0.080**
(0.025) (0.027) (0.033) (0.038)
N 5,373 5,373 5,373 5,373
Notes: Double-difference estimate Treatment∗Reform is reported, full
control specification.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.12: Mechanisms at work
Cito-Reading (std) Cito-Math (std)
Reading Math Reading Math
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Boys and girls -0.038** 0.016 0.031* -0.054***
(0.019) (0.020) (0.017) (0.020)
N 35,545 35,545 35,538 35,538
Boys -0.067*** 0.034 0.019 -0.050**
(0.025) (0.026) (0.021) (0.025)
N 17,889 17,889 17,873 17,873
Girls -0.006 0.008 0.043** -0.057***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.020) (0.021)
N 17,656 17,656 17,665 17,665
Notes: Double-difference estimate Treatment ∗Reform is report-
ed, full control specification.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figures
(a) PRIMA Reading
(b) PRIMA Math
Figure 4.1: Kernel densities before and after the reform, full sample.
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(a) Track ≥ T6 (0/1) (b) Track ≥ T6 (0/1)
(c) Cito-score (std) (d) Cito-score (std)
Figure 4.2: Common trend in outcomes, estimation sample.
Figures 215
(a) Pre-reform
(b) Post-reform
Figure 4.3: Track recommendation, pre- and post-reform, estimation sam-
ple.
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Figure 4.4: Kernel density of Cito-scores pre- and post-reform
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Table 4.A1: Cito-score and corresponding school tracks.
Score range Track
501-523 vmbo-bb
524-528 vmbo-kb
529-536 vmbo-gl/vmbo-tl
537-544 havo
545-550 vwo
1 Classification by Van Boxtel
et al. (2011).
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Table 4.A2: Sample selection overview
Full sample Estimation sample
(1) (2)
Pupils Schools Pupils Schools
1994-1995 11,743 651 6,120 379
1996-1997 10,512 603 5,930 379
1998-1999 12,126 592 6,507 378
2000-2001 13,276 588 7,776 422
2002-2003 13,607 589 8,194 420
2004-2005 13,400 587 7,851 406
N 74,664 1,475 42,378 1,061
Cito test-score 0.016 0.060
(0.997) (0.975)
Participation (%) 0.64 1.00
PRIMA math score 0.011 0.076
(0.996) (0.983)
PRIMA reading score 0.013 0.078
(0.100) (0.989)
Track recommendation N % N %
T1 4,286 5.74 2,494 5.89
T2 578 0.77 402 0.95
T3 12,280 16.45 8,492 20.04
T4 3,425 4.59 2,354 5.55
T5 13,612 18.23 9,792 23.11
T6 6,323 8.47 4,490 10.60
T7 8,165 10.94 5,864 13.84
T8 6,106 8.18 4,608 10.87
T9 5,206 6.97 3,882 9.16
Missing 14,683 19.67 0 0.00
Age (average) 12.10 12.09
Gender (% girl) 50.2 49.9
One parent higher educated (0/1) 0.136 0.137
Subsidy factor (%)
1.00 49.48 49.99
1.25 26.02 27.05
1.40 0.27 0.28
1.75 0.37 0.37
1.90 23.85 22.31
Notes: Standard deviations in brackets. The number of observations is lower for the
parental education variable, N= 67, 745 for the full sample and N = 39, 231 for
the estimation sample.
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(a) PRIMA Reading
(b) PRIMA Math
Figure 4.A1: Kernel densities by survey wave, full sample.

Nederlandse samenvatting
(Summary in Dutch)
In dit proefschrift onderzoek ik hoe omstandigheden in de kinderjaren de
vorming van menselijk kapitaal be¨ınvloeden. Het proefschrift bevat drie
hoofdstukken die elk een van de factoren bestuderen die van invloed kunnen
zijn op menselijk kapitaal. De focus van dit proefschrift ligt op de rol van
de familie - van voor de conceptie van het kind tot lang na de geboorte.
Hoofdstuk twee analyseert hoe betere sociaaleconomische omstandig-
heden ouderlijke selectie be¨ınvloeden (welke ouders een kind krijgen), en
uiteindelijk hoe dit doorwerkt in de arbeidsmarkt- en gezondheidsuitkom-
sten van het kind. Ik gebruik hiervoor regionale variatie die voortkomt
uit het einde van de Tweede Wereldoorlog in Nederland. In dit hoofdstuk
vind ik geen bewijs dat betere sociaaleconomische omstandigheden leiden
tot ouderlijke selectie. Verder vind ik voor een groep ongeplande concep-
ties, die zijn voortgekomen uit de betere sociaaleconomische omstandig-
heden, dat opgroeien in een minder stabiele familie niet leidt tot slechtere
arbeidsmarkt- of gezondheidsuitkomsten. Het einde van de Tweede Wereld-
oorlog had een grote impact op de levensomstandigheden en het is daarom
verrassend dat dit hoofdstuk geen bewijs vindt voor ouderlijke selectie.
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Hoofdstuk drie bestudeert of biologie, en specifiek prenataal testosteron,
genderverschillen in educatie kan verklaren. We gebruiken hiervoor exogene
variatie in prenataal testosteron dat voortkomt uit een natuurlijk experi-
ment in tweelingen. Prenataal testosteron verplaatst zich in de baarmoe-
der tussen de mannelijke helft van een tweeling en zijn tweelingbroer of
-zus. We houden rekening met de potentie¨le socialisatie effecten van het
opgroeien met een broer of zus door een controlegroep te gebruiken van
broertjes en zusjes die maximaal twaalf maanden van elkaar geboren zijn.
We vinden dat meisjes met een tweelingbroer, na het controleren voor so-
cialisatie effecten, ongeveer 7% van een standaarddeviatie lager scoren op
wiskunde; we vinden geen effect op taal. Dit effect is geconcentreerd onder
kinderen die opgroeien in traditionele gezinnen en gebieden. We vermoe-
den dat conformeren aan de sociale norm een belangrijke rol speelt. Dit
betekent dat onze resultaten niet alleen gedreven worden door biologie,
maar zich uitten afhankelijk van omgevingsfactoren.
Hoofdstuk 4 bestudeert hoe een aversie tegen de laatste plek schooluit-
komsten vormt, en specifiek uitkomsten die belangrijk zijn voor het niveau
van het schooltraject op de middelbare school. Dit hoofdstuk analyseert een
Nederlandse hervorming die de laagste twee niveaus heeft samengevoegd.
Dat betekent dat kinderen die eerst in aanmerking kwamen voor het op
e´e´n-na-laagste niveau, nu in aanmerking komen voor het laagste niveau.
Voor de identificatie gebruik ik dat de hervorming alleen een effect heeft op
de kinderen van wie verwacht wordt dat ze naar het laagste niveau gaan.
De uitkomstvariabelen zijn het schooladvies van de basisschoolleraar, en de
test-score op een belangrijke gestandaardiseerde toets. Mijn bevindingen
laten zien dat kinderen van wie verwacht wordt dat ze naar het laagste
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niveau gaan een lagere kans hebben om een schooladvies te krijgen boven
het laagste niveau, ook scoren ze lager op de gestandaardiseerde toets. De
effecten zijn het sterkst voor het zwakste vak van een kind (wiskunde of
taal), en in families waar de aversie tegen het laagste niveau vermoede-
lijk groter is. Een aversie tegen de laatste plek kan zorgen voor slechtere
prestaties door een hogere druk om te presteren.
Dit proefschrift bestudeert hoe drie verschillende omstandigheden in de
kinderjaren de vorming van menselijk kapitaal be¨ınvloeden. Het laat zien
dat betere sociaaleconomische omstandigheden die zijn voortgekomen uit
het einde van de Tweede Wereldoorlog in Nederland niet leiden tot ouder-
lijke selectie, dat een hogere blootstelling aan prenataal testosteron leidt
tot lagere wiskunde scores voor meisjes, en dat aversie tegen de laatste plek
kan zorgen voor lagere onderwijsuitkomsten. Het spectrum van omstandig-
heden in de kinderjaren dat invloed kan hebben op de vorming van mense-
lijk kapitaal is groot, en de drie factoren die onderzocht worden in dit
proefschrift vertegenwoordigen slechts een klein deel van de puzzel van hoe
iemands familie invloed heeft op iemands levenslot. Echter, een puzzel kan
alleen worden opgelost met alle puzzelstukjes in de doos. Dit proefschrift
brengt ons een stap dichter bij het begrijpen van welke omstandigheden in
de jonge jaren belangrijk zijn voor de vorming van het menselijk kapitaal.
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